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Informed by liberal political philosophy, aesthetic critics such as Walter Pater, 
Vernon Lee, and Oscar Wilde urged people to engage with art, arguing that because 
each individual had an unerring innate capacity to make aesthetic judgments, no one 
needed experts to validate their critical claims. However, when the emergent middle-
classes began to judge art, they unexpectedly employed standards that the aesthetes 
deplored. In response, the aesthetes seemed to abandon their liberalism, gladly 
becoming authoritarian teachers whose textbooks sought to convert the vulgar to 
specific critical methods and tastes. This dissertation argues that the aesthetes actually 
regretted their prescriptive roles, and that their texts are structured by their 
ambivalence about teaching specific ways of reading texts. Even as aestheticist 
handbooks impart principles, they imagine scenes wherein tutors and textbooks would 
become unnecessary because the intended student has a repressed knowledge of 
aesthetic criticism. These forgotten tenets emerge into consciousness when the 
aspirant connoisseur has a deeply affecting erotic encounter with an uncannily animate 
art object. Through these queer fantasies, the aesthetes preserve the liberal ideal of 
individuals who judges solely through their own authorization. Reading Pater’s The 
Renaissance, Plato and Platonism, and Gaston de Latour, I reveal his fear that modern 
educators can only withhold the love that succors students or desire them with an 
excessive ardor that threatens their autonomy by destroying the borders between 
subjects. Pater suggests would-be aesthetes should avoid dangerous professors by 
 seeking art’s love. I then argue that in Lee’s Belcaro, professional aestheticians are 
cast as prudish protectionists who teach abstract aesthetic theories in order to distract 
their audiences from the erotic immediacy of art’s materiality. Lee appropriates the 
Gothic novel’s plots of religious conversion in order to imagine a teacherless 
education in which statues at the Vatican Museum seduce a child and implant 
formalist aestheticist doctrines into its mind. Finally, I look to Wilde’s “The Critic as 
Artist,” “The Portrait of Mr. W. H.” and The Picture of Dorian Gray to examine 
Wilde’s fancy that artworks enable critics to gain access to aestheticist knowledge 
they have biologically inherited. 
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 8 
INTRODUCTION 
Aestheticism and the Erotics of Pedagogy 
 
 In Walter Pater’s novel Marius the Epicurean, the eponymous protagonist 
desires an education “directed especially to the expansion and refinement of the 
powers of reception; of those powers above all, which are immediately relative to 
fleeting phenomena, the powers of emotion and sense” (140). This education concerns 
the “things which affect us pleasurably through sensation, art...including all the finer 
sorts of literature” and “comprehends all those matters over which the Muses of Greek 
mythology preside” (140).  The aim of this training is to “conduct one to an exquisite 
appreciation of all the finer traits of nature and of man” (140). This, as Pater states, is 
an aesthetic education, conducted according to the tenets of aestheticism.1  In Marius, 
Pater imagines that “the right education of oneself, or of another” is possible (140). 
“Aestheticism and the Erotics of Pedagogy” examines the conditions under which 
aestheticist texts pose the “right education of oneself” as a defensive alternative from 
the interpersonal processes of education. The etymology of the word “educate” is 
related to educere, to lead out. We might think of self-education as a leading out of 
knowledge or skills that lie latent within the individual. Defining teachers as those 
who instill knowledge, pedagogical aestheticist texts can declare them unnecessary. In 
the project, I analyze narratives of pedagogical intercourse that appear in texts by the 
aesthetes Pater, Vernon Lee and Oscar Wilde. Each text specifies the dangers of 
                                                 
1
 When I use the term “aestheticism” in this study, I am primarily interested in aestheticism as a set of 
theories about the perception of art.  The word “aesthetic” derives from the Greek aisthanesthai, “to 
perceive.” When we first think of aestheticism, we are likely to think of slogans like “art for art’s sake” 
or “style is more important than substance.” But these are catchphrases that can only be understood in 
the context of what the aesthetes thought art could do for the senses of those who were engaging with it. 
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educational transmissions or relationships and ponders ways in which art objects can 
make pedagogical exchange superfluous. 
In The Vulgarization of Art: The Victorians and Aesthetic Democracy, Linda 
Dowling contextualizes British aestheticism within the aesthetic and political theory of 
the Earl of Shaftesbury. When Shaftesbury sought a transcendental foundation for the 
right of the liberal polity to set aside absolutist monarchical authority and govern 
itself, he argued that the people had an innate moral sense to guide their self-rule; they 
knew right from wrong in the same way that they immediately knew the beautiful 
from the ugly. At a stroke, Shaftesbury universalized the capacity to make legitimate 
aesthetic judgments, and associated the aesthetic realm with the individual’s 
autonomy. His idea of the sensus communis, passing through Kant, gave the aesthetic 
critics great optimism. They saw all around them a world full of natural and man-made 
objects that could afford everyone great sensuous pleasure, if only people would pay 
greater attention to them. Aestheticism sought to orient people towards art, then, to 
extol its virtues and to promote disciplined observation, so that people could learn how 
to discern art more carefully, more intensely, thus maximizing the pleasure they could 
derive from art objects.  
As the nineteenth century progressed in Britain, the evangelical middle-classes 
made their morality the normative standard for all society, and as they did so, the 
pleasures of the senses came under attack. In order to free “himself and his 
contemporaries from the brutal constraints of the Victorian cults of religion and 
respectability” (Dowling 80), Walter Pater wrote Studies in the History of the 
Renaissance, the seminal text of critical British Aestheticism.2  Through this collection 
                                                 
2
 I qualify the term “British Aestheticism” in recognition that there is not a monolithic British 
Aestheticism. Realizing that a masculine, literary, decadent tradition had become the dominant 
manifestation of aestheticism in scholarly accounts, critics have recently explored marginalized 
categories such as the “Women’s World aestheticism” of female aesthetes, Arts and Crafts aestheticism, 
and the philanthropic “missionary aestheticism” based on Ruskin’s work. Our definition of aestheticism 
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of essays, he hoped to help affect a “social transformation of Victorian life through an 
enlarged and embedded sensuousness” (76). He valued the Renaissance as a time 
when people were free to find joy in art—in his review of J. A. Symonds Renaissance 
in Italy, he described the period as “an assertion of liberty …to see and feel those 
things the seeing and feeling of which generate. . .a sympathy with life everywhere” 
(Review, 196) Seeking to generate a Victorian Renaissance (or as Oscar Wilde would 
call it later, “our English Renaissance”) Pater promised his readers that the “love of art 
for its own sake” would give them a “quickened sense of life” (Renaissance 190). He 
then urged them to assert their liberty to judge art.   
What is this song or picture, this engaging personality in life or book to me? 
What effect does it really produce on me? Does it give me pleasure? How is 
my nature modified by its presence and under its influence? The answers to 
these questions are the original facts with which the aesthetic critic has to 
do…one must realise such primary data for one’s self, or not at all. (xix – xx) 
In response to the authorities and social codes that would force his readers to conform 
to the dull earnestness of the respectable and to deny the life of the senses, Pater urges 
them to seize the opportunity for sensuous pleasure and to assert an authority of their 
own: What are all these phenomena to me? What joys would I lose by giving them up? 
What impressions do I have of these art-objects? What do they mean to me? Indeed, in 
his conclusion, Pater gave a extreme solipsistic account of experience that suggested 
we could never be subject to other authorities, since their demands would never touch 
the core of our personality: “Experience, already reduced to a group of impressions, is 
ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which no real 
                                                                                                                                            
has become much more capacious and complex, although not without some categorical problems.  For 
instance, as she attempts to envision a “more inclusive British aestheticism” Diana Maltz argues that 
“anyone who works towards art as transformation of everyday life is a practical aesthete,’ an inclusive 
term that describes Ruskin as well as Wilde” (21).  Ruskin is undoubtedly an important influence on 
many who would call themselves aesthetes, but it is not a name he would claim himself, and this raises 
the question of how we should respect the rights of the figures we study to define themselves. 
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voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can only 
conjecture to be without” (187). 
In arguing that the first step of aesthetic criticism is that one should “know 
one’s own impression as it really is,” Pater seems to have made the judgment of art a 
zone of complete freedom for the critic, a private realm where all authority resided 
within the perceiver. But aestheticism has a privileged mode of reading art that 
undercuts that freedom. In 1888, Pater added “The School of Giorgione” to the third 
edition of The Renaissance and complained:  
It is the mistake of much popular criticism to regard poetry, music, and 
painting—all the various products of art—as but translations into different 
languages of one and the same fixed quantity of imaginative thought, 
supplemented by certain technical qualities of colour, in painting; of sound, in 
music; of rhythmical words in poetry. (102) 
For Pater, the problem with this type of criticism is that it makes the “sensuous 
element in art…a matter of indifference” (102). For him, “the sensuous material of 
each art brings with it a special phase or quality of beauty” and accounting for the 
pleasure afforded by the specificity of the artistic medium and artistic form is “the 
beginning of all true aesthetic criticism” (102). Since aestheticism stressed the 
importance of directly engaging the art object, it privileged formalism as its method, 
assuming that interpretive mode brought the observer into closest contemplation of 
art's sensuousness. In asserting that certain types of aesthetic judgments are correct 
and others are mistakes, Pater destroys the zone of privatized judgment he had granted 
to all spectators and places himself as an authority to be obeyed. Moreover, he 
associates aestheticism with an elite or elect; to make mistakes in reading art is the 
especial province of “popular criticism,” the vulgar criticism of the people.  
Pater and his fellow-aesthetes had assumed that their own aesthetic preferences 
and critical standards were as universal as the capacity to judge art. They had believed 
their critical task lay in orienting the people towards art, in encouraging them to take it 
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seriously. Once people had a desire for the beautiful, their natural sense of how to 
judge art would operate. This optimism appears in the work of Pater’s disciple Vernon 
Lee, who stressed in her aestheticist textbook Belcaro, “My object is not to teach 
others, but to show them how far I have taught myself, and how far they may teach 
themselves” (13). A similar positivity appears in the art-critic Ruskin’s Stones of 
Venice: 
I would have the reader discern [the universal and divine canons of loveliness] 
so quickly that, as he passes along a street, he may, by a glance of the eye, 
distinguish the noble from the noble work. He can do this, if he permit free 
play to his natural instinct; and all I have to do for him is to remove from those 
instincts the artificial restraints which prevent their action, and encourage them 
to an unaffected and unbiased choice between right and wrong. (Works 9:62) 
To the aesthetes’ dismay, when the working- and lower-middle-classes began to make 
art part of their lives, when they exercised their right to judge art as they wished, they 
had standards of taste the aesthetes deplored, not the unerring critical sense that 
Shaftesbury had associated with aesthetic democracy, or that Ruskin appeals to in the 
preceding passage. Worse, these thousands of new art-lovers were “newly endowed 
with leisure and money undreamt of by their predecessors” and were “in a position 
forcibly to impress their aesthetic preferences on the material world” (91). Focalizing 
her critical account through the aesthetes, Dowling describes the “crushing ugliness of 
late Victorian landscapes—and especially cityscapes—now hideously defaced with 
the consequences of millions of individual aesthetic choices, each the result of 
‘judging for yourself’” (90). Faced with the disappointing actions of the demos, the 
aesthetes became evermore authoritarian teachers, writing prescriptive texts that 
sought to convert the vulgar to their interpretive methods and critical assumptions. 
This explains Pater’s “School of Giorgione” essay with its lesson on aesthetic 
formalism and its swipe at popular criticism.3 It also explains “Wilde’s repeated 
                                                 
3
 Dowling’s study of The Renaissance focuses on its publication in 1873. She notes that at this time, it 
had “not yet become fully clear what the new middle-class audiences for art…might do with the 
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swerve away from his announced topics of art and beauty and towards those 
obsessively elaborated topics of the press and public” as he “repeatedly attempted to 
browbeat the public into acquiescence with his own standards of taste” (Dowling 92). 
Dowling suggests that when the aesthetic critics realized they needed to 
discipline their audiences and lay out the tenets of aesthetic criticism, they abandoned 
the notion of freedom for all in aesthetic judgment and envisioned themselves as elite, 
aristocratic authorities who could speak in defense of, and on behalf of the aesthetic 
realm itself. This tendency flowered in Oscar Wilde, who was to “rediscover and 
reassert that alien principle of aristocratic spirit silently repressed by the Whig 
aesthetic tradition as a condition of its emergence two centuries before” (94). Wilde’s 
aristocratic characters, like Lord Henry or Lord Goring, work to instruct others about 
the virtues of art from an acknowledged, indeed boasted, position of superiority. They 
believe their students can aspire to their level, but their educational efforts do not 
presuppose their students’ innate sense of aesthetic right or wrong; students must 
submit to their masters’ authority. Hence Wilde’s aristocratic spokesman Gilbert 
expresses “an idea of aristocratic soul or spirit still potentially universalizable” and 
speaks as “an apostle of the realm of art and beauty returned to ordinary existence to 
tell others of its wonders” (95). Dowling’s rhetoric here clearly separates the critic 
from his student; the former is an emissary from the transcendental world of art, 
returned briefly to address the benighted subjects of this world. 
                                                                                                                                            
abundant disposable income flowing into their pockets” (81). Associating Pater with “the early 
optimistic moments of the Victorian Renaissance of the 1870s” (81), she characterizes Wilde as Pater’s 
heir.  In her account, when Wilde assumes “the mantle of Whig aesthetic tradition in the 1890s,” he, not 
Pater, becomes the ultimate witness to the “disturbing developments” that occurred when the aesthetes’ 
vulgar audiences began to “act on the aesthetic permission that had been so democratically endowed” 
upon them (81). Dowling’s narrative of succession forgets that Pater revised and expanded The 
Renaissance until 1893. Later editions of The Renaissance are marked by Pater’s pedagogical response 
to those audiences who were not following the aesthetic program he had envisioned for them in the 
1870s, but because of her focus, Dowling does not realize this. 
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Dowling never suggests that aesthetes were concerned by their increasing 
critical earnestness and authoritarian stances. In this way, she echoes the critical 
narrative presented by Jonathan Freedman in Professions of Taste: Henry James, 
British Aestheticism, and Commodity Culture: 
But, clearly, the texts of British aestheticism similarly work as a form of 
specialized, esoteric knowledge, which is not only gathered, analyzed, and 
ordered by aesthetic professionals in any number of fields but which also 
serves to mystify the authority of those professionals. Despite the overtly 
democratizing tendencies evident in the earlier phases of aestheticism, the 
result of aestheticism’s endeavors was that the perception of the beautiful was 
no longer held to be a universal or communal experience (as it is, at least in 
theory in the aesthetics of Romanticism); rather it became one that…serves to 
define the expertise of the relevant authority, which that authority then imparts 
to an awed but appreciative public. Ruskin not only defines the importance of 
aesthetic experience, but tells the reader how to go about gathering such 
experience for himself—from this artist, this natural scene, and not from that 
one or that one. Pater can be read as performing a similar maneuver: it is not 
only that value inheres in one or another special moment of intense experience, 
but also that one can—and people did—read one’s Pater in order to learn 
which moments of experience are most intense, which focus the greatest 
amount of aesthetic energy and which are simply a waste of time. (56) 
Freedman’s account, like Dowling’s, associates aestheticism’s “overtly democratizing 
tendencies” with its earlier phases, arguing that by the time aestheticism’s doctrines 
are codified in its mature critical texts, aesthetes no longer deem “the perception of the 
beautiful” a universal possibility.4 Now, Freedman says that the “defining quality of 
British aestheticism…is the desire to embrace contradictions, indeed the desire to seek 
them out the better to play with the possibilities they afford” (6). But his progressive 
critical narrative, like Dowling’s, overlooks possible contradictions within the esoteric 
handbooks he describes by assuming that the democratizing tendencies of aestheticism 
                                                 
4
 Freedman does not explicitly refer to the codified texts of aestheticism as “mature.” However, he 
implicitly imposes a developmental narrative, for although he mentions the universalizing tendencies 
within aestheticism, tendencies that endow each individual with the authority for critical judgment, he 
describes all texts of British aestheticism as “a form of specialized esoteric knowledge…ordered by 
aesthetic professionals,” a form which serves “to mystify the authority of those professionals.” It is as if 
aestheticist texts only become true aestheticist texts when they “define the expertise” and authority of 
the aesthete. 
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are excluded from the aesthete’s more authoritarian texts and confined to their earlier, 
more optimistic texts. In Freedman’s account, without any inner conflict or sense of 
contradiction, “aesthetic professionals” who had once claimed the perception of the 
beautiful was a universal experience happily make themselves authoritative bestowers 
of aesthetic judgment. Moreover, in his description of “an awed but appreciative 
public” who eagerly read aestheticist criticism as a canonical list of wrong, right, or 
most intense aesthetic experiences, Freedman (unlike Dowling) does not state that the 
public ever resisted the aesthete’s critical authority, a resistance that may well have 
reminded the aesthetic experts of the liberal, anti-authoritarian possibilities of the 
aestheticism they expounded. Dowling and Freedman’s critical accounts seem a little 
too smooth, too calm. They provide a narrative that this dissertation complicates and 
nuances. 
“Aestheticism and the Erotics of Pedagogy” argues that although aestheticist 
texts recognize the necessity of asserting authority to achieve their pedagogical aims, 
they regret this necessity, and disavow it at the same time they insist upon it. Because 
Dowling’s brief text mostly concentrates on exposing the paradoxes within liberal 
political and aesthetic theory, it devotes only a little time to literary close-readings of 
the aesthetes' texts. Therefore, she neglects to emphasize that when aestheticist texts 
impart critical principles they do so within narratives about teacherly aesthetes: 
charismatic teachers, dangerously influential teachers, sadistic or pedantic teachers, 
teachers who make their students feel like slaves. These depictions are self-
dramatizations, figures through which the aesthetes comment on their own 
pedagogical strategies. Even as aesthetic critics prescribe certain ways of 
understanding art, even as they set themselves up as experts to be obeyed, their texts 
construct narratives in which students resist experts. More importantly, aestheticist 
handbooks imagine a world wherein education is unnecessary because novice 
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aesthetes have a repressed, innate knowledge of aesthetic criticism and need no tutors 
or textbooks to instill aestheticist tenets. Instead, the would-be aesthete has a deeply 
affecting encounter with art itself, a direct engagement with art’s sensuousness that 
brings the buried principles of criticism into consciousness. Through art’s intercession, 
the process of learning ceases to be an interpersonal process and becomes a form of 
reminiscence, what Plato would term anamnesis. By dreaming that the transmission of 
knowledge might be an unnecessary aspect of education, at the level of fantasy, the 
aesthetes preserve the liberal ideal of the individual’s authority to judge solely through 
her own authorization. 
The primary argument of “Aestheticism and the Erotics of Pedagogy” deepens 
our historical understanding of aestheticist texts by nuancing our account of how those 
texts assert their authority. Additionally, this project argues that each of the 
aestheticist texts it examines investigates queer pedagogy. In other words, these texts 
analyze how sexuality and erotic desire affect learning and teaching, and they 
especially foreground ways in which transgressive or non-normative erotic desires 
enable the transmission of aesthetic knowledge.5 To demonstrate how Pater, Lee, and 
Wilde’s texts are theorizing queer pedagogy, I examine the erotics of those scenes of 
art-inspired anamnesis, reading the desire that connoisseurs have for artworks as 
queer. 
The analysis of art and the analysis of queer eroticism have long been 
associated with each other. Classifying deviant erotic desire as unnatural and hence 
artificial, many aesthetes valorized non-normative sexualities as artistic. Such 
                                                 
5
  Queer pedagogy is fundamentally the analysis of how sexuality and erotic desire affect learning and 
teaching. Theorists build on this foundational definition to produce many competing versions of queer 
pedagogy.  Susanne Luhmann foregrounds the myriad ways the term is understood and deployed when 
she asks, “Is a queer pedagogy about and for queer students or queer teachers? Is a queer pedagogy a 
question of queer curriculum? Or, is it about teaching methods adequate for queer content? Or, about 
queer learning and teaching—and what would that mean? Moreover, is a queer pedagogy to become the 
house pedagogy of queer studies or is it about the queering of pedagogical theory?” (141) 
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aesthetes might argue that to pursue one’s homosexual or masochistic desires was to 
break free from the form in which nature had cast one and to re-fashion oneself anew 
as one might mold clay into a vase. Drawing on Platonic philosophy and the theories 
of Greek pederasty, some aesthetes also understood certain queer relationships as 
artistic matrices. For instance, although an erotic relationship between men might not 
produce children, it was an artistic institution in which one man’s beauty might inspire 
his partner to produce great art or great criticism.  
Aesthetes who viewed queer desire positively were well placed to consider 
how it could be harnessed to promote an aesthetic education. When aestheticist texts 
imagine education without interpersonal exchange, they are developing tenets of queer 
epistemology that had occurred in texts as ancient as Plato’s Phaedrus and Meno. In 
the Meno, Socrates insists that he does not instill precepts into others; instead those 
who appear to absorb knowledge from teachers are merely recollecting facts that they 
knew before they were incarnated in their present life. This reminiscence is 
anamnesis. The remembered knowledge had been transmitted to the learners’ souls, 
which had been privileged to behold the ultimate truths of the universe in the divine 
and ideal world of Forms. Those who aspire to become wise must train themselves so 
that they recall as much of the world of Forms as possible. In the Phaedrus, Plato 
suggests that certain individuals are more capable of experiencing anamnesis than 
others. The philosopher, who is both the lover of wisdom and the lover of boys, heads 
the list of those who experience reminiscence. In Plato’s erotic dialogues, non-
normative sexual desire (specifically homoerotic desire) becomes an epistemological 
key, allowing the philosopher to access the knowledge that is stored within him. 
Many of the aesthetes were also classicists, and when they read of Socrates in 
Plato’s erotic dialogues they encountered an exemplary liberal intellectual who 
renounced his pedagogical authority and proclaimed the self-sufficiency of those who 
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wished to learn. The myth of anamnesis also provided them the basis upon which to 
build their own fantasies of an eroticized, teacher-free education. Because the 
foundational Platonic texts had focused upon pederastic desire’s role in triggering 
anamnesis, and because many prominent aesthetes were apologists for male same sex 
desire, aestheticist pedagogical narratives often examine how homosexual desire can 
make people better connoisseurs of art. Yet male same sex desire was not the only, or 
even the most prominent form of eroticism that structured aestheticist pedagogy. 
Aestheticism was partially a liberal protest against how restrictive moral laws had 
proscribed certain sensuous possibilities for people. In curtailing certain types of 
aesthetic experience, these laws curtailed certain kinds of erotic experiences as well. 
In a world in which the freedom to enjoy the sight of a painting or a sunset is suspect 
because it may endear worldly things too much to the onlooker, the pleasure one takes 
in looking at or touching one’s beloved is equally underappreciated. Pater knew this, 
which is why the series of aesthetic objects he lists that may “set the spirit free for a 
moment” includes  “work of the artist’s hands, or the face of one’s friend” 
(Renaissance 189).  As the aesthetes realized that the capacity for humans to flourish 
fully as sensate beings was tied to their ability to express or fulfill their erotic 
yearnings, they began to argue for a state of erotic liberalism in which myriad kinds of 
sexual propensity would be unconstrained by moral law. Hence aestheticist critical 
texts often revolve around a period of history that is romanticized as a time of 
wantonness, a time when adulterous sex, extramarital sex, same sex-desire and 
sadomasochism occur unchecked. For example, in The Renaissance, Pater praises the 
medieval chivalric poetry of Provence because it is written by those who experience 
“the liberty of the heart” and depicts “earthly passion, with its intimacy, its freedom, 
its variety” (3). As Stefano Evangelista aptly states: 
Pater’s model of aesthetic criticism not only opens a space in which sexual 
pleasure is allied with cultural refinement, but turns perversion into what, after 
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Bourdieu, we would call cultural capital. The Renaissance became central to 
aesthetic criticism precisely because it was seen as a culture, which, like 
aestheticism itself, opened up a gap between aesthetics and ethics in which 
aesthetic critics like Pater and Symonds locate the value of the sexually 
perverse. (“Vernon Lee” 96)  
The form of sexual perversity that governs aestheticist pedagogical texts is fetishism. 
While the philosopher of the Phaedrus is able to achieve anamnesis because he is a 
lover of boys, novice aesthetes experience anamnesis because they fall in love with art 
objects. Each of the aesthetes in this study imagines that art objects can assume human 
characteristics, taking on an uncanny liveliness. In their animate states, these art 
objects become love-objects for aesthetic critics; they express, reciprocate and accept 
erotic desire in ways that humans do. This exchange of desire creates the conditions 
under which novice aesthetes discover the rules of connoisseurship. As we will see, 
both Pater and Vernon Lee imagine educational scenes that involve falling in love 
with animate statues, while Wilde considers the attractions of the living portrait.  In 
analyzing desire’s educational role, contemporary queer pedagogical theory has 
focused on how teaching can be queer. It has explored the ethics of how teachers 
frustrate, intensify and celebrate students’ queer desires. It has investigated the 
specific learning styles of queer students. However, by attending mainly to the 
interaction between teachers and students, queer pedagogy has underanalyzed how 
non-normative desire that is not interpersonal can structure education.  Fetishism is 
one such impersonal desire. My project is sympathetic to the goals of queer theory 
generally, and queer pedagogical theory specifically; my work seeks to expand the 
objects and practices queer pedagogy can claim as its rightful field of study.  
In my first chapter, I examine Pater’s notoriously reserved pedagogical 
conduct. Students and colleagues pathologized him as abnormally shy, carelessly 
indifferent to undergraduates or morbidly fixated on art rather than life. At an Oxford 
that valorized homosocial intimacy, his lessons were denounced for making 
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engagements with texts, not teachers, most important; he triangulated his charisma 
through his instructive writings and the art objects about which he taught. Arguing that 
his reserve was ethical, purposeful and motivated by love, I show how he became 
concerned that a mentor’s desire could damage a student’s inchoate aesthetic 
sensibility. Ascribing the aesthetic critic’s acuity to his amorousness, Pater’s Plato and 
Platonism praises Greek pederasty as a disciplined educational system in which the 
student could experience love with a teacher who desired him neither too much, nor 
too little. In The Renaissance and Gaston de Latour, Pater argues that modern 
educators have abandoned Greek regulative codes of conduct. They either withhold 
the love that succors students, or threaten students’ autonomy with an excessive desire 
that destroys intersubjective boundaries. Among Pater’s examples of these deficient 
teachers are the “professional guardians” of learning who neglect the critic 
Winckelmann (Renaissance 143), and the femme fatale Queen Margaret, whose 
“consuming and essentially wolfish” love menaces Gaston (101). Pater proposes that 
if people are to avoid such dangerous professors, they must use texts and art objects to 
teach themselves. For him, this autodidactic process is safely erotic. Through the 
learner’s imagination, the art object comes to life and acquires a solicitous and 
seductive personality. For example, when Gaston reads Ronsard’s Odes, it seems to 
“take possession of [him] with the ready intimacy of one’s equal in age” (26). It is 
such erotic contact that allows learners to derive the principles of aesthetic criticism. 
For example, feeling the “pulsation of sensuous life” in sculpture, Winckelmann 
suddenly perceives the rules that govern Greek art (146). To him, it seems as these 
rules were “forgotten knowledge hidden for a time in [his] mind itself” (155), rules the 
living art has helped him recall. 
My second chapter turns to Lee’s essay collection Belcaro to argue that she 
excoriates formal aesthetic training because it promotes a patronizing cult of 
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innocence. She claims that before the advent of modern aesthetic education, people 
knew innately how to appreciate art. Enjoying a direct connection with art, they 
appraised it by relating how the sensuousness of art’s form affected them. She then 
argues that in modernity, to understand art, people no longer refer to the pleasure art’s 
form produces. Instead they must mechanically interpret art through the insulating 
hermeneutics taught by aestheticians like Ruskin, who wish to shield the innocent 
from the sensuous and erotic immediacy of art objects. Opposing such professionals, 
Lee casts herself as a professor who has renounced the authority to teach, and 
imagines scenes in which art, not aestheticians would teach people how to appreciate 
art’s sensuousness. By drawing on plots about forcible religious and intellectual 
conversion derived from the Gothic novel, Lee tells how the statues of Greek gods 
seduce an innocent child and implant the doctrine of art for art’s sake into its mind. 
Because Lee imagines this rape as pleasurably and intellectually productive and 
because she identifies the child with her beloved companion, the poet Mary Robinson, 
Belcaro provides us an account of how fetishistic and lesbian desire might inflect 
aesthetic education, how a female aesthete might imagine the education of women and 
why that female-centered education might value an eroticized violence in pedagogical 
relations. 
My final chapter examines Wilde’s warning against “trying to educate others.” 
In his view, those who attempt to teach impoverish themselves mentally; the “fatal 
habit of imparting opinions” to students causes the teacher’s “ignorance.” While Pater 
and Lee theorize pedagogy out of their concern for the student, Wilde worries about 
teachers. Believing that “every disciple takes something away from his master” and 
that teachers lose “what is most precious” when they exercise influence over students, 
Wilde proposes that such costly pedagogical transfers are needless because no one 
requires teaching; those who wish to be aesthetes know all they could ever need to 
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know about criticism because they have an innate, inherited trove of knowledge. 
Wilde imagines that because of the legacies of heredity” the “true critic is he who 
bears within himself the dreams and ideas and feelings of myriad generations.” He 
develops this idea in “The Critic as Artist” and The Picture of Dorian Gray, arguing 
that people inherit “strange legacies of thought and passion” from human ancestors 
and artistic ones; because people are the children of art, they are better able to 
understand it. I argue that although Wilde wants heredity to guarantee the critic’s 
intellectual self-sufficiency, the Gothic mode he unnecessarily uses to define heredity 
actually undermines critical autonomy. In “The Critic as Artist,” heredity is not an 
innocuous mechanism that brings us the knowledge of our forebears; it is “a terrible 
shadow” that makes us live “not our own life” but “the lives of the dead.” Dorian Gray 
wonders if he is merely a vehicle for his ancestors to realize the dreams they had not 
fulfilled in life and likens inherited traits to “strange poisonous germ[s]” that creep 
from body to body. While Lee employed the Gothic to ensure students’ independence, 
in Wilde’s texts, the Gothic reveals that man is not of “one essence” but a “complex 
multiform creature,” threatening the individualism that aesthetic critical choices rely 
upon. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BETWEEN DEARTH & EXCESS: WALTER PATER AND THE 
EXTREMES OF PEDAGOGICAL DESIRE 
 
I – “Unalterably a Lover” – Aesthetic Susceptibility and Eros 
 
As the audience was dispersing from his lecture, the Oxford don and aesthete 
Walter Pater inquired “I hope you heard me, Mr. Wilde.” “We overheard you,” replied 
Pater’s auditor.  In Wilde’s view, by drowsily murmuring his talk, Pater had 
succeeded in making a public address into soliloquy. Rather than presenting himself 
forcefully to his listeners, he made them violate his privacy. This moment of failed 
address, instruction compromised by impersonality, is hardly singular in Pater’s 
career. A former student of his remarked that because of his “his habit of slouching 
past under a wall and never looking anyone fairly in the face, the undergraduates 
called him ‘Judas’” (Wright, 119). It is as if these young men see his failure to look 
them in the eyes as a betrayal, a treachery of which the professor is conscious, and 
which bends his frame with shame.  It seems, as the novelist George Moore 
complained, that Pater had “no gift of intimacy” (527), an embarrassment at an Oxford 
that increasingly valorized loving pedagogical relationships. 
In Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford, Linda Dowling tracks 
how the Oxonian college tutorial evolves, describing how in the 1820s, the Tractarians 
rejected an icy tradition of donnish “condescension, impersonality and sloth” to insist 
on the pastoral care of the tutor for his pupil. Under the lead of John Henry Newman 
and Hurrell Froude, the “college tutorial began to function at Oxford as a vehicle for 
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the intensifying reciprocal bonds of masculine interest, affection and obligation to 
which modern cultural theory has given the name ‘male homosociality’” (35). Later, 
in the 1860s, liberal reformers like Benjamin Jowett appropriated the tutorial to assist 
their project of university reform, part of which involved moving Greek studies to the 
center of the university curriculum. The tutorial, itself an institution directing 
masculine affection, became the structure in which tutors and pupils examined Plato’s 
philosophy and the pederasty he believed enabled all cultural production.  As it drifted 
from the religious character the Tractarians had infused it with, the tutorial became 
governed by the principles and methods of the Hellenic pedagogy Oxford was 
studying. Dowling reports that “Jowett’s conduct as tutor was universally regarded as 
‘Socratic’ in some degree” (76), and that fellow Mark Pattison praised the dialectical 
method of the tutorial as “the nearest approach…to the Socratic principle of 
education” (76). The combined effect of Christian and Greek cultures had made love 
central to an advanced education. 
While Jowett’s paternal demeanor made him the object of many 
undergraduates’ “tutor worship” and caused him to be named the “beloved presence” 
by at least one student, Pater stirred no such wide-spread adoration (Dowling).6 As an 
Oxonian memoirist recalls, “Walter Pater, of Brasenose, the master of style, 
influenced only by means of his books. One can remember seeing him, in the narrow 
path leading to the Union, stop to stroke a cat, lost to the whole world and blocking the 
way” (Atkinson, qtd. in Mikhail, 19). Pater is an otherworldly figure here, oblivious to 
                                                 
6
 That Pater could inspire and return affection to select undergraduates is proven by his romantic 
involvement with William Money Hardinge, an affair which cost the nineteen-year-old his place at the 
university and damaged Pater’s academic career, causing him to be rejected for a proctorship. But we 
have no proof that Pater tutored Hardinge, and I am referring to the pervasive view of how Pater related 
to his students and those who saw themselves as his followers. Billie Andrew Inman suggests that it is 
the disastrous outcome of the Hardinge scandal that chilled Pater’s view of the pedagogical eros 
permissible at Oxford, leading him to adapt his characterization of the philosopher Abelard in “protest 
against the type of persons who had judged [Pater]” (15). In defending Abelard, who was condemned 
for his affair with his student, Pater defends himself. 
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the surrounding students. His only means of directing them comes through his written 
words, not through any charisma that warms his conversation or lectures. Matthew 
Potolsky argues that Pater’s esteem for textually mediated relationships is a recurring 
element in the “narratives of pedagogical danger” that his contemporaries and 
successive writers constructed around his texts (701). For his detractors, of whom 
William Butler Yeats is Potolsky’s representative figure, “it is nearly always by means 
of reading, rather than by face-to-face interaction that Pater has his most threatening 
effect” (701).  Potolsky argues that for Yeats, Pater’s teaching replaces the “unique 
and personal impact of the teacher with the conventional and impersonal effect of art 
or learning” (703). This methodology is disastrous, because it “encourages a 
triangulation of personal intercourse, by which one related to others not directly but 
through learning and poetry” (703).  The “presumably artificial distance Pater’s 
teaching cultivates between student and teacher…yields its fatal fruit in the barriers it 
places between student and student. The affectation of learning he took from Pater’s 
teaching, Yeats claims, prevented him from recognizing the disorder that marked the 
lives of his generation” (704). When he encounters Ernest Dowson, for example, the 
“ceremonious and polite” manner that Pater’s impersonal pedagogy teaches only 
allows Yeats to notice Dowson’s “dignity and reserve” but he lacks the familiarity 
with his fellow to notice how he is “breaking his heart for the daughter of the keeper 
of an Italian eating house, in dissipation and drink.” Pater, to whom Yeats and his 
fellows “looked consciously for [their] philosophy” is to blame for the collapse of 
homosociality among his disciples. Because Yeats never considers why Pater routs his 
relationships with others through texts, he casts Pater as the besotted art-lover who 
thoughtlessly endangers his followers’ sympathy simply to promote Art’s agency and 
perfection.  
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Yeats overlooks the purposefullness of Pater’s impersonality. By analyzing 
educational structures across Pater’s entire oeuvre, we will discover that Pater’s 
reserve cannot be solely attributed to his personal shyness, nor does it spring from an 
actual indifference towards students, or an exclusive affective attachment to art. 
Rather, Pater’s textually mediated pedagogy results from a deeply ethical love for 
those placed in his care—the love of a teacher who assesses the detrimental effects 
that a mentor’s desire can have on the student’s inchoate sensibility and who 
emotionally withdraws just enough to catalyze the student’s development optimally. 
As critics have tried to understand how desire plays a role in Pater’s teaching 
philosophy, they have framed that desire mainly by thinking about how his texts 
promote homosocial and homoerotic relations between Oxford men or male aesthetes, 
and how masculine desire enhances learning.7  But what insights can we gain if we 
move away from casting the student and the teacher as a couple in a homoerotic 
romance? Does investigating the erotics of pedagogy not include considering how 
teachers create the conditions for their students’ autodidacticism? What might we 
learn if we consider the erotic charge of teaching oneself by communing with art? 
Analyzing solitary learning is also vital to understanding Pater’s pedagogy since his 
attempts to develop an erotics of self-education derive from the limits he detects in the 
dialectical pedagogical romance. 
To comprehend Pater’s thoughts on desire and pedagogy as well as the 
limitations of the pedagogical romance, we will consult his final complete text, Plato 
and Platonism (1893). Based on a series of lectures “written for delivery to some 
young students of philosophy”, it is the work in which Pater’s thoughts on aesthetic 
education engage most with the practical, immediate demands of teaching embodied 
                                                 
7
 For readings in this vein, see Richard Dellamora, Masculine Desire and Linda Dowling, Hellenism 
and Homosexuality at Victorian Oxford. 
 27 
individuals—above all, youth. Although Pater’s novels and non-fictional prose often 
contain instructional scenes, because he never writes directly about his professional 
life, it is easy to forget that he was Fellow at Brasenose College, rather than simply a 
writer who distantly influenced an abstract readership of aesthetes through his books. 
His textbook reminds us that Pater earned his bread by educating young men, and that 
through contact with them, observing their transition to adulthood, he would have had 
many opportunities to think about the effects of love and desire on learning. Yet Plato 
and Platonism’s erotics have not been analyzed closely enough. For example, because 
Dowling believes Oxford dons work their most transformative intellectual and 
spiritual effects through the intimacy of the tutorial, she does not closely address how 
lecturing also promotes homosociality, and pays little attention to the textbook. Yet it 
is through lectures open to all undergraduates, not one-on-one conferences with 
students of his own college, that Pater’s university teaching reached its widest 
audience. Having captivated many young men drawn to his philosophy, he publishes 
his textbook “with the hope of interesting a larger number” of these enthusiasts, men 
beyond the reach of his voice.  (Given Pater’s soft-spoken delivery, this was wise). 
 One issue Plato and Platonism investigates is how love enabled Greek 
aesthetic education, and how love could facilitate the education of nineteenth-century 
aesthetes.  Prior to Plato, Pater writes, “there had been no theorising about the 
beautiful, its place in life, and the like; and as a matter of fact he is the earliest critic of 
the fine arts.  He anticipates the modern notion that art as such has no end but its own 
perfection,—‘art for art's sake’” (269). Not only the first aesthete, Plato is also the 
original theorist of aesthetic education: “Wherever people have been inclined to lay 
stress on the colouring, for instance, cheerful or otherwise, of the walls of the room 
where children learn to read, as though that had something to do with the colouring of 
their minds; on the possible moral effect of the beautiful ancient buildings of some of 
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our own schools and colleges; on the building of character, in any way, through the 
eye and ear; there the spirit of Plato has been understood to be” (270). As we imagine 
Pater delivering these words, the idea of him in an auditorium speaking to a body of 
students is particularly useful, for it reminds us that the term “aesthetic,” from the 
Greek aisthesis, primarily concerns not questions of what art is or how it functions, 
but questions of how a body perceives. As Terry Eagleton memorably sums up in The 
Ideology of the Aesthetic, aesthetic territory is “nothing less than the whole of our 
sensate life together—the business of affections and aversions, of how the world 
strikes the body on its sensory surfaces, of that which takes root in the gaze and the 
guts and all that arises from our most banal biological insertion into the world” (13). 
Taking Eagleton’s statement into account, we are not surprised to find Pater attributing 
Plato’s aesthetic sensitivity to his amatory experience: 
Now Plato is one for whom the visible world thus “really exists” because he is 
by nature and before all things, from first to last, unalterably a lover.  In that, 
precisely, lies the secret of the susceptible and diligent eye, the so sensitive 
ear.  The central interest of his own youth—of his profoundly impressible 
youth—as happens always with natures of real capacity, gives law and pattern 
to all that succeeds it.  Τά έρωτικά, as he says, the experience, the discipline, of 
love, had been that for Plato; and, as love must of necessity deal above all with 
visible persons, this discipline involved an exquisite culture of the senses. 
(134) 
Here, Pater grounds aesthetics in the erotic not for just any aesthetician’s benefit, but 
for an audience familiar with the key terms and codes of the Aesthetic Movement. 
Previously we saw him associating Plato’s aesthetics with the slogan “art for art’s 
sake” but here, through misquotation, we see him likening Plato to the man who 
popularized the phrase “l’art pour l’art” in France, the writer Theophile Gautier. 
Gautier intimated that his artistic and critical success lay in his close attention to the 
sights around him: “My critics and supporters praise and damn me without 
understanding one word of me. They have never spoken of the essence of my worth,   
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that I am a man for whom the visible world exists.” [my translation]8 Plato, like 
Gautier, is a master-critic because he attends the “visible world” closely, but for the 
student who wishes to know the origins of this Gallic and Greek affinity for what can 
be seen, Pater traces its foundation to desire. To be a good aesthete, one must love in 
youth. The Platonic love Pater describes foregrounds and ensures the role of the 
body’s response in aesthetic judgments.  It cultures the senses to apprehend “visible 
persons” optimally—people within sight and hope of touch; mere representations of 
the beloved in thought or speech leave the senses starved, the lover disconsolate. Such 
sensuous love gives “law and pattern” to the aesthete’s critical activity because it 
alters his sensibility. Having loved, he strives to anchor himself in the materiality from 
which aesthetic practice is constantly in danger of being dislodged.   
Although aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, Pater often presents it as a 
relation of which the other branches are ashamed. It has an embarrassing attachment to 
the physical and particular that other philosophical areas disown for the general and 
abstract. Thus it struggles against a disciplinary pressure to give up its foundation in 
the specific and sensuous, as Pater argues early in his career. In The Renaissance 
(1873), he warns: “Many attempts have been made by writers on art and poetry to 
define beauty in the abstract, to express in the most general terms, to find some 
universal formula for it….To define beauty not in the most abstract but in the most 
concrete terms possible, to find, not its universal formula, but the formula which 
expresses most adequately this or that special manifestation of it, is the aim of the true 
student of aesthetics” (xix). The “abstract question of what beauty is in itself, or what 
its exact relation to truth or experience” Pater dismisses as speculation “as 
unprofitable as metaphysical questions elsewhere” (xx). He returns to philosophy’s 
                                                 
8
 Critiques et louanges me louent et m’abiment sans comprendre un mot de que je suis. Toute ma 
valeur, ils n’ont jamais parle de cela, c’est que je suis un homme pour qui le monde visible existe.  
(Gautier, as reported in the Goncourt Journal for 1 May 1857) 
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transcendentalism in Plato and Platonism, noting: “The great masters of philosophy 
have been for the most part its noticeably single-minded servants” (126). Devoted to 
obtaining knowledge, “they have served science, science in vacuo, as if nothing 
beside, faith, imagination, love, the bodily sense, could detach them from it for an 
hour.” This monomania has leached their substance, leading   Pater to lament, “[W]e 
know nothing at all of their temperaments; of which, that one leading abstract or 
scientific force in them was in fact strictly exclusive.  Little more than intellectual 
abstractions themselves, in them philosophy was wholly faithful to its colours, or its 
colourlessness; rendering not grey only, as Hegel said of it, but all colours alike, in 
grey” (126-7). To portray the damaging poverty of philosophical abstraction, Pater 
uses an artistic metaphor: abstraction is like a bad painter that misrepresents the tonal 
variety of the world in his work. In doing so he creates a wretchedly limited portrait of 
world, distorting and lessening the impressions an onlooker can draw from his images. 
While this abstraction, so monotonous and impersonal, threatens to damage 
aesthetic inquiry, Pater finds reparative value in youthful love. Not only is it an 
embodied affect that asserts the importance of thinking about the concrete, it has a 
clarifying and purifying capacity to idealize the beloved object, to make the object’s 
essence more apparent to the senses.  The Platonic lover’s amorous attention to the 
beloved person or thing is a crucible wherein “the material and the spiritual are blent 
and fused together. While, in that fire and heat, what is spiritual attains the definite 
visibility of a crystal, what is material, on the other hand will lose its earthiness and 
impurity” (121). Moreover, in the observational techniques it devises and perfects to 
appreciate the beloved’s charms, love provides the critic the first opportunities to 
develop the discerning attitude he will train on the artistic object. As Pater writes, “It 
is of the amorous temper, therefore, you must think in connexion with Plato’s youth—
of this, amid all the strength of the genius in which it is so large a constituent,—
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indulging, developing, refining, the sensuous capacities, the powers of eye and ear, of 
the fancy also which can re-fashion, of the speech which can best respond to and 
reproduce, their liveliest presentments” (135).  
Pater idealized the institutions of Greek learning because he saw how they 
were specially adapted to channel pedagogical eros, and how they might provide a 
template for a modern erotics of education. If Plato’s success in aesthetics comes from 
the “discipline” of love, a Platonic aesthetic education must be that which encourages 
the student to love, which makes him more capable of love, which analyzes love 
seriously in order to better pursue it and which assesses the import of love within the 
student-teacher relationship. Why then, was there such a disjunction between Pater’s 
personal manner and the amatory substance of his tutorials, lectures and historical 
fictions? The divergence between his theory and his practice can be explained by his 
understanding of the cultural differences between ancient and modern societies. The 
Greeks possessed pederasty, the educational system that devoted a whole 
philosophical corpus to managing and promulgating the affairs of the heart. Pater 
eulogizes the Dorian mode of this erotic-educational relationship by describing the 
constellations of the Gemini, who represent its ideal: 
Brothers, comrades, who could not live without each other, [Castor and 
Polydeuces] were the most fitting patrons of a place in which friendship, 
comradeship, like theirs, came to so much.  Lovers of youth they remained, 
those enstarred types of it, arrested thus at that moment of miraculous good 
fortune as a consecration of the clean, youthful friendship, “passing even the 
love of woman,” which, by system…elaborated into a kind of art, became an 
elementary part of education.  A part of [Dorian] duty and discipline, it was 
also [the Dorians’] great solace and encouragement.  The beloved and the 
lover, side by side through their long days of eager labour, and above all on the 
battlefield, became respectively, άτης, the hearer, and είσpiνήλας, the inspirer; 
the elder inspiring the younger with his own strength and noble taste in things. 
(231)    
The erotically grounded aesthetic training is clear here in the image of the lover 
inspiring his beloved “with his own strength and noble taste in things.” But Pater 
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experiences difficulty in appropriating this Greek pagan ideal for his contemporary 
audience. His description of the pederastic affection as a “clean, youthful friendship, 
‘passing even the love of woman,’” refers to the biblical friendship of David and 
Jonathan. For homophile apologists, the Old Testament account of this intense 
masculine love offered a way of sanctioning the homoerotic friendships of men; the 
sanitizing function of the word “clean” in Pater’s description is obvious.9  But instead 
of serving as an aid to understanding pederasty better, Pater’s attempt to translate 
Greek ways of life into more assimilable modes of affection is glaringly incongruous 
due to its anachronism and its disregard for cultural context. It mystifies his readers’ 
understanding of the erotic relations between men in ancient Greece and our 
understanding of how Plato and his compatriots loved, marring our understanding of 
how Platonic aesthetics relate to desire.  
Pater’s bowdlerism here points to a general pessimism in his texts over 
whether pedagogical love can flourish outside of the disciplinary conditions of ancient 
Greek culture. It is true, as Dowling states, that Pater’s writing  “is a daring texture of 
covert allusions working continuously and unmistakably” to demonstrate that a liberal 
political project of national regeneration is “unintelligible unless viewed within the 
context of a Socratic eros of men loving men in spiritual procreancy” (94). He clearly 
thought that studying pedagogical eros could benefit young Oxford men, and hence, 
the nation. However, whenever Pater directly attempts to envision erotic education 
                                                 
9
 Some readers may find it difficult to see how, from a homophobic point of view, two men that share a 
love that exceeds their love for women, are any less troubling than a man and a boy joined in a 
pederastic relationship. That David and Jonathan have become modern gay icons would support their 
skepticism. To understand the Victorians’ comfort with the biblical pair, we might follow David 
Halperin, who differentiates relationships between equal men, such as David and Jonathan, from the 
hierarchically structured relations found in pederasty: “It is this very emphasis on identity, similarity 
and mutuality that distances the friendship tradition, in its original social and discursive context, from 
the world of sexual love. Sexual love, in the light of the male friendship tradition, actually sounds like a 
contradiction in terms: sexual penetration is not the sort of thing you would do to someone you really 
love” (121). On the other hand, Halperin avers, “hierarchy itself is hot; it is indissociably bound up with 
at least the potential for erotic signification” (118). 
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outside the historical conditions that nurtured Greek civilization, he emphasizes how 
harshly it is opposed, how easily it goes awry and how people struggle to define its 
character.  In The Renaissance, he laments the persecution Abelard suffers for his 
relationship to his student Heloise. In his short story “Emerald Uthwart” he depicts 
how James Stokes, inspired by the beauty and comportment of his school-friend, the 
eponymous protagonist, becomes a better scholar. Yet James struggles to understand 
the nature of his relationship with Emerald. “He finds the Greek or the Latin model of 
their antique friendship or tries to find it, in the books they read together. None fits 
exactly” (185). The insistence on the “antique” nature of the boys’ friendship and 
James’ textual searches set the standard for pedagogical eros in the Greek past; it 
cannot be understood as a modern phenomenon, or redefined for whatever era 
experiences it. 
As Pater’s constant references to the “discipline” of Greek love and life show, 
he associated Greek institutions with regulative principles. The “system” of the 
pederastic relationship demanded that the teacher manage his emotions and 
comportment towards his student to educate him optimally.  We will discover, 
however, that under inopportune modern conditions, the “art” of friendship Pater 
describes in Sparta has been lost; the teacher can become a threatening source to the 
susceptible, fragile student, either withholding the foundational love that the student 
needs for support, or inundating the student with such intense desire that the student’s 
autonomy feels threatened. Despite the vagaries of the teacher’s love, Pater’s students 
need to feel and return some source of love to develop into proper aesthetes and 
intellectuals. If Pater points his students to texts as a way to teach his lessons, it is not 
to push them into a reserved, austere relation with unfeeling Art, but because he 
imagines the artwork may have a personality as seductive and warmly nurturing as any 
actual ideal teacher, a personality it acquires due to the imaginative investments of the 
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learner.  In Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity, Eve Sedgwick 
associates “the hermeneutics of suspicion” that characterizes contemporary critical 
practice with paranoia. In the effort to uncover the insidious mechanisms by which 
oppressive systems operate in texts,  the paranoid critic must become suspicious of 
every word he reads, incessantly searching to see how the text is mystifying his view 
of the hidden meanings and ideologies it seeks to support. Understood in Kleinian 
terms this critic  “adopts a position of terrible alertness to the dangers posed by the 
hateful and envious part-objects that one defensively projects into, carves out of and 
ingests from the world around one” (128). We might argue that learning how to be a 
critic too inspires paranoia, for when we accept our teachers’ influence, some part of 
us is surely aware that they are fallible sources of knowledge or that their intentions in 
educating us may not be altruistic. One type of student may have an easy time 
disavowing the teacher’s faults, while another may adopt the paranoid position, 
hypervigilant and suspicious about the imagined and very real dangers posed by the 
educator. In response to the damaging demands of paranoid epistemology, Sedgwick 
poses a reparative impulse, whose “fear, a realistic one, is that the culture surrounding 
it is inadequate or inimical to its nurture; it wants to assemble and confer plenitude on 
an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self” (149). We should 
value Pater’s pedagogical erotics as an example of Sedgwick’s reparative practices. In 
texts we will examine, from The Renaissance to Gaston de Latour to Plato and 
Platonism, he uses a variety of tropes and formal tricks to imagine a fetishistic scene 
in which an autodidactic student encounters a work of art that has all the corporeality 
and allure of a human lover. Animated, the text has the capacity to nurture the student, 
to give it a space to develop safely from unregulated passions of the threatening 
teacher. 
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II  The Tactile Poverty of the Professional Touch 
 
In the course of Plato and Platonism, Pater refers to the Sophists as the 
“professional rivals” of Socrates and the “professional teachers of the art of rhetoric” 
(101, 116). Plato, “inheriting, expanding, the preferences and antipathies of his 
master” defames the Sophist as the “professional enemy of Socrates” and ensures that 
the epithet Sophist is a “bad name” (99). Associated so insistently with the foes of 
philosophy, professionalism cannot escape the disrepute that tars rhetoric. We should 
not see Socrates and the Sophists as opposing factions within one intellectual 
fraternity—it is not in that sense that they are “professional rivals”—rather, it is the 
Sophists’ very professionalism that contributes to their ideological quarrel with Plato 
and his teacher. In championing Plato then, Pater criticizes professionalism.  We 
should understand his ostinato on expertise in ancient Greece, not merely as a 
historical account of intellectual rivalry, but an oblique assessment of how 
professionalism coloured nineteenth-century conceptions of labour, especially the 
educator’s labour.  
Pater had reason to dwell on how the process of becoming an expert affected 
his contemporaries. While the professions of “law, divinity and physic” were ancient 
by the start of Victoria’s reign, by the end of the nineteenth century that trio was 
joined by a host of nascent professions.  This proliferation drew the attention of many 
intellectuals. As Ian Small reminds us in Conditions for Criticism, “the professions as 
we know them today were a Victorian product, brought into being to serve the needs 
of an increasingly complex industrial society” (20). Professionalization ensured the 
individual’s competence in dealing with informational excess produced by rapid 
scientific and technological advance. By focusing on a delimited field of enquiry, 
undergoing specialized training to handle that area and submitting to the profession’s 
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disciplinary norms, the individual developed into a reliably knowing subject; his 
credentials marked him as a trustworthy authority. Professionalism emerged not solely 
to manage abundant knowledge, but also as an economic effect. As Jonathan 
Freedman writes in Professions of Taste, “the emphasis on the rationalization of time 
and space wrought by a mature capitalist culture leads to the organization of life paths 
into distinct ‘careers,’ and thus to the further rationalization of the career into the self-
defining, self-privileging shape of the profession” (52). Moreover, for a capitalism 
constantly seeking new wares to hawk, professionalization commoditized knowledge. 
One usually pays to be trained and accredited by the professional class one aspires to, 
and knowledge can then be judged not by the pleasure it brings or whether it is 
interesting or good to know, but how useful and valuable it is in shaping one’s career. 
Mainly, the critical tradition on Pater sees him as anti-professional, 
uncomfortable with his roles as institutionalized educator and expert aesthete. This 
view begins with his biographer A.C. Benson, and can be traced down to the relatively 
recent arguments of Small and Freedman. Small argues that professionalization was 
accompanied by a shift in the kinds of authority that had to be invoked to make critical 
judgments.  Noting that The Renaissance “eschewed most of the paraphernalia and 
devices of contemporary academic commentary” he traces how Pater, writing an 
paradisciplinary work, flouts the conventions of professional  art historians and critics, 
attempting to “rehabilitate  individual authority, and to disregard an institutional 
authority based on scholarly consensus” (93). Similarly, it is Pater’s refusal to obey 
the disciplinary standards of professional educators in philosophy that explains the 
critical fortunes of Plato and Platonism. As Small concludes, “In Marius the 
Epicurean and Plato and Platonism he was trying to write works in which and for 
which authority existed in the author alone….such a characterization explains the 
reception of Plato and Platonism; it could be welcomed as a work of art, because it 
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eschewed the rigour and paraphernalia of scholarship—it did not, that is announce 
itself as containing scholarly knowledge” (111). Taking another approach to anti-
professionalism, Freedman notes that British professionals were particularly intent “to 
differentiate themselves from what they saw as the acquisitive ethos of the mercantile 
classes or orders” (52). He understands Pater’s “emphasis on the appreciation of fine 
or special moments of intense experience” as a leisurely, non-productive challenge to 
the bourgeois economy that fuels this work-oriented avarice. Freedman and Small’s 
arguments clarify our understanding of how Pater’s work reacted generally to the 
reality of professionalization and how that work contests the professional authority of 
his colleagues, but neither set of arguments helps us understand how Pater’s antipathy 
or anxiety towards professionalism affected his attitude towards educating others.  
Exemplifying the anti-mercantile feeling that Freedman identifies, Pater’s colleague 
and friend Mark Pattison complains that contemporary education has “sunk into a 
trade, and like trading Sophists, we have not cared to keep on hand a larger stock than 
we could dispose of in the season” (Suggestions 167). Employing similar rhetoric in 
his reports on examination reform, Archibald Sayce, professor of Assyriology at 
Oxford, despairs that students who “play the sophist best will gain the best place.” 
Such students come to the university “not to learn, but to traffic in learning; not to gain 
knowledge for its own sake, but for what it will fetch” (837). Sayce and Pattison’s 
condemnations of sophist commercialism among undergraduates and dons show how 
classical instruction provided its scholars with a special discourse to describe their 
anxieties over the professionalization of education. Searching in ancient Greek culture 
for analogues for contemporary life, Victorian Hellenists make the Sophist the 
prototype of the greedy professional.  
Pater, like his colleagues, uses the Sophist to give a model of professional 
education a bad name. We might expect that forced to earn his bread as an educator, 
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he would identify partially with the Sophists, who in their conduct and careers bear 
similarities to Oxbridge dons. But he actually casts his lot with Socrates, who 
ironically regards himself as “something less than a wise man, a philosopher only, a 
mere seeker after such wisdom as he might after all never attain” (88). Refusing 
expertise, he is a student who helps his fellows to learn by displaying his own 
autodidactic courses and accompanying others on theirs. Not assuming the 
professional role of teacher, he can hardly profit from it; we are told he “never 
touched” the money of the rich men’s sons who followed him. Unworldly in the 
extreme, he is only invested in becoming wiser and helping others to also become 
wise. Pater writes: “ If one, if Socrates, seemed to become the teacher of another, it 
was but by thinking aloud for a few moments over his own lesson, or leaning upon 
that other as he went along that difficult way which each one must really prosecute for 
himself… The Platonic Socrates, in fact, does not propose to teach anything” (160). 
By contrast, the Sophists embrace professional authority as “the experts—wise men, 
who proposed to make other people as wise as themselves, wise in that sort of wisdom 
regarding which we can really test others, and let them test us, not with the merely 
approximate results of the Socratic method” (88). And above all, these wise-men are 
all too aware of how their intellectual capital will be lucrative. Pater notes how they 
are ensconced in their “large fashionable expensive schools” (94) and remarks how 
devoted Greek parents “pay readily large sums” for their children’s “instruction in 
what it was found so useful to know” (89). The portrait here is not merely of parental 
sacrifice, but of exploitation and gullibility since the Sophists have no care for their 
student’s edification, have no philanthropic calling to do their teaching—Pater defines 
them primarily in economic terms as 
the class of persons through whom, in the most effectual manner, supply met 
demand, the demand for education, asserted by that marvellously ready Greek 
people, when the youthful mind in them became suddenly aware of the coming 
of virile capacity, and they desired to be made by rules of art better speakers, 
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better writers and accountants, than any merely natural, unassisted gifts, 
however fortunate, could make them. (88) 
In Pater’s economic description of the Sophists, we detect how the demands of the 
market they attempt to exploit cynically actually undermine any capacity they have to 
educate their clients. Pater insists that as bad as the Sophists appear, “the chosen 
educators of the public” do “but fan and add fuel to the fire  in which Greece…is 
flaming itself away” (94). That is, in the types of services they provide, they merely 
feed the consumerist desire of their paying public. These “ostensible or professional 
Sophists” were “not so much [the public’s] intellectual directors as the pupils or 
followers of it. They did but make it…abound the more in its own sense, like to 
keeper…of some wild beast, which he knows how to command by a well considered-
obedience to all its varying humours (95). Here, the rules of the market invert order 
and the teacher abdicates leadership to follow the public.  Although the Athenian 
public has sought out the Sophists precisely because it is aware of some “virile 
capacity” in itself to be elevated by “rules of art,” the Sophists are incapable of 
developing the public’s latent masculinity. By submitting to the laws of economic 
determination they find themselves the caretakers—not even the trainers—of a beast 
whom they can only control through gratifying its animal drives. Pater does not speak 
kindly of this bestial public, and only overcomes his sense of its menacing, savage 
potential in the following description: 
The great sophist was indeed the Athenian public itself, Athens, as the willing 
victim of its own gifts, its own flamboyancy, well nigh worn out now by the 
mutual friction of its own parts, given over completely to hazardous political 
experiment with the irresponsibility which is ever the great vice of democracy, 
ever ready to float away any whither, to misunderstand, or forget or discredit 
its own past. (94) 
Without the guidance of teachers who conceive their students as more than their 
clients, and intervene to refine or check desire, the Athenian public, once aspiring to 
virility, becomes effete. Here when Pater invokes the foppish enervated masturbator to 
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characterize the agitations of competing elements in the polity, he draws on the 
rhetoric of classical republican theory, in which the effeminatus is “empty or negative 
symbol at once of civic enfeeblement and of the monstrous self-absorption that 
becomes visible in a society at just the moment at which…private interest has begun 
to prevail against those things that concern the public welfare” (Dowling 8). If we 
remember that Pater is writing at the end of an century in which a vastly expanded 
franchise, increasing buying power and developing consumer capitalism had given 
thousands an unprecedented power to  realize their individual desires, we recognize 
that in portraying the “ruinous fluidity” of the Athenians (94), the “centrifugal, the 
irresponsible, the Ionian or Asiatic” tendency (91), he portrays late- nineteenth century 
Britain, in which capital enables people to gratify their desires just as easily as the 
masturbator satisfies himself.  What such societies need to keep them from flying 
apart are agents, who like Plato regulate desire. Against Ionian fluidity, Plato urges 
“an effectual desire towards the Dorian order and ascêsis, asserts everywhere the 
principle of outline, in political and moral life; in the education which is to fit men for 
it (98). This is the “salutary, strictly European tendency” that asserts that the most 
precious thing in the world is “human reason, calm and sane” (93). The Hegelian 
synthesis of these opposing tendencies reveals the character of the ideal state. 
Clearly then, Pater’s unease with the mercantile aspects of professional 
education is not merely a classist aversion to handling filthy lucre or laboring to make 
a living. But neither is it simply a reaction against the avarice associated with 
trafficking. He partially dislikes the commodification of education because of the 
model of human interaction it produces and the philosophy of handling persons and 
objects that it underpins.  Freedman argues that professionals reassured themselves 
that they were not succumbing to the mercantile ethos through “a strategy of self-
conscious delusion” (53). They told themselves that to be a professional was to be 
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governed by gentlemanly behavioral codes, not the laws of the market.  Sheldon 
Rothblatt explains how according to this ideological recasting, while the business man 
was rewarded by profits, and  was distanced from his clients by an “impersonal market 
situation,” the genteel professional was not paid, but given an honorarium to reward 
his attention to his clients, whom he attended with friendly interest, out of a sense of 
duty.  While the acquisitive nature of the businessman was linked to brash and 
aggressive” behavior, the gentleman possessed a decorous and sensitive “self 
restraint.”  Now as we have seen, Pater does not wish to recuperate the term 
“professional.” Therefore, he does not use the differentiation Rothblatt outlines to 
valorize the professional over the businessman. He accepts the collapse of the two 
concepts, binding the image of the sophist expert to financial transactions. But he is 
still capable of opposing the compromised term “professional” to another privileged 
category by appealing to codes of right conduct and decorum. He never explicitly 
names this category, but we might call it “amateur,” remembering that the amateur is a 
“lover.” While the Sophist professional is alienated and out of touch with his clients 
because he handles them solely through the cash nexus, the amateur, like Socrates, 
loves his clients, has close contact with them and as someone in touch with another 
person, must develop tact to avoid abusing the intimacy he enjoys.  
The professional’s poor contact with his clients and his tactlessness is not a 
mere social matter, but an aesthetic one, for it leads him to mishandle people and their 
emotions as if they had no reality—the brusqueness of the professional betrays an 
insensitivity to souls that is linked to an insensitivity to statues and style. Pater writes, 
“The essential vice of sophistry, as Plato conceived it, was that for it no real things 
existed” (110). Yet we have seen how being lovingly convinced of the sensuous 
reality of things is exactly the first step to developing a refined aesthetic taste. As 
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Pater presents them, Sophist pedagogy and philosophy are contaminated by principles 
that make a virtue of the distant social relations associated with professionalism: 
Art, the art of oratory…in this case, how one should write or speak really 
inflammatory discourses about love, write love-letters, so to speak, that shall 
really get at the heart they’re meant for—that was a matter on which the 
Sophists had thought much professionally.  And the debate introduced in the 
Phaedrus regarding the secret of success in proposals of love or friendship 
turns properly on this: whether it is necessary, or even advantageous, for one 
who would be a good orator, or writer, a poet, a good artist generally, to know, 
and consciously to keep himself in contact with, the truth of his subject as he 
knows or feels it; or only with what other people, perhaps quite indolently, 
think, or suppose others to think, about it.  And here the charge of Socrates 
against those professional teachers of the art of rhetoric comes to be, that, with 
much superficial aptitude in the conduct of the matter, they neither reach, nor 
put others in the way of reaching, that intellectual ground of things (of the 
consciousness of love for instance, when they are to open their lips, and 
presumably their souls, about that) in true contact with which alone can there 
be a real mastery in dealing with them. (116)   
Here Pater emphasizes how when the Sophists think “professionally” about how to 
treat the subject of love, they do not feel they must have any convictions or 
impassioned feelings towards the subject of love to “write love-letters”—they do not 
even have to know what other people quite earnestly feel about the subject.  Now, the 
problem here is whether a good artist need “keep himself in contact with the truth of 
his subject as he knows or feels it” and that subject may be any besides love. But 
considering the perceptual powers that Pater associates with inamoration, that the 
subject is love is important. Investigating how to artfully pen love-letters that inflame 
their addressee’s heart is to inquire into the proper (and hence successful) way that the 
pederastic lover should go about wooing his beloved. Pater’s allusion to the Phaedrus 
alerts us that he is considering the erotic-educational relationship of the eremenos and 
erastes.  But the man who follows the precepts of professional rhetoricians will find 
that his letters fail as oratorical art, and worse, his writing will fail to kindle his 
beloved’s desire. As Pater writes, the Sophist’s “superficial aptitude” cannot “reach, 
nor put others in the way of reaching” the “intellectual ground of things”— here the 
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“consciousness of love.” Neglecting to plumb the depths of his love to find its 
foundation, the lover can hardly make the beloved aware of his own desire for the 
lover, nor of the philosophical basis of love in general. Furthermore, Pater complains 
that with the Sophists “art began too precipitately, as mere form without matter; a 
thing of disconnected empiric rules, caught from the mere surface of other people’s 
productions, in congruity with a general method which everywhere ruthlessly severed 
branch and flower from its natural root—art from one’s own vivid sensation or 
belief”(105). Sophist aesthetic instruction is doomed for at least two reasons.  First, its 
“general method” is fundamentally flawed since the Sophist derives artistic rules 
through the superficial empiric analysis of “other people’s productions” rather than 
theorizing according to how art sensuously touches him or those others. Thus he 
avoids the fundamental question the aesthetic critic must ask: “What is this song or 
picture, this engaging personality presented in life or in a book to me? What effect 
does it really produce on me?” (Renaissance xix) The Sophist overlooks how art 
affects our “vivid sensation or belief” by severing the connection of art from the 
sensate life—a connection Pater presents as natural through his metaphor of the 
severed blossom. Second, even if the Sophists understood the proper relation of form 
and matter, not deriving aesthetic principles through their “disconnected empiric 
rules” their methodology cannot anchor aesthetic inquiry, because it fails to inspire 
love and because it fails to envision love as an affect grounded in real, personal 
feelings and real objects. 
Pater’s clearest argument that the professional has a touch that is poorly 
equipped to teach aesthetic tact and communicate love appears in The Renaissance, 
where he traces the education of the art critic Johann Joachim Winckelmann.   
At twenty-one he enters the University of Halle, to study theology, as his 
friends desire; instead he becomes the enthusiastic translator of Herodotus. The 
condition of Greek learning in German schools and universities had fallen, and 
there were no professors at Halle who could satisfy his sharp intellectual 
 44 
craving. Of his professional education he always speaks with scorn, claiming 
to have been his own teacher from first to last. His appointed teachers did not 
perceive that a new source of culture was within their hands. Homo vagus et 
inconstans!—one of them pedantically reports of the future pilgrim to Rome, 
unaware on which side his irony is whetted…But that Winckelmann, the 
votary of the gravest of intellectual traditions, should get nothing but an 
attempt at suppression from the professional guardians of learning is what may 
well surprise us.  (143)  
As in Plato and Platonism, here we find professional education criticized. Through his 
account of Winckelmann’s “appointed teachers” Pater laments that “an attempt at 
suppression” should replace an opportunity for education, which is related to 
procession, a leading out, from the Latin educere.  We might imagine here the hand of 
the ideal teacher wrapped around that of his student as they progress towards learning, 
the teacher helping the student to express what he believes and thinks about the world. 
But poor Winckelmann is mishandled by the professional guardians of learning, 
whose dealings with their student betray their aesthetic insensitivity.  Winckelmann is 
destined to develop an innovative aesthetic criticism and is therefore a “new source of 
culture” much like the artistic objects that archaeology uncovers for his analysis. Yet 
although he rests within the hands of his professors and before their eyes like some 
Rosetta Stone, they cannot “perceive” him or his worth—though they have grasp of 
him, they do not have the tact to feel him and they let him elude them, taking his 
education into his own hands.  
This failure to truly touch Winckelmann, to draw something out of him is not 
merely an aesthetic failure, but an erotic one. While The Renaissance closes  by 
examining how Winckelmann initiates a “new sense” in artistic matters despite the 
fallen conditions of professionalized higher learning, the text’s first essay, “Two Early 
French Stories”, touches upon the more successful and celebrated education of  the 
abbess Heloise by her lover, the medieval philosopher Abelard. What Pater finds most 
effective in their sexually charged relationship is emblematized by the image of their 
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hands touching.  Abelard is introduced as “the great scholar and the great lover” (3). In 
him “earthly passion” connects “the liberty of the heart with the free play of human 
intelligence” (3). In noting the greatness of Abelard’s passion and intellect, Pater is not 
merely descriptive but is actually theorizing how being an intellectual and a paramour 
might be correlated; the parallelism in the phrase suggests that being a gifted scholar 
and lover are somehow equivalent. The reason for this becomes clear when we 
examine the pedagogical scene staged around Abelard and Heloise. Pater addresses us 
“You conceive the temptations of the scholar, who, in such dreamy tranquility, amid 
the bright and busy spectacle of the ‘Island,’ lived in a world of something like 
shadows; and that for one who knew so well how to assign the exact value to every 
abstract thought, those restraints which lie on the consciences of other men had been 
relaxed” (4). Interpellated as fellow scholars, we envision Abelard on the Île de la 
Cité, surrounded by the vivacity that springs from the religious and intellectual culture 
of Notre-Dame. Yet instead of benefitting optimally from this “bright and busy 
spectacle” Abelard is noctambulant in his “dreamy tranquility,” drowsing over the 
“abstract thought” that so often merely shadows the real. In his “world of something 
like shadows” Abelard recalls Tennyson’s Lady of Shallot, who, alone on her isle, 
sees reality refracted through her magic glass, and who, shut up with her own thought 
grows “half-sick with shadows.” Now although Abelard’s traffic with abstract 
philosophy leads him away from the bright, real world, his exclusive engagement with 
abstraction is a disorder that allowed to work its way to the extreme, will effect its 
own cure. Because he learns to evaluate every abstract thought, he loses some 
discretion, making him more receptive to the transgressive desire that might ground 
him in the concrete. Thus, when Abelard and Heloise sit together at home to “refine a 
little further on the nature of abstract ideas, ‘Love made himself of the party with 
them’” (3). Pater’s personification here identifies desire with the uninvited guest who 
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makes a company into a crowd, but Pater welcomes this intrusion insofar as it brings 
the couple downwards from the rarefied atmosphere where they discuss.  
Contemplating the correspondence that issues from Love’s advent, Pater notes 
how  Abelard and Heloise “write their letters—letters with a wonderful outpouring of 
soul—in medieval Latin” and how “Abelard . . .writes also in Latin those treatises in 
which he tries to find a ground of reality below the abstractions of philosophy, as one 
bent on trying all things by their congruity with human experience, who had felt the 
hand of Heloise, and looked into her eyes, and tested the resources of humanity in her 
great and energetic nature” (6). Even knowing the writing conventions that governed 
medieval intellectual interchange, we may find it remarkable that Abelard and Heloise 
write about their most intimate affairs in the dead language of church and university, 
as opposed to their native French. It is Pater’s mild surprise at this fact that causes him 
to interrupt his own critical narrative to note the “wonderful outpouring of soul” the 
letters contain, even in Latin. Yet the point of foregrounding the language both 
treatises and correspondence are written in is to suggest how desire transforms the 
remote Latin that is used to express thoughts that are remote from quotidian 
experience.  Inamorated, Abelard strives to find a “ground of reality below the 
abstractions of philosophy,” intent on making abstruse matters respond to “human 
experience,” because he has adoringly “felt the hand of Heloise.” Unlike 
Winckelmann’s teachers, Abelard is able to perceive his student, to attain contact with 
her, because he loves her. This loving touch sharpens his own perception of how 
reality relates to human experience. Heloise, also transfigured by the tactile nature of 
her education, gains deeper understanding. Men remark that she could “penetrate into 
the mysteries of the older world, she had become a sorceress, like the Celtic 
druidesses” (3). Winckelmann’s struggle to understand antiquity is not so easily 
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won—deprived of a professorial touch by professional distance, he only understands 
ancient art through hard struggle. 
History reveals how the consummated desire of Abelard and Heloise, once 
discovered, leads to their persecution, and disturbed the conditions of their intellectual 
intercourse. Taking leave of the lovers, Pater condemns the professional values and 
antagonistic narrow-mindedness that hounded them. 
The opposition into which Abelard is thrown, which gives its colour to his 
career, which breaks his soul to pieces, is a no less subtle opposition than that 
between the merely professional, official, hireling ministers of that system, 
with their ignorant worship of system for its own sake, and the true child of 
light, the humanist, with reason and heart and senses quick, while theirs were 
almost dead. He reaches out towards, he attains, modes of ideal living, beyond 
the prescribed limits of that system, though in essential germ, it may be, 
contained within it. (5) 
Abelard is a type for the aesthete here. Pater’s admires him because he keeps his 
“reason and heart and senses quick” –alert to impressions. But while he “reaches out 
towards” a better way of life, raising again the metaphors of tact and manipulation that 
Pater associates with fruitful aesthetic experience, his opponents perceive nothing with 
their deadened senses. Pater correlates this anesthesia with a purview of life has 
dwindled to the “merely professional” and official. Once more Pater links 
professionalism to that greed that insulates an individual from contact with the world 
and its inhabitants. While the humanist Abelard is intimately concerned with his 
fellow man, the professionals, concerned primarily with finances, not fraternity, are 
“hireling.” They have become obsessed with dogma that defines their spiritual system, 
and more importantly, that defines their professional roles within that system. In 
describing this “ignorant worship of system for its own sake” Pater’s phrasing evokes 
“the love of art for its own sake” that he recommends, suggesting that absorbed in the 
former, Abelard’s enemies miss out on the latter.   
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The austere professionalism that so violently disrupted the romance of Abelard 
and Heloise had one virtue: in separating the lovers, it provided the occasion for the 
Abelard’s Historia Calamitum and Heloise’s passionate responses to her former 
teacher and lover. In referring to their letters in Plato and Platonism, Pater suggests 
their texts possess the power to seduce readers into the fulfilling erotic relationship 
they lost.  He likens the Sophists to lawyers who use words in whatever ways will 
achieve their ends  although they “do not care very much about justice itself” (107), 
but opposing the Sophist’s mechanical principles of action, so ungrounded in 
conviction, is the “principle on which Abelard and Heloise wrote their love letters” 
and which made Plato write “kindled and enkindling words on love and friendship in 
the Symposium”  and which governed the way “a certain book discoursed of love to 
Paolo and Francesca, till they found themselves—well! in the Inferno; so potent it 
was” (107). This set of texts about love foster amorous relationships in a world where 
humans risk losing contact with each other. 
 
III The Femme Fatale’s Pedagogy of Excess 
 
If in The Renaissance Pater is concerned with pedagogical situations in which 
there is not enough love to aid the student’s progress, he investigates the effects of 
excessive desire on the learner and teacher in his late text, Gaston de Latour (1895). 
That unfinished novel traces the intellectual development of its eponymous 
protagonist during the 16th century.  Gaston’s aesthetic education is shaped by several 
influences, of which Queen Margaret of Navarre is merely one. But of all his mentors, 
Margaret concerns us most, because she is described most with the rhetoric of 
institutional education and because her portrayal shows most elegantly how critical 
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autonomy can be threatened by the teacher’s desire within an erotically charged 
education. 
 Fully developed female characters are rare in Pater’s writing. Margaret has the 
singular privilege of being a woman who interested him not because of maternal 
principles, nor piety, not solely for beauty, but also for her intellect. For this interest, 
only Heloise rivals Margaret in his work, but he does not celebrate the abbess in her 
own right, but solely in her collaboration with Abelard. Only a paragraph is devoted to 
her in The Renaissance along with some stray lines in Plato and Platonism, but 
Margaret is fleshed out in a full imaginary portrait. Although in his essay on “Style” 
Pater defines the “scholarly conscience” as the “male conscience” and dismisses the 
“female conscience” as that which “traverses so lightly, so amiably” over intellectual 
ground (8), with Margaret, he investigates the extent to which feminine traits and 
appetites might not hinder intellectual power, but might support it. To consider how 
Margaret might serve a productive or positive purpose for Pater is to read against most 
critical accounts of the character, which overlook that she is the most arresting 
character by far in Gaston de Latour, and see her as an unconscious product of Pater’s 
fear of powerful women rather than a solution to a particular artistic or intellectual 
problem.10 Hence Billie Andrew Inman sees Margaret as an “approximate surrogate” 
for the decadent French novelist Rachilde, whom she believes to have stirred Pater’s 
“fear and hatred” (98). She speculates that Pater knew Rachilde’s novel Monsieur 
Venus and was  offended because it chronicled how “such a highly intellectual young 
                                                 
10
 For exhaustive discussion of this see Bram Dijkstra, Idols of Perversity: Fantasies of Feminine Evil 
in Fin-de-Siècle Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Dijkstra’s sweeping sense of how 
misogynist themes inflect 19th century art can be linked to a feminist politics that polices how women 
are presented culturally, hoping to improve women’s lot by critiquing bad representations and the 
politics they spawn. Though his approach may seem unnuanced or outdated to contemporary readers, 
with qualification, his interpretations and vast catalogue of visual and literary texts give a good 
foundation to build arguments about the femme fatale. For further critique of Dijkstra, see Martha 
Vicinus’ “The Adolescent Boy: Fin de Siècle Femme Fatale?” 
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woman with an excellent writing style” could conceive a character that was “a sadist, a 
vampire, and the destroyer of a beautiful young man” (98). Pater’s “revulsion was 
likely to find expression” and did so in Margaret (98). This logic, based on very thin 
evidence, is difficult to follow. Why would Pater express his distaste for a 
characterization by replicating it, especially when circulating the type might encourage 
other intellectual women to write about the femme fatale?11 Furthermore, while Inman 
claims Pater harbors “hatred of Margaret of Valois” he more obviously is fascinated 
by her, critical where he must be, but far from repulsed. 
 Gaston de Latour can make productive use of Margaret because the novel is 
partially a study of how knowledge grows out of various forms of self-absorption and 
introspection, concepts misogynistically linked in fin-de-siècle art and literature to the 
image of the self-adoring femme-fatale. Early in the novel, Pater nominates Montaigne 
as the intellectual who best represents the spirit of the sixteenth century, tracing the 
thinker’s genius to an egotistical root: “But beyond and above all the various interests 
upon which the philosopher’s mind was for ever afloat, there was one subject always 
in prominence—himself” (54). If, as Montaigne claims, his own “egotism was but the 
pattern of the true intellectual life of every one” we must understand Queen Margaret 
as his female fellow-scholar who achieves a profound intellectual life through 
narcissistic contemplation. That is why Pater constantly connects Margaret’s intellect 
to her self-indulgent rituals. When, with Gaston, we find her at the Louvre, she is in 
her apartment which is both bedroom and “a student’s chamber as seriously arranged 
for its purpose as any monastic scriptorium: the tapestries…a security also against the 
intrusion upon this charmed area of any quite simple thoughts from the world without” 
                                                 
11
 One such woman would be Pater’s friend and disciple, Vernon Lee, whom we will meet in the next 
chapter. Pater’s portrait of the vampiric Mona Lisa, itself influenced by Swinburne’s poetry and art 
criticism, is arguably an influence on Lee’s collection of short stories, Hauntings (1890). The text 
features two wonderfully wicked femmes fatales. 
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(97). Described as a “place of strange worship” where its owner serves simultaneously 
as “idol and priestess” this sequestered vanity room recalls the “narrow chamber of the 
individual mind” Pater describes in the conclusion to the Renaissance, showing us 
how Margaret’s complex thoughts, distinguished from the simplistic philosophies of 
the world without, emerge only from her solipsism. It is not surprising then, that Pater 
displays her scholarly or “clerkly” abilities by portraying her writing her renowned 
memoirs. While Montaigne analyzes himself in his self-regarding Essays, she “takes 
all the world into her confidence about all her people and herself”, “writing, writing 
constantly with a sort of really classic instinct for the genius of her tongue” (97). 
Unlike bluestockings whose charm is ruined by their intellect, Margaret’s “clerkliness 
did but add the more to the impression of cunning and wizardry about her, again like 
that of Homer’s Circe—δειυή θεός” (97). Thus, her navel-gazing only serves to 
increase the grandeur and charm of her self, making it worthy of more narcissistic 
attention. 
 Margaret demands that others share her own great opinion of her self, a 
yearning that drives her to be “queen, empress, deity if it might be, of men’s hearts.” 
Therefore she studies love and cultivates that beauty which attracts it (102). She 
impresses Gaston with the “curious scholarship of love” in which she seems “a 
graduate, a doctor” (103) and so great is her knowledge that she might pen a “book on 
the physiology of love…with triumphant suitability” (103). She is no mere researcher, 
however, but also a teacher.  Observing the “best way of presenting her personal gifts” 
(97), she also possesses a general knowledge of aesthetics and the ability to develop 
the aesthetic merits of others.  She gathers “the virginal, the really white flowers of 
both sexes” to her salon, where under her direction, exposed to her beauty, they 
blossom, becoming her “willing, devoted, thirsty subjects” (102). 
From forgotten old houses in remote corners of France, like choice furniture or 
untouched portraits, they had come on demand; and with the lapse of a month 
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or a year in this singular atmosphere, the exotic personality, the hand, the eye, 
the lip, the inflammable fancy within of which these were eloquent, had even 
surpassed the utmost imaginings of the exotic fine art which had discovered to 
others as to themselves their high aesthetic value…They filled a place made 
ready for them by the books, the pictures, the very fashions of the day—nay 
more than filled it, they superseded all this daringly. (102) 
Margaret’s refined sensibility makes everything she does of aesthetic moment. Here, 
her selection of adoring courtiers is both matriculation and a show of connoisseurship; 
those she desires come to Paris like so many freshmen, and so much “choice 
furniture.” As if they were arriving at a university, all is outfitted for their comfortable 
edification as they fill “a place made ready for them by the books, the pictures, the 
very fashions of the day.” So much bric-a-brac themselves, they are meant to 
complement these modish items, but those objects also are to instruct them. After a 
“month or a year in the singular atmosphere” of Margaret’s care, they are transformed 
into artworks that surpass and supplement the objets d’art that inspire and edify them. 
Dwelling with Montaigne, Gaston ponders: “If Circe could turn men into swine, could 
she also release them again” (46)? In Paris, we see Margaret, whom Pater constantly 
compares to Circe, involved in the cultural work that elevates beasts into men. Her 
subjects’ “inflammable fancy” shows the extent of their increased aesthetic 
receptivity—their  imagination is primed to catch fire over this or that new sensation 
or idea. Balancing this inner transformation, the changes in hand, eye and lip tell of an 
outer refinement. The overall amelioration makes Margaret’s students more worthy to 
be her subjects; her pride allows only the finest devotees to join her in her self-
worship. 
  The preceding represents just one aspect of the aesthetic education Margaret 
offers, the practical side of artistic self-fashioning. Yet she enables theoretical 
speculation on aesthetics as well, showing us this side of her influence through 
Gaston. The Frenchman, “at home in this singular place like Circe’s enchanted island” 
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(103), finds himself almost exclusively pondering  “the religion of physical 
beauty…the ‘impassioned love of passion,’ love for love’s sake as a doctrine and a 
discipline, a science and a fine art all in one, its evocative power over what finely 
educated senses must straightaway declare delightful, desirable, in the sphere of 
imageries, colour, music, words refining the very lips that uttered them” (102).  The 
syntax of this section is snarled, even more than usually for Pater, but he seems to 
mean that love has an analytical affinity for beauty. By considering or experiencing 
“love for love’s sake” one is able to picture what refined aesthetic sensibility must 
immediately experience as “delightful, desirable” in artistic matters—it is as if love 
would enable one to derive a law of the compellingly beautiful. For her own studies, 
Margaret investigates “the question (of a kind seductive for the thoughtful) in what 
exact proportions a cool, grave, self-possessed intelligence might coexist with the 
physical throb of youth, could conspire with it” (103). In what seems to be Pater’s 
idealized evocation of nerdy or scholarly chic, the queen is directed to this topic by 
gazing upon the fresh virility of Gaston, whose “clerkly distinction was in truth to the 
taste of Margaret, as the final expression of the taste of that day” (103). If Margaret 
suggests to Gaston that love’s carnality may reveal certain aesthetic laws to the 
philosopher, here she ponders and demonstrates how aesthetic and erotic gazing may 
further not only aesthetics, but thinking in general. Insofar as Gaston’s “clerkly 
distinction” expresses the tastes of the day, he is being read as an object that obeys 
general rules of art, fashion, culture. But Margaret also appreciates the “trim, discreet, 
almost priestly scholar correcting, annotating the great lady’s manuscripts” and the 
adjectives describing him seem suffused with Margaret’s personal desire rather than 
any widely recognizable cultural aesthetic. Noting that Gaston is “nominally a very 
proper secretary,” Pater’s phrasing suggests that Margaret’s relations with her scribe 
are potentially not so proper, at least in her mind. Appropriately, the erotic expectancy 
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in the air between the priestly scholar and the adulterous queen (a latter Faustina, Pater 
calls her) deepens her philosophical speculation on the very compatibility of 
intellectual labor and youthful passion. 
Margaret’s reflection on amatory matters establishes her as heir to the 
assumptions and methodology Pater associates with Plato in Plato and Platonism.  For 
Margaret and Gaston, “both alike absorbed students, fellow-students, there was 
certainly a wonderful charm when, as with the poet of the Vita Nuova, with Petrarch, 
with sinful Abelard of old here in Paris, such grave thoughts as seem naturally alien 
from carnal love enter its service, put on its livery, become its accomplices” (103). 
Margaret investigates love as the intellectual foundation for matters that seem wholly 
unconcerned with love, too weighty and abstract to connect with desire. Thus she 
provides the foundation that moves Gaston to consider the specific connection of love 
and aesthetics. The figures Margaret and her fellow-student esteem link Gaston de 
Latour to the other works in which Pater formulates a theory of erotic aesthetics.  
Recall that Abelard, having lovingly  held the hand of  his student Heloise is able to 
resist the metaphysical tendencies that Pater believes impair aesthetic inquiry in The 
Renaissance. Recall too how the Plato of Plato and Platonism derives his analytical 
“power over the sensible world,” because he is “a lover, a great lover, somewhat after 
the manner of Dante,” author of the Vita Nuova (120, 121).   
Given the treatment of love as a complement to intellectual growth and 
aesthetic sensibility, we might expect Pater to cast Margaret and Gaston as a new 
Abelard and Heloise, dramatizing the licentious behavior suggested by Margaret’s 
thoughtful gaze at her “nominally very proper secretary” (103). Earlier in the novel, 
Pater writes that “Lodged in Abelard’s quarter he [Gaston] all but repeats Abelard’s 
typical experience” (64). But his Heloise is not Margaret, but his Huguenot wife, 
Colombe. The historical Abelard and Heloise share a passion that enables their 
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intellectual growth, but Gaston fails to nurture his “new Heloise, [who has] capacities 
doubtless, as he reflected afterwards regretfully, for a refined and serious happiness” 
(64). For him, their marriage “seemed to have but the transitoriness, as also the guilt of 
vagrant love” and a “connexion so light of motive, so inexpressive of…his character” 
that it might have been regarded finally as a mere mistake, or an unmeaning accident 
in his career” (65). In Pater’s scheme of erotic pedagogy, Gaston is guilty of being the 
teacher who loved too little. When his wife and child are killed in the St 
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre while he is away from them, he becomes painfully and 
guiltily aware of his lost opportunity to develop her “rudimentary aptitude for the 
really high things himself had represented to her fancy” (67). It is partially Gaston’s 
mourning for his wife and child that commits him to the abstinence and indifference 
that helps him handle Margot. 
Pater dismisses all erotic fulfillment between the queen and scholar, noting that 
to Gaston’s “good fortune,” as he  comes and goes on his “learned business” with the 
poison-daisy of France, he and she share no sentiment but “a kind of mutual 
indifference” (103). Pater elaborates, “For, as with physical delicacies, if you wished 
to sip, as you might wine, to enjoy in veritable connoisseurship the singularly 
attempered character of the so gifted Margaret a calm though kindly indifference was, 
in fact, the proper condition for doing so—an indifference which would have formed, 
in truth, one of the three constituent chapters in that book on the physiology of love 
which she might have penned with triumphant suitability to the humour of her 
generation” (103). So important is affective neutrality in dealing with Margaret that 
Pater repeats his lament later: “With a kind of ultimate indifference on both sides, how 
pleasant could Margaret, Queen Margot be to those whom the fortune of the hour 
brought her. Only, if her heart moved at eye or hand, if that malediction of her love 
entered into the […] it was equally fatal to slave or rebel” (sic) (129). 
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Now why does Margaret only benefit those with whom she reciprocates a 
feeling of indifference? And what does Pater mean by this term, so prevalent in 
Gaston de Latour?  Here it is associated with aesthetic principles of judgment and 
taste that are vividly rendered through the oenophile’s art. If you wish “to sip, as you 
might wine, to enjoy in veritable connoisseurship, the singularly attempered character 
of the so gifted Margaret” you must operate under a kindly “indifference.” In the 
prescription to handle a personality indifferently, to experience such an encounter like 
a wine-tasting, we see the conditions for aesthetic criticism Pater outlined in as early a 
text as The Renaissance: 
The aesthetic critic, then, regards all the objects with which he has to do, all 
works of art, and the fairer forms of nature and human life, as powers or forces 
producing pleasurable sensations, each of a more or less peculiar or unique 
kind. This influence he feels, and wishes to explain, by analysing and reducing 
it to its elements. To him, the picture, the landscape, the engaging personality 
in life or in a book, La Gioconda, the hills of Carrara, Pico of Mirandola, are 
valuable for their virtues, as we say, in speaking of a herb, a wine, a gem; for 
the property each has of affecting one with a special, a unique, impression of 
pleasure. (xx) 
Kevin Ohi identifies indifference as a multivalent “key term in Pater’s aesthetics” 
noting that it “sometimes indicates that for which the spectator aims—disinterested 
engagement—and sometimes that which, in a work of art, inspires fascination” (17). 
In raising the concept of “disinterested engagement” Ohi alludes to the emotional and 
mental ideal in a Kantian aesthetic encounter, an interaction that here provides the 
rules of engagement for Margaret’s social encounters. In optimally interacting with 
those whom she improves and entertains with her gifts, Margaret adopts the merciful 
indifference of a critic, dispassionately involved with them, appreciating them as 
artworks. It is with an indifferent eye that she benignly views Gaston “as the final 
expression of the taste of that day, the hour, the moment” (103). Guided by similar 
principles, he espies in her “the cunning Bella Donna whose physiognomy haunts so 
much of the art-work of [his] time, the visible form or presentment of an unseen force 
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moulding and remoulding, after its pattern, all one saw”(99).  But, when instead of 
merely appreciating with touch or sight, the queen’s “heart is moved at eye or hand,” 
she fails to be Kant’s disinterested aesthete, and the “malediction of her love” destroys 
her beloved. Why destruction? Margaret is not merely an embodiment of a love 
innocuously attached to the visual world, she incarnates what Pater terms “erotic 
pride” (101). Pater suggests that Margaret is beleaguered constantly in the political 
realm, married against her will by her brothers and mother, made queen of a “rude 
little mountainous dominion” and doomed “not to be Queen of France” (92, 93), fated 
for “long years of banishment or imprisonment” and made to wage wars constantly to 
guard her safety (93). Externally threatened in this way, at all costs she will maintain 
her self-regard, her self-rule, and her position as queen of hearts.  Conscious of her 
own “inalienable, incommunicable personal distinction” she claims a narcissistic 
superiority over others. As a proof of their humble love, and to preserve and prove her 
unassailable autonomy, she demands the “voluntary yet so ruinous servility of others: 
their bodily or mental decrease—their suicide let us say!—as just one grain of incense 
consumed, wholly consumed, on the red coal” (100). Her love is the blaze that 
fascinates and finally incinerates the reluctant, flaring forth all the more fiercely to 
embrace her willing victim, urging him, moth-like, to sacrifice. Margaret’s lapse into 
love therefore does not merely result in an interested judgment, which is a failure of 
aesthetic response; it is linked with the destruction of a subject meant to be engaged 
aesthetically. 
We might think of this unfortunate moment when Margaret fails to regulate her 
desires as Pater’s layered meditation on the manifold ways an aesthetic education can 
go awry. First, we see the teacher not properly approaching her student, a failure of 
both aesthetic and ethical conduct, because the right way, the “kindly” or humane 
manner, of handling another is represented in the rules of engagement that structure 
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artistic encounters. The damage wrought by the failed relation is complexly realized. 
The lapse in connoisseurship may threaten the student’s belief in pedagogical 
authority because the teacher has been seen doing something “wrong,” but more 
importantly for Pater, the flaring of desire gives a bad mimetic example and voids the 
opportunity to practice proper aesthetic principles. Recall that Margaret and Gaston do 
enjoy a fortunate relationship, that of mutual indifference. We might profitably say 
mirrored indifference, since in  Gaston de Latour Pater is interested in how an 
individual reflects what it beholds and ponders and how it learns from self-
speculation: “And glancing across his mirror (how that age doated on its mirrors!) 
Gaston saw himself also closely enough conformed to the aesthetic demand of the day, 
that he too had taken the impress and colour of his age, the hue (like the insect on the 
tree) of what he mentally fed on” (110); “If according to the Platonic doctrine people 
become like what they see, surely the omnipresences of fine art around one must re-
touch, at least in the case of the sensitive, what is still mobile in a human countenance 
(90). The phrase “a kind of ultimate indifference on both sides” suggests an object and 
its reflection beyond the plane of the looking-glass, a symmetry in which one side 
mirrors the other to create the conditions necessary for disinterested aesthetic 
judgment. In imitating her affective state, Gaston is able to enjoy his queen in 
“veritable connoisseurship” as one of the “fairer forms of nature and human life” 
identified in The Renaissance (xx). Insofar as the novel tracks his impressions, we 
may understand him as the ideal aesthete explaining and exploring Margaret’s 
“singularly attempered character” by “analysing it and reducing it to its elements” 
(Renaissance, xx). But Gaston’s critical distance is not secure. We sense that one day 
he may look at Margaret’s eyes to find no cool regard to return his regard. When Pater 
writes “Only, if her heart moved at eye or hand, if that malediction of her love entered 
into the[…] it was equally fatal to slave or rebel” he presents love’s advent as a fairy-
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tale curse whose effect may be realized any time, intruding unexpectedly. And what is 
worse, no one can resist desire’s siren call, they must return it and be slain by it, 
submissive slave or resisting rebel. (Indeed, the term rebel suggests one resisting the 
force he is already ruled by, as if there is no free agent that exists before the advent of 
Margaret’s love, as if desire always held sway). Criticism for both teacher and student 
becomes impossible when Margaret loves. Consider also that a disinterested criticism 
is hardly the gravest consequence of the femme fatale’s desire. Hers is a desire 
ferociously destructive—“the love or lust that will not be contented with anything less 
than the consumption, the destruction of its object” (101). Such destruction here is a 
symbolic and literal annihilation of an art object no less than it is an obliteration of the 
conditions for artistic criticism. The etiquette of responding to the other coolly—read 
aesthetically—is no empty form or fanciful projection of artistic attributes, but a 
performative gesture that allows the recognized individual to claim the success of his 
or her aesthetic education. Recall that Margaret’s courtiers are represented as artistic 
subjects who labor to increase their aesthetic value—their time in Paris is spent in self-
culture as they court the impressions offered by the books, the fashions, and the art 
that surrounds them. But according to the Kantian logic invoked, in the moment in 
which Margaret cannot judge them dispassionately, she fails to recognize how in their 
perfected self-fashioning they have “superseded” all the “exotic fine art which had 
discovered to others as to themselves their high aesthetic value.” The education she 
has enabled and inspired she now ignores or ruins, and the students, not hailed as 
artistic, are set on the path to various forms of social death or even actual extinction. 
None she loves live through that love. One of her suitors “unfriendly, perhaps 
disappointed” (but lucky) remarks that Margaret’s beauty has “the air of an instrument 
for men’s perdition about it” (98).  A “devoted friend of Margaret’s own sex” also 
fears that her lady’s tender deathbed ministrations threaten her soul with perdition; 
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“dying and desiring to die piously [she] must needs thrust her from the bedside: 
Retirez-vous Madame, je vous prie, car il me faut prier et songer a mon Dieu, et vous 
ne me faites que rementevoir le monde, quand je vous regarde” (98).12 
  If some relic of Margaret’s beloved survives desire’s assault, it may return to 
the status of coldly admired object.  Our example here is Jacques La Mole, who is 
caught up in Margot’s desire, albeit willingly : “the entire sheaf of his gifts and 
gaieties had kindled into fire, a pyramid of sweet aromatic flame moving to its end 
before her as she went onward” (104). Only as his death is imminent does Margaret 
recover the indifference she might have had in dealing with him before—though that 
disengagement as she watches his torture and execution is hardly so kindly then. In 
death, his head takes its place “among the best prized objects of the lady’s personal 
property, mounted in a kind of shine of pyx of good goldsmith’s work, and set with 
gems picked from milady’s own jewel-case” (104). But even if we view this as a 
desirable or effective transmutation into art, we should realize that Pater is theorizing a 
destructive desire so intense that there may often be no relic left to aestheticize, a 
consideration that frames his valedictory prayer “Ci-git [Jacques La Mole,] and [may 
God] have mercy on his soul or on what may still be left unconsumed of it” (105).  In 
summary, we see how the prospect of Queen Margot’s arousal presents many horrific 
possibilities to Pater—nightmarish scenarios of aesthetic criticism that is impaired or 
fatal, and art and artistic subjects threatened with obliteration. 
As we’ve noted, Margot’s aesthetic instruction inspires her students to fashion 
themselves and their lives into works of art through processes of self-culture. 
Although initially the goal of an aesthetic Bildung seems to inhere in maintaining an 
artistic way of life for as long as possible, through a masochistic logic, it is possible to 
                                                 
12
 “Draw away, Madame, I beg you, for I must pray and meditate upon God, and you only make me 
recall this world when I look at you.” 
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imagine prizing one’s painful death as the ultimate artistic production, especially if the 
spectacle of one’s self-sacrifice, martyrdom or suicide were immortalized in great art, 
or if one’s remains were aesthetically preserved. In thinking about Gaston de Latour, 
which Pater commenced publishing in 1888, we should remember the many fin-de-
siècle imperial romances which, according to John Kucich, imagined colonial spaces 
as “opportunities for glorious suicide” and which “helped foster a fundamentally 
masochistic ethos of British masculinity, in which the ability to absorb pain 
stoically—or even ecstatically—was greatly prized” (9). Is Jacques La Mole kin to 
these ecstatic sufferers? If Pater’s portrait of Margot had been published, would 
readers have compared it to Rider Haggard’s She (1887) which “described the 
dangerous seductive power an exotic dominatrix could exercise over willingly 
subservient British men” (Kucich, 9)? According to Gilles Deleuze, “the masochist is 
essentially an educator” who teaches a female despot how to tyrannize over him (22). 
If we try to view her through the lens of masochism, might we discover that Margaret 
has two pedagogical modes, one instilled by her suffering lover? We have examined 
the first mode, which depends on emotive discipline as a kindly Kantian indifference. 
The second might capitalize on her devouring love and sadistic hauteur to provide the 
conditions under which a masochistic student, here Jacques La Mole, might immolate 
himself. Passing from Life to Art, he is transformed into a jeweled relic after 
showcasing the masculine discipline that enables him to use his execution to display 
forms of gracious conduct; chivalrously dandiacal to the end, he uses his “shattered 
arm… to fling his cap in air gallantly” (105).  
 Reading Gaston de Latour in this way is to suggest its place in the decadent 
canon of dark romanticism that, according to Ellis Hanson, “represents melancholia, 
self-sacrifice, suffering and suicide as various shades of martyrdom in the worship of 
love or beauty for its own sake” (104). Billie Andrew Inman errs when she first claims 
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“Pater clearly deplores a love a love like de la Mole’s” (97). As Pater imagines a 
masochistic aesthetics capable of turning a human body into the sacred art object, he 
ponders the ecstasies of the lover who wishes “to consume, to destroy himself by 
sacrifice, delightful surely in its degree to him” (103). He also naturalizes submissive 
desires by appealing to Aristotle’s Politics, which theorizes that there is an 
“elementary ground of slavery in human nature itself” (102). He even considers a 
biological basis for sadistic and masochistic desire, suggesting there may be a 
“seigneurial species of soul” and a “servile species” whose desire is the result of 
“some original, primitive, purely physical animal divergency in the cerebral molecule 
or germ” (107). These appeals to pleasure, philosophy, and science lay the 
groundwork for an apologia of sadomasochism, a topic that inflects Pater’s late 
reflections on pedagogy. Margot and Jacques may allow him to reflect upon the 
problem of coercion in teaching, how the power of the teacher is to be exercised and 
how far the submissive tendencies of the student may be indulged or exploited, all 
problems posed in classical philosophy. Consider, for example, the Symposium’s 
discussion of “voluntary slavery” in pederasty (16). Such slavery is not reprehensible 
when it “aims to produce virtue.  Our view is that if someone is willing to put himself 
at someone else’s service in the belief that the other person will help him improve in 
wisdom or some other aspect of virtue, this willing slavery isn’t wrong or humiliating” 
(16). Although here Plato authorizes a slavery that leads to moral development, Pater 
often indicates that such slavery has its aesthetic effects as well. In Plato and 
Platonism, he idealizes Spartan slavery as a “relentlessly organized” system that 
fosters the “well-being which does come of organisation” (183). It is a “sort of slavery 
that makes [the slave] strong and beautiful” (185). 
 We should also be aware that in Gaston de Latour Pater is grappling with the 
aesthetic value of what appears to be evil, a philosophical undertaking he takes up by 
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referring to Charles Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal.13 If masochism can be attacked 
as a perversion or madness, or if we become too quick to denounce Margaret’s cruel 
love as unethical, Pater’s engagement with Baudelaire prompts us to suspend 
moralistic judgments and consider whether any artful thing, any valuable thing may 
come from these moments where Margaret’s kindly indifference falters and her 
students suffer. Herself described as a “poison-daisy,” her lessons make Gaston 
evaluate “the entanglement of beauty with evil,—to what extent one might succeed in 
disentangling them or, failing that, how far one may warm and water the dubious 
double root, watch for its flower, or retain the hope, or the memory, or the mere tokens 
of it in one’s keeping”(104)? 
Insofar as he does not judge or condemn voluntary suffering or pain—or even 
suicide—Pater is useful as a tentative apologist for masochistic eroticism, but here his 
rendering of the transformation that aestheticizes the masochist is not wholly 
convincing or approving. Jacques La Mole “emerges…to suffer in public, and as if 
voluntarily, by way of a slight offering, to fling his life” to Margaret (105). She 
watches his torture and execution with aesthetic indifference, showing no “effective or 
natural sympathy for the young man, with form already ruined” (105), then collects his 
head as her prize. Is it possible that in manifesting “that cruel weariness of a lover 
found too facile, which allowed, nay encouraged him to consume, to destroy himself 
by sacrifice” Margaret creates the conditions for his aesthetic transformation? Does 
she derive her stoicism from a practicality that allows her to ransom beauty from the 
wasteful execution of a man who had to die for his reckless involvement in political 
intrigue? Is she recognizing the grave sacredness of his sacrifice by revering his head 
                                                 
13
 For extensive analysis of how Baudelaire influences Pater, and how Pater buries his engagement with 
the poet in his texts, see Patricia Clement’s Baudelaire and the English Tradition. John Conlon’s Pater 
and the French Tradition provides a useful overview of how Pater conduit through which French 
influences shape British literature.  
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as a fascinating “relic”? All this aestheticizing possibility is undercut when we 
consider the aesthetic judgment Pater passes on Jacques’s mummified head and the 
ethical conduct with which Pater associates aesthetic indifference in the rest of the 
novel.  
Pater focalizes his description of Jacques’ head through “graceful Jasmin” 
another of Margaret’s lovers (105). For  Jasmin, an aesthete whose house showcases  
“the most perfect fruits of art” assorted by “perfect scholarship” (86), Jacques’ head is 
“like the smirched moth upon the candle,” an “ugly brown face, made thus ugly for 
[Margaret’s] sake” (105). This judgment complicates our understanding of Jacques’ 
self-sacrifice by linking Margaret’s desire to the “pyramid of sweet aromatic flame” 
that does not merely consume, but that uglifies (104). The adjective “smirched” here is 
an exquisite choice, conveying the sense of an object sullied, disgraced and tortured. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the verb “smirch” derives from 
“‘esmorcher’ to torment, to torture (as by the application of hot metal).” 
 If Margaret’s consuming desire and cruel disdain were in service of 
transfiguring Jacques into a more beautiful artwork, the sacrificial logic necessary to 
valorize masochism as an aestheticizing proclivity would be convincing—such is the 
narrative of Christian martyrdom, which promises a new body in exchange for the 
ruination of the old, and which invests a great deal of erotic appeal in the body that 
suffers for God. (Kucich also argues that imperial martyrdom is sanctioned by 
sanctification fantasies that “transformed the pain and finality of death and defeat into 
pleasurable fantasies of ecstatic rebirth or resurrection” (5).  Such moments of 
apotheosis were captured in glorious paintings (5).)  Pater explores the logic of 
Christian martyrdom in Marius the Epicurean, but despite the quasi-religious 
veneration Margaret gives Jacques’ relic, the juxtaposition of his uglified face  among 
the “good goldsmith’s work” of its pyx and with the “best prized objects” of 
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Margaret’s chamber suggests that efforts to aestheticize his suffering are futile.  Along 
with Jasmin, who “recoils instinctively” from the sight, we witness “the embalmed 
lips and eyes, so winning and eloquent once” and “so repulsive now” (105). The 
focalization of the narrative here encourages us to take these claims of horrifying 
ugliness as something like objective facts—because Margaret remains inscrutable, we 
cannot tell whether for her the head is exquisitely beautiful, or rather an object of 
horrid fascination, or whether she keeps it precisely for a repulsively singular ugliness. 
The narrative supplies no aesthetic judgments to compete with Jasmin’s claims. 
Displayed among the other finely crafted objects, the most obvious aesthetic pleasure 
Jacques’ desiccated head provides is the increased luster it adds to the gold and gems, 
contrasted with them, it may give what Pater called “the sense of death and the desire 
of beauty; the desire of beauty quickened by the sense of death” (“Aesthetic” 89 ). 
As we saw earlier,  Gaston de Latour proposes what must be done when the 
“dubious double root” of beauty with evil is found inextricable, and ponders how we 
should “watch for [the root’s] flower, or retain the hope, or the memory, or the mere 
tokens of it in one’s keeping”(104). Margaret’s care of Jacques’ head may be an 
attempt to answer these issues. Preserved against decay and kept ever in her presence, 
the remnant of his tortured and ruined form promises a new ideal of decadent beauty 
that one need have no passing fascination with, but which may be kept forever. But if 
Pater is trying to portray the pleasures of a decadent aesthetic, he is unable to accept 
that this ideal is founded on the sacrifice of masculine beauty. There are plenty of dead 
youths in Pater’s oeuvre, many of whom come to violent ends. But the corpses Pater 
loves are always “red with life” in the grave, retaining their beauty through death. By 
contrast, Jacques’ head is repeatedly described as a “ghastly.”  Ultimately, it is 
Margaret’s aesthetic attachment to the relic that Pater condemns through Jasmin. Just 
like his queen, who will drive him down the same destructive road taken by Jacques, 
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Jasmin is a cruel lover. He “does his part in crushing living sentient things” (105) and 
when he watches the execution of the manservant who has committed a crime for love 
of him, it is with “passing regret” and the same cruel indifference Margaret cultivates. 
But Pater differentiates the valences of Margaret and Jasmin’s cruel indifference by 
insisting that Jasmin could never attempt to aestheticize the event as she does. He “has 
no liking for ghastly relics in the pleasant chambers of his memory or his house” 
(105). 
In the context of Pater’s larger oeuvre, Jasmin’s disdain is praiseworthy, 
because as Marius the Epicurean reminds us, “the object, or the experience, as it will 
be in memory, is really the chief thing to care for from first to last, in the conduct of 
our lives”(32). It is this precept that feeds Marius’ “innate and habitual longing for a 
world altogether fairer than that he saw” and causes him to abandon the gladiatorial 
executions that are staged as artistic entertainments (32). Although these shows are “so 
to speak, the novel reading of that age” Marius cannot enjoy them as art because they 
provide ugly things to store in the memory, evil things (171). “This, and this is what 
you may not look upon!” he thinks (171). Furthermore, Pater’s association of domestic 
interior decoration with a character’s interiority must be understood by reviewing the 
struggle between male and female aesthetes for creative authority in the household. As 
Talia Schaffer reminds us, “male aesthetes increasingly claimed to be the authorities 
on home decoration, fashion design, cookery and flowers” thus appropriating a realm 
that had, under the separate spheres doctrine, been largely left to women (73). And 
yet, even in this feminine sphere, women’s creative freedom was curtailed. It was not 
until 1882, six years before Gaston begins to appear in Macmillan’s, that the Married 
Women’s Property Act allowed a wife to own property fully in her own right. 
Previously, under the principle of coverture, she could only act as the agent of her 
husband, who truly owned the decorative commodities she bought and who could 
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prevent her from acquiring them. Women’s constraints in practicing connoisseurship 
was not seen as especially problematic since until the 1870s, women decorated the 
home not by “choosing attractive furniture, wall treatments , and carpeting, but by 
creating attractive craft objects with which to cover the furniture walls and floor” ( 
Schaffer 76). These domestically produced crafts were treasured for their sentimental 
worth, signifying the “female producer’s thriftiness, creativity and personal care for 
her family (77). In the “aesthetic era, however, those mementos were systematically 
banned in the attempt to make the ideal home resemble a museum rather than a 
sentimental retreat” (79). As the male aesthetes turned home decoration into a 
professional activity that depended on trained expertise in artistic matters and tasteful 
acquisition of commodities “women often found themselves vilified as inept amateurs. 
Male aesthetes had embraced women’s work and rejected women” (85). Now, in 
Gaston de Latour, Pater is clearly interested in the idea of a female connoisseur who 
has transcended the limitations of the domestic craftswoman. Childless, promiscuous, 
adulterous Margaret is not the kind of woman who adorns a domestic interior with 
doilies for familial comfort; as we have seen, she collects antiques from all over 
France. But we should recall that even as some women managed to enter the 
professional sphere of interior decorating that men had created, their entry was viewed 
with suspicion.14  Jasmin’s disdain for a woman who has been instrumental in his 
education, his questioning of her taste for ghastly relics, may indicate Pater’s 
skepticism towards women’s ability to make aesthetic choices, especially if a 
woman’s aesthetic judgment is susceptible to corruption by sentimentality. As we’ve 
noted already, we have no access to Margaret’s interiority, and cannot know for what 
reasons she treasures the head of Jacques La Mole. But from Jasmin’s point of view, 
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 For extensive explication of how professional interior decoration came to be a feminist issue in the 
late nineteenth century, see Deborah Cohen’s Household Gods. 
 68 
one reason she may not be able to see the ghastliness of her prize is because she has 
become emotionally involved with it, seeing it not in its pure form, but as a memento 
of her affair with the dead man. Her judgment on the head is not a pure one, in 
Kantian terms. Jacques’ death may have brought him erotic fulfillment, and may have 
gratified his queen in her erotic pride, but as an artistic success, his death does not 
seem worth the loss of his “entire sheaf of his gifts and gaieties” or the ruination of his 
living beauty, at least not in the way Pater frames it. 
Pater’s critics in training are often averse to the dominance of their teachers. In 
Marius the Epicurean, Flavian, Marius’ tutor, most resembles Margaret: “Prince of the 
school, he had gained an easy dominion over the old Greek master by the fascination 
of his parts, and over his fellow-scholars by the figure he bore” (29).  Again we see the 
imperious mesmerism of personal beauty, which Pater subsequently connects to the 
desire to govern others (36). Flavian becomes the “ardent, indefatigable student of 
words” in order to learn how oratory and literary art may “overawe or charm” others. 
His desire for charismatic, perfectly polished style springs from his craving for 
“predominance, for the satisfaction of which another might have relied on the 
acquisition and display of brilliant military qualities” (66). Accordingly, he makes 
Marius “virtually his servant in many things” (29). After Flavian’s death, Marius 
reflects that although his teacher’s beauty and love of beauty have taught him 
“reconciliation to the world of sense” his “feverish attachment” to Flavian “had made 
him at times feel like an uneasy slave” (166). Yet although both Flavian and Margot 
make others their slaves, Pater is much less horrified at the effects of this within the 
boyish pedagogical relationship. The submission Flavian demands or inspires in 
Marius never threatens to destroy him—and he retains the power to move away from 
Flavian’s teachings and to critique his views, unlike Margot’s victims. We may 
account for this difference between two modes of slavery as an effect of gender. The 
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late Pater relishes the submission of one man to another as he pays tribute to his 
better’s superior skills, strength and beauty. All the late educational narratives, such as 
the account of Greek education at Sparta in Plato and Platonism and the short story 
“Emerald Uthwart” analyze male figures who give up their autonomy and 
individuality in allegiance to a powerful authority. Emerald Uthwart, for instance is 
said to have a submissiveness with “the force of genius” (188), and according to Pater 
“the sense of authority, of a large intellectual authority over us, impressed anew day 
after day, of some impenetrable glory round ‘the masters of those who know,’ is of 
course one of the effects we look for from a classical education” (188).  But this 
authority, as harsh and oppressive as it may feel, need ultimately not be feared.  Pater 
presumes that this force is ultimately held in restraint by institutional norms, he 
fetishizes masculine power held in reserve, and the force that bends the knee will not 
break the body ultimately.15 By contrast, the domineering desire he imagines through 
the femme fatale figure of Queen Margot is a power that will not or cannot be checked 
or regulated; it makes others bow before it and consumes them. The image of the 
desiring woman who cannot be satiated is common in late-Victorian literature; her 
most obvious guise is as the vampire seductress who endangers man by sucking away 
his vital fluids. Margaret is no bloodsucker, but Pater marks how her desire is 
dangerous to masculinity above all by making her prize the decapitated head of her 
lover; “[M]ade ugly” for her sake, his virile beauty lost, he has been symbolically 
emasculated. As Freud says, “To decapitate = to castrate” (202).  
When we consider the educational figures that structure Pater’s presentation of 
Queen Margot then, we discover him using the figure of the scholarly femme fatale to 
work out the pernicious effects of an excessive love in the pedagogical relation, a 
desire that disturbs the tranquil system of reserve and disinterestedness Kantian 
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 On Pater and masculine reserve or ascêsis, see James Eli Adams, Dandies and Desert Saints. 
 70 
aesthetics idealizes. I do not mean that this consuming desire need only or necessarily 
arise in female or feminized subjects, but for Pater the vehicle of this desire seems 
characteristically female. We see the virile, preferred alternative in Plato and 
Platonism. If in Gaston de Latour Margaret moves Gaston to think of the 
“impassioned love of passion” (110) “ Plato, with a kind of unimpassioned 
passion,[my emphasis] was a lover in particular of temperance; of temperance too, as 
it may be seen, as a visible thing—seen in Charmides, say! in that subdued and grey-
eyed loveliness, ‘clad in sober grey’; or in those youthful athletes which, in ancient 
marble, reproduce him and the like of him with sound, firm outlines, such as 
temperance secures”(122) . Here temperance as “unimpassioned passion” and 
“subdued loveliness” is fetishized as the very foundation of masculine beauty, that 
which creates the body of the athlete-warrior. Plato is imagined as constantly in 
struggle with his own excessive delight in and desire for beautiful things: “Still, that 
some more luxurious sense of physical beauty had at one time greatly disturbed him, 
divided him against himself, we may judge from his own words in a famous passage 
of the Phaedrus concerning the management, the so difficult management, of those 
winged steeds of the body, which is the chariot of the soul” (122). This constant 
discipline, as well as the suspicion that “the beautiful would never come to seem 
strictly concentric with the good” (122) makes Plato “glad when in the mere natural 
course of years he was become at all events less ardent a lover” (123).  
’Tis he is the authority for what Sophocles had said on the happy decay of the 
passions as age advanced: it was ‘like being set free from service to a band of 
madmen.’  His own distinguishing note is tranquil afterthought upon this 
conflict, with a kind of envy of the almost disembodied old age of Cephalus, 
who quotes that saying of Sophocles amid his placid sacrificial doings (123). 
This passage is striking in its turn to The Republic’s “almost disembodied Cephalus.” 
As enamored of the body as he is, Plato, and Pater through him, feels equivocally 
relieved to consider the passionless existence of old age that senescence offers, if 
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youth means the experience of a mad, destructive love. Because Cephalus means 
“head,” Pater’s image here might emblematize a survival of rationality and the ego 
through the extreme sacrifice of the body, which here is almost—not quite—reduced 
to nothing.  Of course, Pater’s larger project in his oeuvre to make sure this choice 
between rational and bodily senses never arises. In Plato and Platonism he attempts 
this through deconstructing Plato, reading him against himself: “Not to be pure from 
the body but to identify it, in its utmost fairness…became, from first to last, the aim of 
education as [Plato] conceived it. That the body is but ‘a hindrance to the attainment 
of philosophy, if one takes it along with one as a companion in one’s search’…can 
hardly have been the last thought of Plato himself on quitting it” (130).  As we have 
seen here through Queen Margot, the finely educated aesthete develops an eye that can 
appreciate the body in all its beauty, and that artful appreciation may very well be of 
benefit to others, teaching them to espy the beauty of the body and indeed beauty 
generally. But we must look elsewhere in Pater’s body of work to find out how the lust 
of the eye that beauty may arouse can exist within an aesthetic education without 
ruining its student.  
 
IV Education in Equipoise: the Nurturing Affection of the Artwork 
 
Pater’s portraits of Winckelmann’s teachers and Queen Margaret are both 
indictments of bad erotic pedagogy and teachers who fail their students. We might 
wonder then, how is it possible to obtain the proper kind of erotic tutelage from one’s 
teachers—how to place the teacher at the right distance from the student so that the 
educator’s affection can be felt, but so that it does not consume the student in its 
proximity. In response to situations in which the teacher’s comportment endangers the 
student’s autonomy or inhibits his potential, Pater examines processes by which the 
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student can be distanced from structures of formal education and the personal 
fallibility of “the professional guardians of learning.” Early in life Marius the 
Epicurean acquires the art of optimally enjoying the ideal “elements of distinction in 
our everyday life” (38), an ability to isolate and dwell upon choice impressions that 
Pater links with seeing “a revelation in colour and form” among quotidian affairs. He 
learns this visionary art from no teacher, but through Apuleius’ The Golden Ass. Pater 
writes: “If modern education, in its better efforts, really conveys to any of us that kind 
of idealizing power, it does so (though dealing mainly, as its professed instruments, 
with the most select and ideal remains of ancient literature) oftenest by truant reading; 
and thus it happened also, long ago, with Marius and his friend” (38). We might call 
Apuleius’ text merely extra-curricular—unprescribed reading—but in evoking 
truancy, Pater casts The Golden Ass as proscribed reading, a text that does not 
supplement or innocuously co-exist with curricular texts, but that detracts from 
pedagogical discipline and opposes institutional structure.16 
Gaston de Latour too is inspired by an act of truant reading, winning his 
aesthetic awareness from Pierre de Ronsard’s Odes. These poems are “the key to a 
new world of seemingly boundless intellectual resources and yet with a special 
closeness to visible or sensuous things (26). They provide “a lesson, a doctrine, the 
communication of an art,—the art of placing the pleasantly aesthetic, the welcome, 
elements of life at an advantage in one’s view of it till they seemed to occupy the 
entire surface” (29). Yet although Pater uses this language of teaching, it is clear the 
evoked aesthetic education counters formal teaching.  Jasmin, who gifts Gaston with 
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 Truant texts are defined relative to the curricular standards of the time, of course. For us and the 
Victorians, The Golden Ass may be canonical literature, one of the “ideal remains of literature” 
education professes to deal with. For us to understand or enjoy it untranslated requires extensive 
classical training within institutional bounds. However, Pater’s characterization of Flavian’s yellow-
wrapped book suggests that it serves the boys in the way a popular yellow-backed French novel might 
serve an Oxford undergraduate.  
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Ronsard’s poetry, is introduced as part of a company that has “detached themselves by 
an irresistible natural effectiveness from the surface of that youthful scholastic world 
around the episcopal throne of Chartres (24). This detachment marks Jasmin as an 
absentee, happily escaped from ecclesiastical, scholarly authority. Insofar as the term 
“scholastic” is not used generally, but to describe a particular philosophical clerically-
inspired pedagogy that flourished at Chartres, Pater shows Jasmin’s revolt against a 
hegemonic intellectual tradition; he resists the training that would optimally make him 
a priest and aspires to become a poet. But we need not derive the anti-institutional 
nature of Jasmin’s gift by associating it with his anti-scholastic nature. Pater directly 
links the Odes to escaping the classroom learning:   
Just eighteen years old, and the work of the poet’s own youth, it took 
possession of Gaston with the ready intimacy of one’s equal in age, fresh at 
every point; and he experienced what it is the function of contemporary poetry 
to effect anew for sensitive youth in each succeeding generation. The truant 
and irregular poetry of his own nature, all in solution there, found an external 
and authorised mouth-piece, ranging itself rightfully, as the latest achievement 
of human soul in this matter, along with the consecrated poetic voice of the 
past (27).  
In this account of how modern poetry, conceived and esteemed by youth, struggles to 
be valued alongside canonized, ancient poetry, the Odes are personified as a fellow 
who inspires Gaston to rebellion—who verbalizes his “truant and irregular” desires, to 
defy institutional bounds and canonical schools of taste.  
Yet another of Pater’s narratives, the imaginary portrait “Emerald Uthwart,” 
valorizes the independent discovery of literature by youth, and disparages prescribed 
reading. Pater marvels: 
In every generation of schoolboys there are a few who find out, almost for 
themselves, the beauty and power of good literature, even in the literature they 
must read perforce; and this, in turn, is but the handsel of a beauty and power 
still active in the actual world, should they have the good fortune, or rather, 
acquire the skill, to deal with it properly. It has something of the stir and 
unction– this intellectual awaking with a leap–of the coming of love. So it was 
with Uthwart about his seventeenth year. (219) 
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Once more, Pater prefers the truant text for aesthetic training, suggesting that the act 
of making texts mandatory reading—textbooks—is very good way to blind students to 
not only the strength and beauty of the proscribed reading, but literature generally. Yet 
even in a curriculum, select students, almost entirely unaided by teachers or 
schoolmates, still manage to discover the virtues of good literature. The aesthetic 
power contained in books then alerts these students to the bounty of “beauty and 
power” at work in life, a source of joy that awaits one who makes himself receptive to 
it. But what we should note here is how this act of reading has been eroticized. For 
Emerald Uthwart, this intellectual awakening to aesthetic influence is like a love-
affair, a textually inspired inamoration. We might argue that in each of the sessions of 
Pater’s sessions of truant reading it is the text becomes the source, conduit and object 
of desire rather than the teacher who has been excluded from the scene of learning. 
Pater accomplishes this by personifying the text, lending it attributes from its author, 
or owner. In his analysis of Marius the Epicurean, Matthew Potolsky argues that when 
Marius is reading The Golden Ass, he is actually undergoing a team-taught lesson by 
Apuleius’ text and Flavian. According to Potolsky, we know the identity between the 
tenets that the book and Flavian offer to Marius because of the conflation that Pater 
makes between the text and the teacher.  
The effects of his two teachers are nearly indistinguishable, their ‘attitude of 
mind’ identical. Marius's relation to the ‘golden’ Flavian (from the Latin 
flavus, meaning ‘yellow-gold’) is increasingly assimilated to his reading of 
Apuleius's ‘golden book.’ This assimilation becomes particularly clear in 
Pater's description of the physical book that the boys read, which is covered 
with ‘yellow wrapper’ and inscribed, ‘after the title,’ with Flavian's name” 
(715).  
However, we might question the idea of a doubled lesson. Marius and Flavian both 
escape school precincts for this truant reading in the granary, a space we might see as 
a zone of truancy in which all normal roles and functions associated with formal 
learning are suspended for a different kind of education. If this is so, Flavian’s official 
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role as Marius’ tutor has also been suspended, and the attendant dangers of that 
position are also laid aside in the reading of Apuleius’ book. The Golden Ass instead 
takes up the work of education, assuming something of the identity and blond or 
bronzed beauty of Flavian, who has temporarily abdicated his tutorial role.  
Pater not only personifies Ronsard’s Odes as a schoolboy, but eroticizes the 
relationship between the text and its reader by having the truant poems take 
“possession” of Gaston with “ready intimacy.” As the text provides Gaston with its 
doctrine, we see the potential erotic union between student and teacher displaced for 
an eroticized relation between the reader and the word. This relationship also offers a 
romanticized contact with the author, as Pater explains:  
And yet the gifted poet seemed but to have spoken what was already in 
Gaston’s own mind, what he had longed to say, had been just going to say: so 
near it came, that it had the charm of a discovery of one’s own. Perhaps that 
was because the poet told one so much about himself, of his love-secrets 
especially, how love and nothing else filled his mind. He was in truth but 
“love’s secretary,” noting from hour to hour its minutely changing fortunes. 
Yes! That was the reason why visible, audible, sensible things glowed so 
brightly, why there was luxury in sounds, words, rhythms, of the new light 
come on the world, of that wonderful freshness. (26) 
Still living, the “gifted poet” is a prematurely aged Prior, but for Gaston, Ronsard’s 
poetry, “the work of [his] own youth,” arrests the poet’s persona in its springtide. That 
persona, as fresh as the eighteen year old text itself, is similarly capable of seizing the 
reader with “ready intimacy.” Listening to the poet reveal himself, Gaston enjoys 
perfect sympathy with him. In Ronsard’s poetry, he does not so much encounter 
another’s thought as discover his own convictions anticipated and clearly expressed.  
This conceit, which evokes the trope prolepsis, minimizes Ronsard’s role as one who 
instructs through his work, removing us once again from the dangerous zone of formal 
instruction; it is as if author and reader meld, share one mind. Pater explains this 
fanciful identification by reminding us that the Odes largely confess how Ronsard 
experiences youthful love. When he tells of “his love-secrets especially, how love and 
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nothing else filled his mind” he presents the innermost part of himself to Gaston, who 
equally consumed by love shows his romantic hunger as he yearns for “poetry, as 
intimately near, as corporeal, as the new faces of the hour” (27). While classical poetry 
can move him “with no more directness than the beautiful faces of antiquity which are 
not here for us to see and unaffectedly love,” Ronsard’s work, fresh and modern, 
fulfills his need for an art that touches him because he can touch it. It is the experience 
of this love that quickens Ronsard’s, then Gaston’s aesthetic sensibility, their 
awareness of how “visible, audible [and] sensible things” press on us. 
Plato and Platonism provides a final example of strange textual embodiment. 
There Pater argues that for Plato “all knowledge was like knowing a person.  The 
Dialogue itself, being, as it is, the special creation of his literary art, becomes in his 
hands, and by his masterly conduct of it, like a single living person; so comprehensive 
a sense does he bring to bear upon it of the slowly-developing physiognomy of the 
thing—its organic structure, its symmetry and expression” (115).  To encounter the 
dialogue, Plato’s privileged pedagogical form, is to scrutinize a youthful face as its 
beauty waxes—we might recall Pater’s Mona Lisa, her beauty wrought out from 
within upon the flesh” deposited “little cell by cell.” By contrast, Pater associates the 
academic treatise, with its “ambitious array of premiss and conclusion” (157) and its 
confident “scholastic all-sufficiency” (157) with the morbidity of a “dogmatic system, 
the dry bones of which rattle in one’s ears” (156). His characterization rejects the 
formal lecture or “treatise in embryo” as well (158). 
Now why does Pater fetishize these texts so? What makes him desire to turn 
the word to flesh, calling for a corporeal poetry that is like a new face, or an intimate 
friend? Why does he blur the boundary that separates art from life?  His essay on 
Winckelmann suggests that personifying art allowed him to imagine a scene of 
aesthetic education wherein the dangers of learning from another are neutralized, and 
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the best aspects of autodidacticism are accentuated. The rapacious intensity of Queen 
Margot and the inattentive attitude of Winckelmann’s professors represent  extremes 
of pedagogical affect that imperil Pater’s developing aesthetes, but  Winckelmann’s 
countenance, which blends “ardour and indifference” so that they are “by no means 
incompatible” promises that he might be a teacher in whom these extremes moderate 
each others effects. If Winckelmann achieves this affective equilibrium, however, it is 
only by learning or assuming the affective serenity of art—even as that art warms its 
indifferent, plastic chill by taking on some quality of human character. 
 
V  The Educational Exemplarity of Winckelmann and Goethe 
 
When we last saw Winckelmann, he was taking his education into his own 
hands. Not understanding him as a “new source of culture” who will expound the 
aesthetics of newly discovered Greek art, his teachers neglect him. When the art-
historian’s independent investigations lead him to classical sculpture, Pater explains 
his methodology as a corrective to the undextrous suppression he suffered: he 
“apprehended the subtlest principles of the Hellenic manner, not through the 
understanding, but by instinct or touch” (154). Deprived of the educative caress that 
fosters our development by drawing us out of ourselves [e-ducere—to lead out] 
Winckelmann gains the very knowledge he needs from the cupped hand of sculpture 
itself.  Fingering the Greek marbles, he is in touch with the ancient world; “it 
penetrates him, and becomes part of his temperament. He remodels his writings with 
constant renewal of insight; he catches the thread of a whole new sequence of laws in 
some hollowing of the hand or dividing of the hair” (155).   
At Halle, Winckelmann’s professors fail to welcome him into their intellectual 
fraternity because they cannot recognize him as “the votary of the gravest of 
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intellectual traditions.” But by focusing on the tactile sources of Winckelmann’s 
knowledge, Pater situates him within a transhistorical brotherhood in which 
knowledge flows mystically from one initiate to another, rather than being validated 
by the (professional) teacher or communicated by his cumbersome didactic methods. 
The term “votary” marks  the lineage Winckelmann joins as religious; as James Eli 
Adams notes in Dandies and Desert Saints, the art historian’s interaction with 
sculpture recalls the laying on of hands that Christian priests use to transmit pastoral 
authority during ordination. The ritual touching of hand to hand or hand on body is 
merely one point of contact in a vast chain—as Adams puts it, “a homosocial 
continuum across history, in which past and present are linked by a masculine relay of 
charismatic power, power that is communicated through…apostles of Christ or relics 
of Greek sculpture”(159). In handling art, Winckelmann imitates the gestures of all 
who have reverentially touched or created art; he memorializes their contact, touches 
them through the statues and assumes their authority. As Winckelmann “remodels” his 
writings after contact with art we see him taking on the role of a sculptor or 
clayshaper, those artists who may have had a hand in creating the very sculpture he 
touches. His knowledge becomes like the firsthand knowledge of the artist rather than 
that of the critic who understands aesthetic theory, but cannot realize it. 
The manual rituals of apostolic succession offer Winckelmann one means of 
self-authorization through bypassing the teacher’s disseminatory methods, but Pater’s 
use of this image is not wholly Christian.  Winckelmann’s fingertips give him 
aesthetic “insight” that he experiences as if it were the “reminiscence of a forgotten 
knowledge hidden for a time in the mind itself; as if the mind of one, lover and 
philosopher at once, were beginning its intellectual career over again, yet with a 
certain power of anticipating its results.” This concept of mentally stored knowledge, 
ready to be recovered rather than discovered or learned, is called anamnesis, 
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reminiscence. It appears in Platonic texts such as the Meno and Phaedrus where it is 
connected with the mystical idea of metempsychosis, transmigration of the soul. 
Because the soul has had many lives in different bodies, it has accumulated learning 
and experience that a person may recall fragmentarily. Thus did the ancients explain 
mental phenomena such as déjà vu and intuition.   Pater fascination with anamnesis 
appears in his earliest surviving text “Diaphaneitè,” wherein he outlines the 
characteristics of an ideal type who possesses a latent “magnificent intellectual force” 
“like the reminiscence of a forgotten culture that once adorned the mind; as if the 
mind…were beginning its spiritual progress over again, but with a certain power of 
anticipating its stages.” Anamnesis is always connected with subverting the teacher’s 
function in Pater’s work. By situating knowledge in the student already, the theory of 
remembering rejects a pedagogical model in which the learned teacher fills the 
learner’s empty mind. At best, the teacher’s questioning serves only as a mnemonic 
aid for the student, but this role is not necessary in any pedagogical accounts that 
concern anamnesis—images, experiences and sensations can stir the memory. In Plato 
and Platonism, Pater explains how Socrates’ understanding of reminiscence supports 
his claim that he does not teach: 
Yes, certainly; the Pythagoreans are right in saying that what we call learning 
is in fact reminiscence—:νάµνησις famous word! and Socrates proceeds to 
show in what precise way it is impossible or possible to find out what you 
don’t know: how that happens.  In full use of the dialogue . . . Plato, dramatic 
always, brings in one of Meno’s slaves, a boy who . . . knows nothing of 
geometry: introduces him, we may fancy, into a mathematical lecture-room 
where diagrams are to be seen on the walls, cubes and the like lying on the 
table--particular objects, the mere sight of which will rouse him when 
subjected to the dialectical treatment, to universal truths concerning them.  The 
problem required of him is to describe a square of a particular size: to find the 
line which must be the side of such a square; and he is to find it for himself.  
Meno, carefully on his guard, is to watch whether the boy is taught by Socrates 
in any of his answers; whether he answers anything at any point otherwise than 
by way of reminiscence and really out of his own mind, as the reasonable 
questions of Socrates fall like water on the seed-ground, or like sunlight on the 
photographer’s negative.  (66)  
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When the boy, led by Socrates’ questioning, does deduce the right answer, Pater notes 
“Those notions were in the boy, they and the like of them, in all boys and men; and he 
did not come by them in this life, a young slave in Athens.  Ancient, half-obliterated 
inscriptions on the mental walls, the mental tablet, seeds of knowledge to come, shed 
by some flower of it long ago, it was in an earlier period of time they had been laid up 
in him, to blossom again now, so kindly, so firmly!” (66)  
Anamnesis functions here by appealing to an originary scene of writing, where 
the mind becomes a textual surface. However, although the knowledge that powers 
reminiscence first appears as mentally inscribed writing, Pater jarringly alters his 
metaphor, representing it as a seed. How might we explain this metaphorical shift? To 
begin with, the blurred boundary between life and art that the shift from textual to 
organic metaphors expose is already present in the architectural metaphor that renders 
our interiority as if it were a chamber. Cancelling the necessity for a potentially 
traumatic moment of teaching “in this life”, Pater imagines a long past moment when 
the mind became the artistic site of inscription, a tablet. Because the mind has been a 
space for art (as writing, as architecture) we need no education now. But this metaphor 
too risks being hijacked by the teacher, for who dictates or writes the words that adorn 
the walls? To avoid this question of human agency, knowledge must become like the 
seeds that flowers haphazardly shed. And yet, Pater does not fully escape imagining an 
agent who directs these germs. Syntactically, adverbs “kindly” and “firmly” may 
modify the manner of knowledge’s blossoming, but the sense of the words make 
“laid” a possible verb that the words apply to.  If this is so, although Pater insists that 
no teaching happens in this life he still flirts with the possibility that once, some 
resolute, well-meaning person was responsible for implanting the knowledge that now 
obviates a less kindly instruction. But the way Pater buries this agency in his grammar 
suggests that even if this is a possibility, it is a hope too wild or too unlikely to be fully 
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acknowledged. The image of knowledge shed freely as from an exploding seed-pod 
predominates here, rather than knowledge planted by the husbandman. 
As Pater imagines “all boys and men”—and only boys and men—who nourish 
the knowledge that waits within to germinate, he echoes the generative imagery of  
Plato’s Symposium, which imagines education as a kind of procreation that men 
accomplish without women. Although Meno is not seeded by Socrates, a rhetorical 
move that would evoke a too didactic insertion of ideas and make the sexual charge of 
education all too explicit, his fertile mind,  watered   by Socrates questioning, is 
fruitful, thus analogizing the male parturition of the Symposium. “Winckelmann” also 
sexualizes the way memory is deployed by limiting the powerful knowledge offered 
by anamnesis to one who is both “lover and philosopher at once” (Renaissance, 155).  
This philosophizing lover identifies himself by the quality of his touch. Imagining 
sculptures unearthed at the Renaissance, Pater describes how the “buried fire of 
ancient art” erupts into the “frozen world.” This metaphor obviously likens the ascent 
of the unearthed sculptures to upwelling magma, but Pater is also trying to convey the 
burning sensuality with which classical art is associated, intensity deemed dangerous 
by the ascetic. We realize the latent danger posed by sculpture as we watch 
Winckelmann safely “fondle those pagan marbles with unsinged hands, with no sense 
of shame or loss.” Here, Pater gives a negative account of how to approach the art: to 
touch it safely is to be free of “shame or loss.” But closer reading of the text reveals 
the feeling Winckelmann must possess to approach art safely: “Enthusiasm,–that, in 
the broad Platonic sense of the Phaedrus, was the secret of his divinatory Power over 
the Hellenic world. This enthusiasm, dependent as it is to a great degree on bodily 
temperament, has a power of re-enforcing the purer emotions of the intellect with an 
almost physical excitement.” No mere delight, it is a passion that “burns like lava.”  In 
its original religious sense, enthusiasm is divine possession, entheos. Therefore, as 
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Linda Dowling notes, by invoking the “broad Platonic sense of the Phaedrus” Pater 
alludes to the mania that text examines, “possession by the god of love, the paederastic 
Eros” (96). Winckelmann’s reminiscence becomes grounded in the homoerotic and 
fetishistic desire he feels towards Greek art; the representative type of which is 
masculine.  Burning with his lava-like enthusiasm, Winckelmann’s body becomes 
akin to the molten stone of the art he appreciates; he is not harmed because his contact 
with the stony skin of sculpture is a meeting of like to like.  
Dismayed by the ascetic inattention of Winckelmann’s professors, Pater 
imagines his self-education as a richly sensuous and erotic process that works outside 
the university, and without teachers. Imagining this type of education. Pater ensures 
that Winckelmann has the sensuous experience and aesthetic knowledge to actually 
provide the ideal education he himself lacks. While it provides the record of his 
autodidactic triumph, Pater’s essay also imagines Winckelmann mentoring many 
young men, and considers his instructive influence on Goethe in particular. 
Certainly, of that beauty of living form which regulated Winckelmann’s 
friendships, it could not be said that it gave no pain. One notable friendship, 
the fortune of which we may trace through his letters, begins with an antique, 
chivalrous letter in French and ends noisily in a burst of angry fire. Far from 
reaching the quietism, the bland indifference of art, such attachments are 
nevertheless more susceptible than others of equal strength of a purely 
intellectual culture. Of passion or physical excitement, they contain only just 
so much as stimulates the eye to the finest delicacies of colour and form. These 
friendships, often the caprices of a moment, make Winckelmann’s letters, with 
their troubled colouring, an instructive but bizarre addition to the History of 
Art, that shrine of grave and mellow light around the mute Olympian family. 
(153) 
The “passion and physical excitement” within Winckelmann’s relationships 
“stimulates the eye to the finest delicacies of colour and form,” marrying erotic 
experience to aesthetic perception. Thus it is that the art critic’s “antique, chivalrous” 
missives to young men—courtly love letters—serve as “instructive” supplements to 
his opus on art history. But even though the eroticism of these relationships surpasses 
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that of the other pedagogical relationships Winckelmann has experienced, they still 
hold cause for concern. Winckelmann’s ardour, like Queen Margot’s, risks running 
out of control. That is why Pater assures his reader that characteristically, “such 
attachments” hold only “just so much” eroticism, just enough to further aesthetic 
insight. Pater does not specify how much this measure” is, which leaves the range of 
desire and physicality of the friendship completely open, but he tries to give the 
impression that this desire falls under strict regulation. The feelings in Winckelmann’s 
friendships, however, hardly seem contained; Pater notes the explosive argument 
between the critic and his friend that painfully ends intimacy “in a burst of angry fire.” 
While the intensity of these friendships makes them susceptible “of a purely 
intellectual culture” the raging emotions involved endanger the learning they foster.  
In lamenting the doomed rendezvous of Goethe and Winckelmann, Pater observes: 
Yet perhaps, it is not fanciful to regret that his proposed meeting with Goethe 
never took place. Goethe, then in all the pregnancy of his wonderful youth, still 
unruffled by the “press and storm” of his earlier manhood, was awaiting 
Winckelmann with a curiosity of the worthiest kind. As it was, Winckelmann 
became to him something like what Virgil was to Dante. And Winckelmann, 
with his fiery friendships, had reached that age and that period of culture at 
which emotions hitherto fitful, sometimes concentrate themselves in a vital 
unchangeable relationship. German literary history seems to have lost the 
chance of one of those famous friendships, the very tradition of which becomes 
a stimulus to culture, and exercises an imperishable influence. (157) 
If Winckelmann and Goethe were to have had a celebrated friendship that would 
influence and stimulate culture, the precondition is that Winckelmann’s fitful emotions 
settle down. Pater imagines a Goethe who, aloof to the passions of both Sturm und 
Drang and early manhood, could be both disciple and model of emotional stability for 
the older man. Paired with Goethe in Pater’s fancy is an aged Winckelmann who 
reaches a stage in life where the fire of his fitful emotions burns less ardently and 
could settle into “a vital unchangeable relationship” with the right protégé. This 
mature calm resembles that “happy decay of the passions” Pater sees Plato yearning 
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for in Plato and Platonism. Yet Pater is aware that all this is speculative, merely a tale 
of what-ifs. “Perhaps it is not fanciful” to desire this impossible meeting. Perhaps 
Winckelmann’s emotions, as passions “sometimes” do, would have concentrated 
themselves into an everlasting desired friendship.  
Given the unpredictability of romantic friendships, Pater might well long for 
“the quietism, the bland indifference” that a relationship with art promises, but that 
man’s impassioned fellowship with man always falls short of. As he reflects on the 
fiery pain caused by Winckelmann’s “romantic fervent friendships with young men”, 
men whose “beauty of living form” marks them as sentient sculptures, his imagery 
evokes and contrasts with his later description of how the art critic is harmlessly 
inflamed by the fire of Greek art.  Winckelmann’s invulnerability may be read as 
Pater’s attempt to combine the intensity of our love for persons with the controlled 
innocuousness of our love for art. Art’s “quietism” offers a lesson on how to avoid the 
passionate outbursts that destroy pedagogical relationships in fire and noise. 
 In mirroring the “fire of ancient art” with the lava of Winckelmann’s 
enthusiasm, Pater clearly sees the moments when Winckelmann is in communion with 
art as moments when he achieves the status of art, or at least takes on its attributes.  
But in his relationship with his lovers and students, he clearly does not maintain that 
status. Pater, like Winckelmann, assigns art an essential harmlessness, an evenness of 
affect. But if he cannot attain the status of art in life, Pater grants it to him in death, 
through the imagination of his readers:  
Goethe’s fragments of art-criticism contain a few pages of strange pregnancy 
on the character of Winckelmann. He speaks of the teacher who had made his 
career possible, but whom he had never seen, as of an abstract type of culture, 
consummate, tranquil, withdrawn already into the region of ideals, yet 
retaining colour from the incidents of a passionate intellectual life. He classes 
him with certain works of art, possessing an inexhaustible gift of suggestion to 
which criticism may return again and again with renewed freshness. “One 
learns nothing from him,” he says to Eckermann, “but one becomes 
something.” (141) 
 85 
The metaphor that describes cultural production by imagining one man’s impregnation 
by another is drawn from Plato’s Symposium, in which Diotima explains to Socrates 
how pederastic relations help men to realize the ideas gestating in their minds. 
Diotima famously values the spirit over the body, and platonic over sexual love, but 
the corporeality of her metaphor for intellectual collaboration counters her asceticism, 
summoning the sensual to mind as we ponder by what intimacy men become pregnant, 
by which way Goethe attains “all the pregnancy of his wonderful youth.” Although we 
know Goethe and Winckelmann never meet, for an instant we may imagine their 
union. But Pater then works to undo this closeness. Goethe never embraces 
Winckelmann as a lover; he only glimpses him as a specter. Separated by death from 
the young poet, manifest to him only through his words, Winckelmann, classed with 
“certain works of art” dwells in a Platonic heaven of ideals, where he is “consummate, 
tranquil, withdrawn.” No longer immersed in passionate intellectual exertion, he only 
bears passion’s traces, as the corpse retains spots of color amid a waxing pallor; the 
dangerous fire that would endanger Goethe’s aesthetic education is gone. Canonized 
among other artistic masterpieces, Winckelmann enables Goethe to achieve the 
disciplined emotional state he himself lacks.  “Through the tumultuous richness of 
Goethe’s culture, the influence of Winckelmann is always discernible, as the strong 
regulative under-current of a clear, antique motive.” The “tumultuous richness of 
Goethe’s culture” is regulated by what is most artistic in Winckelmann, his Hellenic 
character. By invoking the terms “clear”, “antique” and “under-current”  Pater 
metamorphoses the art critic into an embodiment of  classicism, the “absorbed 
underground” tradition characterized by “the clear ring, the eternal outline of the 
antique.” The art-critic, through his texts, serves for the poet the same role that Greek 
art served for him. And yet, although Winckelmann’s influence is so discernible in 
Goethe, Goethe does not see him as his teacher, as he states to Eckermann. We might 
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understand this as yet another rejection of the teacher as a figure who endangers 
because of his human unpredictability. While learning from someone raises the 
possibility that one’s learning has been dictated by another’s purpose, Winckelmann 
enables Goethe to become something. This process of becoming is not clearly 
directed, leaving Goethe more autonomy in his learning; Winckelmann’s influence on 
the poet can be construed as catalysis of self-directed development rather than an 
influence that determines particular goals or paths to education.  
 
VI  The Dialogue of the Mind with Itself: Paterian Pedagogy and Textual Form 
 
While the ideal of pedagogical intimacy fascinates Pater, eroticism between 
student and teacher presents dangers that encourage him to look beyond their 
troublesome amorous relations and to construe education as a loving, autodidactic 
encounter with an instructive artwork. What should be a relation between two people 
becomes communion with an object, either a human being transfigured into art, in the 
case of Goethe reflecting on Winckelmann, or an art-object that occupies a liminal 
space between life and art, cloaked with a humanity projected on it by the spectator. 
Understanding Pater’s interest in this fetishistic, impersonal moment allows us to 
correct and complicate accounts of Pater’s teaching style that cast him as an 
unfailingly optimistic about educational relationships. 
In considering Paterian pedagogy, Matthew Kaiser contests the “retreat 
hypothesis” that informs criticism of Marius the Epicurean.  As is well known, Pater 
removed his “Conclusion” from second edition of The Renaissance, lest it “possibly 
mislead” or seduce [seducere – to lead astray] its young male readers. Having written 
Marius the Epicurean, he restored the conclusion, noting that the novel dealt more 
fully with the concepts suggested in the shorter text. As Kaiser argues, some readers 
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understood these events as “a retreat, an attempt by Pater to temper his headiness, to 
reconcile with aestheticism with the ethical instruction, the moral forthrightness 
demanded of his profession” (189).  Furthermore, these readers may have taken the 
“generic structure of Marius itself” as a corrective to the seductive pedagogical form 
of The Renaissance. Marius is a Victorian Bildungsroman, “the nineteenth century 
genre which…most enthusiastically promotes self-discipline and socialization” (189). 
Specifically, the Bildungsroman curbs the excessive individualism of  the young—as 
Douglas Mao reminds us, its ideal ending is “one in which the protagonist comes to 
accommodation with a society that has thrown up obstacles to the desires and impulses 
of youth” (7). Drawing out what is implicit in Kaiser’s argument, we may argue that 
the essay form that comprises The Renaissance allows a writer (and challenges its 
young reader) to try [essayer: to attempt, to weigh] the depths of his subjectivity and 
to present himself in all the ways he differs from others and does not conform to 
society’s configurations. Pater’s writing repeatedly foregrounds how the essay 
challenges us to write ourselves into being and to realize our difference from others. In 
Gaston de Latour, he examines the quintessential essayist, Montaigne, noting his 
“undissembled egotism” (54) and how his Essays are a product and producer of this 
introspection (54). “I have no other end in writing but to discover myself” writes the 
philosopher (54). His self-scrutiny allows him to realize that the self is inherently 
divided and that a truly uniform society, with all settled in its fixed place, is 
impossible: “What are we but sedition? Like this poor France, faction against faction 
within ourselves…with as much difference between us and ourselves as between 
ourselves and others” (54-55).  
 For the retreat hypothesis to function, we must assume that “seduction and 
ethics are mutually exclusive” and that “the socializing mission of the Bildungsroman 
is incompatible with the seductive agenda” (190). By examining how Platonic 
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philosophy and Hellenic studies moved to the centre of the Oxford curriculum, Kaiser 
astutely shows how Greek philosophy proposed a “lost ethical dimension to 
seduction” (190), and how that seductive ethical system, both as a homoerotic practice 
and a process of intellectual wandering, is portrayed in Marius.  He then discusses 
literary form to address the socializing function of the novel of development. While 
we have foregrounded the tensions between the essay and the Bildungsroman, we 
should recall that Pater says the Platonic dialogue is “essentially an essay” and it is 
dialogue that Kaiser opposes to the Bildungsroman, arguing that not only does Marius 
represent education as a conversation that occurs “in pairs, seductive couplings, 
sometimes even in larger parties, pedagogical assemblages” (198), it is dialogic in the 
Bakhtinian sense, because it disrupts the unitary form of the traditional Bildungsroman 
with a “centrifugal army of subgenres, asides, professorial lectures, translation , and 
myriad fragments of texts” (199). For Kaiser, this dialogized heteroglossia allows 
Pater to show his own hand in the educational process. While the dialogue and the 
Bildungsroman both “aim to produce viable adult subjects, to present their youthful 
audiences with models of meritorious citizenship” the Bildungsroman “socializes by 
obfuscating the contradiction inherent to bourgeois individuality” that is, it first makes 
the subject experience the goals of socialization, self-discovery and self-determination 
as unproblematically identical, and then it hides that the process of individuation is not 
managed independently, but is directed by mentors who guide the subject into 
socialization and who are nevertheless dependent on the subject for their power, which 
is not inherent, but arises relationally  (194). By contrast, the dialogue foregrounds the 
fact that the individual’s socialization (and self-discovery) is “the by-product of 
reciprocity between a susceptible youth and an inherently needy authority” (196). 
 Kaiser’s reading allows us to understand how the dialogic ideal that drove the 
Oxford tutorial made its mark on the Victorian novel. He also enables us to assess how 
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Pater eroticizes the political work of demystifying liberal ideology since it is in the 
process of seducing the student into his proper social space that Pater’s pedagogical 
narrator calls attention to his loving manipulation. But in his zeal to show how Pater 
presents “his reader with an alternative to bourgeois individuality: an ethical 
subjectivity rooted in reciprocity” he makes an overreaching general statement about 
Paterian subjectivity: 
The Paterian subject is dialogic, one could say, rather than soliloquistic. 
Individuation is marked not by involution, a turning-inward, introversion, but 
by exchange, a passing-between, communication. For Pater, the fantasy of an 
unified autonomous subject belies the contradictory and multiplicitous—
indeed, historicist—nature of subjectivity. Bildung therefore is never 
experienced in Marius as soliloquy, as conversation with oneself, but rather as 
dialogue, as influence by another. (197) 
 Even if we accept that this is a true portrait of Bildung in Marius, we cannot state that 
the Paterian subject is universally dialogic. Because he does not turn to Pater’s later 
dialectical theories, Kaiser does not appreciate the ways in which Pater’s dialogism is 
constantly collapsing into soliloquy, and how what seems to be intersubjective 
communication among his characters is often introversion.  
Bolstering Kaiser’s case, in Plato and Platonism, Pater does claim dialogue is 
“the instrument most fit…of whatever what we call teaching and learning may really 
be” (54). But we might immediately be suspicious of this claim, for Pater, unlike many 
of his disciples, wrote no pedagogical dialogues. Despite his equation of the essay and 
the dialogue, might he have not been moved to write at least one dialogue in classic 
form? His reluctance to do so might alert us to his unusual conception of what the 
dialogue is. While dialogue may provide the best means for a teacher to influence a 
student, that mode of influence is not necessarily designed to foster awareness of 
others and exchange with them. Hence Pater is able to explain Socratic pedagogy in 
this way: “To make Meno, Poles, Charmides, really interested in himself, to help him 
to the discovery of that wonderful world here at home—in this effort, even more than 
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in making him interested in other people or things (it is no sophistical paradox) lay and 
still lies the central business of education” (80). Here, the unexplored richness of one’s 
interiority is figured as an entire world that fits within the domestic space of the mind. 
Just as Pater describes in The Renaissance, within the “inward world of thought and 
feeling” the “whole scope of observation is dwarfed into the narrow chamber of the 
individual mind” (187). Although it is the teacher’s task to make the student chart this 
space, here Pater does not require the teacher to foreground his role in helping the 
student turn inward; because the commitment to exploring that interiority outweighs 
any interest in other people or things, there is no need for the teacher to demonstrate 
that the student’s individuation is enabled by an intersubjective process, and no 
guarantee that the student will experience his education as dialogic, whether or not it 
actually is. The sentence alone demonstrates the teacher’s disappearance and 
unaccountability; it is not specifically Socrates’ business to interest young men in 
themselves, but the abstract institution of education, which in its transhistorical 
impersonality cannot be called to give an account of its mechanisms. Describing the 
philosophy student’s education, Pater further insists that “the essential, or dynamic, 
dialogue, is ever that dialogue of the mind with itself, which any converse with 
Socrates or Plato does but promote.  The very words of Plato then challenge us 
straightaway to larger and finer apprehension of the processes of our own minds” 
(129). What else is this self-reflexive discourse but soliloquy? Pater distances the 
moment of learning here from contact with another person—the true benefit of 
dialogue with another, whether that other is a textualized voice or a living interlocutor, 
is that it helps us question ourselves over our beliefs, rather than forcing us to declare 
our truth in response to another’s prodding. In the preceding description of reading, we 
do not even have a moment to consider the words of the other as different or to 
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imagine the value of those words to the other, we “straightaway” retreat inwards to 
consider the workings of our own minds.  
 The image of the mind in soliloquy comes from Matthew Arnold’s critique of 
introverted self consciousness. In his “Preface to the First Edition of Poems” Arnold 
explains that he excluded “Empedocles” from his collected poetry because it 
exemplified the spirit of modernity, not Apollonian classicism. In it: “the calm, the 
cheerfulness, the disinterested objectivity have disappeared, the dialogue of the mind 
with itself has commenced; modern problems have presented themselves, we hear 
already the doubts, we witness the discouragements of  Hamlet and of Faust ” (10). In 
portraying the mindset of Empedocles, the poem depicts and creates in its audience a 
state of suffering that find no “vent in action, in which a continuous state of mental 
distress is prolonged, unrelieved by incident, hope or resistance, in which there is 
everything to be endured, nothing to be done” (11). For Pater, this mode where action 
is suspended in favor of contemplation, where doubts reign, is hardly a state of 
suffering. Rather it is the normal mode of philosophical skepticism, in which the 
subject, doubtful of knowing outward existence, explores the structures of his mind as 
he might appreciate the interior decoration of his home: 
To make men interested in themselves, as being the very ground of all reality 
for them... that was the essential function of the Socratic method: to flash light 
into the house within, its many chambers, its memories and associations, upon 
its inscribed and pictured walls. Fully occupied there, as with his own essential 
business in his own home, the young man would become, of course, 
proportionately less interested...in what was superficial, in the mere outsides of 
other people and their occupations. (121) 
Pater writes the preceding passage after he has denounced Sophist professional 
pedagogy and its failure to make its students realize and declare what they believe 
most deeply about phenomena they perceive. Here he urges students to apprehend 
what he elsewhere calls the vraie verite, not mere fact, but one’s personal sense of it, 
“those more liberal and durable impressions which, in respect of any really 
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considerable person or subject…lie beyond, and must supplement, the narrower range 
of strictly ascertained facts” (121). It is only when one has plumbed the depths of 
one’s own subjectivity through introspection that one can then become interested in 
the depths of others. If we are too quick to claim Pater as a theorist of 
intersubjectivity, one whose textual “intrusions reiterate the reciprocal nature of 
socialization, demystify the dubious process of individuation, put a face upon the 
disembodied authority behind the Bildungsroman” we lose sight of how for him, too 
much traffic with others before one knows one’s self endangers aesthetic perception. 
We may lose sight of how solitude calls forth a creative imaginative faculty. Kaiser 
observes:  
Marius is never alone, never unitary. Even solitude is populated by subtle 
touches, the caress of others….To trust the touch of the invisible, to make 
loving companion of the seemingly insubstantial, to cohabit with sacred 
presences is the lesson to be drawn, certainly, from Pater’s translation of 
Apuleius’s “The Story of Cupid and Psyche,” in which Psyche incurs the 
displeasure of the gods by doubting the sanctity, the sublimity, of the unseen 
companion at her side. It is a lesson Marius takes to heart. (198) 
Kaiser is correct about this injunction to find companionship in solitude, but does not 
foreground that for Marius is the mind itself—the psyche—that is capable of making 
bringing the loving presence into existence.  
When we read Pater’s texts then, the essays that he states are successors to 
Platonic dialogues or the novels and short stories whose narrators and hybrid forms 
mark them as dialogic in the Bakhtinian sense, we are actually encountering texts that 
promote introspection, texts that prize soliloquy as the essential and primary form of 
intellectual labor. With this in mind, we might well return to the scene of instruction 
with which this chapter opened, wherein Oscar Wilde recognized Pater’s public 
lecture as a form of speech overheard, rather than heard by his audience. Pater, 
somewhat stung by Wilde’s quip, reproached him: “Mr. Wilde, you have a phrase for 
everything.” But if we wanted to read against Wilde’s criticism, to see what his wit did 
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not capture, we could see Pater’s soliloquy as an instructive performance in itself. 
Even as he stands before his audience as an authority, he seems to undermine that 
authority, drawing into the recesses of himself. But what we see is not a shameful or 
shy retreat; rather it exemplifies the introspective turn that Pater teaches his students to 
do. It is this inward movement that accompanies the creative autodidactic process 
whereby the student animates the texts around him, turning text to flesh. 
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CHAPTER 2 
“The Child in the Vatican”: Vernon Lee’s Gothic Aesthetic Pedagogy 
 
I  Descending the Stool – Renouncing Academic Authority 
 
“It is not easy to do what you have done…to make, viz. intellectual theorems 
seem like the life’s essence of the concrete, sensuous objects from which they have 
been abstracted. I always welcome this evidence of intellectual structure in a poetic or 
imaginative piece of criticism, as I think it is a very rare thing, and it is also an effect I 
have myself endeavoured after, and so come to know its difficulties” (Pater, Letters 
54).  Praise like this allows critics to call Vernon Lee, born Violet Paget, “the only 
pupil Pater acknowledged” (Schaffer 62). But while Pater and Lee both labor to make 
critical texts pulse with the life of the objects they analyze, they do so with different, 
even opposed, pedagogical intentions.  Pater deems the liveliness of texts and artworks 
as essentially benign. For him, it is the personified text that succors and playfully 
seduces the student when the teacher’s intellectual and amorous attention becomes 
perniciously unreliable. By contrast, there is little gentle about Lee’s animated 
artworks, which begin their aesthetic lessons with acts of erotic aggression against 
their students.  
Difficult to characterize, Lee was an essayist, novelist and short-story writer. 
Born to English parents in France and resident most of her life in Italy, in the waning 
years of the nineteenth century she served her British public as a window on 
Continental culture. She first drew literary attention for her Studies of the Eighteenth 
Century in Italy (1880), but with Belcaro: Sundry Essays on Aesthetical Questions 
(1881), she defined a fresh critical career for herself. Eager to represent ideas she had 
conceived “about art, considered not historically, but in its double relation to the artist 
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and the world for whom he works” (1), she killed the historian persona she had 
assumed for her intellectual debut and took the role of aesthete, posing “questions of  
artistic genesis and evolution”  and “artistic right and wrong” (4).   
Belcaro’s introduction, written to “one of my readers—the first and earliest” 
(1), explains Lee’s “highest ambition”: to “influence those young and powerful 
enough to act” upon her theories (1). She met her addressee, the poet Mary Robinson, 
in 1880, developing a relationship with her that would last nearly a decade. During 
this time, the pair introduced each other to artists and intellectuals from their 
respective social circles and inspired and critiqued each other’s work. Their 
attachment led the sexologist Havelock Ellis to suggest they “might serve as a possible 
case-history for the section on Lesbianism in Sexual Inversion” (Grosskurth 223), but 
their close collaboration was disrupted in 1888 when Robinson married. Lee suffered a 
nervous breakdown over this event, which she decried as the “sacrifice” of her 
companion’s beauty and brilliance to “a dwarf, a humpback, a cripple from birth” (qtd. 
in Colby 125). Although the women corresponded after the marriage, their relationship 
cooled. However, in 1881, still intimate with Robinson, Lee writes her in Belcaro’s 
preface, “my first thought is to place [my ideas] before you: it is, you see, a matter of 
conversion, and the nearest, most difficult convert is yourself” (1).  
We might parse Lee’s desire to convert Robinson as the simple desire to teach, 
with the print circulation of Belcaro enabling her to educate a wide audience alongside 
her friend. Such an ambition seems evident in Lee’s 1878 review of Hippolyte Taine’s 
books on art philosophy. Consoling her contemporaries, she notes that although Taine 
shows how “the work of artistic production is no longer in store for us, [the activity] of 
artistic appreciation is our special domain. . . .The works of the aesthetician and art-
historian, from Lessing and Winckelmann down to Ruskin and Taine, cannot indeed 
instruct us how to produce masterpieces, but they can teach us how to enjoy them (30). 
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We might expect that Lee desires to join this august company of teachers. But while 
she may wish to influence others to her way of thinking, by the time she reflects on 
Studies of the Eighteenth Century in Italy in the preface of Belcaro, teaching and the 
teacher’s position repel her: 
To plan, to work for such a book as that first one, seems to me now about the 
most incomprehensible of all things, to care for one particular historical 
moment, to study the details of one particular civilisation, to worry about 
finding out the exact when and how of any definite event; above all, to feel (as 
I felt) any desire to teach any specified thing to anybody; all this has become 
unintelligible to my sympathies of to-day. And it is natural: natural in mental 
growth that we are, to some extent, professorial and professorially self-
important and engrossed, before becoming restlessly and sceptically studious: 
we may teach some things before we even know the desire of learning others. 
Thus I, from my small magisterial chair or stool of 18th century expounder, 
have descended and humbly gone to school as a student of aesthetics. (4-5) 
Here, Lee presents herself as the professional interpreter of Italian history who holds a 
“magisterial chair.”17 But as she describes stepping down from her endowed chair and 
humbly returning to school, she imposes an unusual developmental model on the roles 
of professor and student.  Her former desire to teach belonged to an earlier state of 
mental growth when she was “professorially self-important and engrossed.” At this 
immature developmental stage, she acquired and disseminated knowledge in order to 
aggrandize herself. Hungry for the recognition that would nourish her sense of self-
importance, she sought an audience for her narrowly defined expertise and limited her 
intellectual ambitions. She was eager to teach “some things” as the “18th century 
expounder” rather than to remain “restlessly and sceptically studious” about a wider 
variety of things. Reflecting upon this younger version of herself, Lee suggests that the 
mature scholar must maintain peripatetic habits of thought; such a scholar has no time 
to teach because all her energies are devoted to learning and probing what she learns. 
                                                 
17
 This is audacious rhetoric. Lee renounces a professorial authority she cannot have—no woman held a 
full professorship at Oxbridge until 1939. Indeed, women were only admitted to hear lectures at Oxford 
in 1879. These female students were not full members of the University, could not earn degrees, and 
could still be barred from the classroom. Pater, for instance, did not allow women auditors. 
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The mature Lee will not delimit a fixed area of expertise from which to expound 
authoritatively. 
By analyzing Lee’s aversion to instructing others, above all her beloved Mary 
Robinson, we may situate her criticism within an anti-hermeneutical, anti-didactic 
aesthetic tradition. Rejecting historicism and valuing the appreciation of form over the 
interpretation of content, this aestheticism distrusts teachers, associating them with 
theories that distract from the sensuous immediacy of the art object. Perhaps the most 
famous recent proponent of a similar anti-theoretical stance is Susan Sontag, who in 
her essay “Against Interpretation” argues, “In most modern instances, interpretation 
amounts to the philistine refusal to leave the work of art alone. Real art has the 
capacity to make us nervous. By reducing the work of art to its content and then 
interpreting that, one tames the world of art. Interpretation makes art manageable, 
conformable” (8). Calling for criticism that would “reveal the sensuous surface of art 
without mucking about in it” Sontag concludes, “In place of a hermeneutics we need 
an erotics of art” (13, 14).  Belcaro could teach us how to devise such an erotics. 
Recording how one woman initiates her dearest companion into the thoughts that she 
holds most fervently, the text is already concerned by the issue of eroticism, but 
remarkably, it commemorates the relationship between Lee and Robinson by 
celebrating the sexual allure of anti-pedagogy, not pedagogy. Lee downplays 
narratives that eroticize a teacher’s masterful direction of her student to explore how 
art might seduce and instruct the student when no teacher, theory in hand, is at hand. 
If for Sontag, art untamed by interpretation renders us anxious with its erotic allure, 
Lee produces this nerve-racking experience for her contemporaries by writing 
aesthetic criticism in horror mode.  Borrowing her rhetoric from the anti-Catholic 
Gothic novel she recasts education as religious conversion, giving the art object an 
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unsettling power to come uncannily to life and entice the spectator to new forms of 
belief. 
To comprehend how Lee’s aesthetics reinforces her disdain of teaching let us 
analyze her philosophy alongside that of her mentor, Pater. While Lee’s late texts 
acknowledge him as her “master,” she never cites him in Belcaro, an omission that 
may reflect her anxiety over educational figures. Nevertheless, critic Laurel Brake 
remarks the “numerous” elements of his influence as it affects the theme, philosophy 
and structure of Lee’s text, an influence that informs Lee’s anti-didacticism (56). For 
Pater, finding pleasure in an object is necessary to practice proper aesthetic criticism. 
As he notes in The Renaissance, “The aesthetic critic then, regards all the objects with 
which he has to do, all works of art, and the fairer forms of nature and human life, as 
powers or forces producing pleasurable sensations, each of a more or less peculiar or 
unique kind. This influence he feels and wishes to explain, by analysing and reducing 
it to its elements” (xx). According to Pater, discriminating the “real, direct, aesthetic 
charm” of an art object from the “borrowed interest” that it gains from being placed in 
its proper historical context is “always pleasant” for the critic (15). One means of 
analyzing the pleasure one feels is to determine how successful the artwork is in its 
struggle to “be independent of the mere intelligence, to become a matter of pure 
perception”—a condition Pater finds when the artwork achieves “perfect identification 
of matter and form” (109).  In short, pleasure is paramount for Pater. Feeling aesthetic 
pleasure demands that the processes producing pleasure be investigated and describing 
how those processes operate produces more pleasure. Lee’s criticism is supported by 
and promotes Pater’s pleasure-seeking principles of criticism.  So critical is this 
pleasure to Lee that even the most accomplished aesthetic criticism would be an 
impoverished formalism if undertaken without it. We are accustomed to hearing 
aestheticism’s quarrel with historicist and moralistic modes of interpretation, but may 
 99 
find it strange that when Lee disparages the wrong kind of critical engagement with 
art, she scorns not only how we “expound the civilisation, the mode of thought” that 
gives rise to an artwork, but how we “trace the differences of school” and “approve 
and condemn” art (Belcaro, 23), how we “dabble deliciously in alternate purity and 
impurity” (23) and how we are “saturated with every kind of critically distilled 
aesthetic essence, till there is not a flavour and not a scent, good or bad, sweet or foul, 
which may not be perceived in this strange soul of ours” (22). Lee’s rhetoric of 
aesthetic flavors and scents suggests it is necessary to have a refined taste that can 
discriminate the elements that compose our aesthetic impressions. But she is critical of 
this keen discrimination when it is born solely from a taxonomical desire rather than 
from an attempt to explain the conditions that produce pleasure. We must discover 
how the work brings us joy, determining how and whether “in reality this antique art 
is, in the life of our feelings, at all important, comforting, influential” (23). 
Like Pater, Lee insists that the pleasure felt in the aesthetic encounter be 
immediate, or as he says, “direct.” Therefore she expresses dismay that “we are all of 
us getting more and more into the habit of enjoying, not so much art as the feelings 
and thoughts, the theories and passions for which we make it the excuse” (279).  These 
theories are objects that block access to art and therefore her criticism works “towards 
getting rid of those foreign, extra-artistic, irrelevant interests which aestheticians have 
since the beginning of time interposed between art and those who are intended to 
enjoy it” (13). Opposing these aestheticians, her “work has unconsciously enough, 
been to logically justify that perfectly simple, direct connection between art and 
ourselves, which was the one I had felt, as a child, before learning all the wonderful 
fantastication of art philosophers” (13). Associating abstract theory with processes of 
education, Lee idealizes her child self as one whose untutored, “felt” connection with 
art was only disrupted by learning the professional discourse of aestheticians.   
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Lee goes so far as to suggest that professional theoretical discourse destroys 
the artwork. In her short story “Amour Dure” (1887) collected in her book, Hauntings, 
(1890) she portrays Spiridion Trepka, who denigrates himself as a “Pole grown into 
the semblance of a German pedant, doctor of philosophy, professor even” (42). 
Spiridion’s predicament is that he has longed for years to visit Italy, to “come face to 
face with the Past” (41). We may understand this Past as the artistic patrimony that 
makes Italy (above all Rome) a living museum; Victorian novels and travel accounts 
repeatedly exclaim that when one visits Italy, one encounters the Past by virtue of the 
overwhelming amounts of ancient architecture, painting, and sculpture there. Based in 
Berlin as a poor scholar, Spiridion finds a leisure trip to Italy unattainable, and can 
only afford his venture to Italy as a research trip. He writes: “Am I not myself a 
product of modern northern civilization; is not my coming to Italy due to this very 
modern scientific vandalism, which has given me a travelling scholarship because I 
have written a book like all those other atrocious books of erudition and art-criticism? 
Nay, am I not here at Urbania on the express understanding that….I shall produce just 
another such book?” (41). Spiridion’s reference to vandalism is notable. He 
characterizes the expatriate German scholars whom he meets in Italy as “Berlin and 
Munich Vandals” inviting us to compare these scholars with the Germanic invaders 
who despoiled Rome, destroying its beauty. His art criticism continues that violence 
against beauty, making him wonder if he can ever really come into contact with it, or 
the history identified with it. He laments, “Dost thou imagine…that thou, with thy 
ministerial letters and proof-sheets in thy black professorial coat pocket, canst ever 
come in spirit into the presence of the Past?” It is as if the scholarship that Spiridion 
would put into circulation to educate others insulates him from the pleasure art 
brings—his credentials and manuscripts are imagined here as if they, along with his 
academic garb, insulate him from the object of his study.  
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The armor-like quality of Spiridion’s academic robes, which drape his 
intellectual authority over the surfaces meant to perceive, are a good symbol for how 
the teacher’s intellectual authority threatens to disrupt the immediate, pleasurable 
connection that exists between us and art. Insofar as teaching supplies ideas and 
feelings that supplant the pleasure-inducing powers of art itself, it must be rejected. 
Lee insists that she designs Belcaro not as  
the Sir-Oracle manual of a professor, with all in its right place understood or 
misunderstood, truth and error all neatly systematized for the teaching of 
others; but rather the scholar’s copy book, the fragmentary and somewhat 
helter-skelter notes of what, in his listening and questions, he has been able to 
understand and which he hands over to his fellow-pupils, who may have 
understood as much of the lessons as himself, but have in all probability 
understood different portions or in different ways. (5)  
Drawn from Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, the reference to the “Sir-Oracle” 
professor’s tome evokes the transcribed authoritative, omniscient oration that will “let 
no dog bark” let alone student speak18. If a novice in Professor Oracle’s class 
possesses an aesthetic insight arising from a “simple, direct connection” to art, that 
notion is not valued in itself, but stands or falls at the professor’s pleasure. While the 
teacher’s handbook proclaims the already ordered, complete system of truth and error, 
Belcaro, merely fragmentary, is handed among co-equal fellow-students who 
collectively attempt to understand the truth.19  In comparing their different 
understandings, derived from personal contact with art, each assert intellectual agency, 
perhaps writing their insights on the blank pages of the unexpended copy-book, 
expanding its notes into thesis and exposition.  
                                                 
18
 Gratiano says “I am Sir Oracle, / And when I ope my lips let no dog bark!” The Merchant of Venice I. 
i. 93-4. 
19
 Later in her life, Lee returns to this opposition between the all-knowing professor and the students 
who collaborate to work out things on their own. As she became a more established intellectual, she 
attracted a cult of admiring young women called “The Souls.”  In a letter to a woman she wished to 
draw into this group Lee wrote, “I can teach you infinitely less than any person at Oxford, but I think 
we might think things out together, which is sometimes quite as fruitful” (Seymour 39). Lee is acutely 
aware that she cannot teach with the authority of an Oxford don but she insists she does not want to 
instruct, she wants to think alongside a fellow, to study collaboratively. 
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 Lee stresses, “My object is not to teach others, but to show them how far I 
have taught myself, and how far they may teach themselves” (13).  Nevertheless, she 
is aware that her text may exceed her intentions. Although Belcaro should simply 
inspire others to self-education, some readers may seize her own record of her 
education as a guide to what to think about art. Anticipating that in “printing, 
correcting and publishing a whole volume of whims and ideas about art” she erects a 
theoretical system that will obstruct access to art (279), Lee replies: 
I have never pretended that I am not as bad as my neighbours; but the whole 
gist of these my theorisings is that people should try and take art more simply 
than they do; that, if not called upon to try and persuade others to simpler 
courses, they should not theorise themselves. By theorising, I mean, incorrectly 
perhaps all manner of irrelevant fantasticating, whether it take the shape of 
seeking in art for hidden psychological meanings or moral values, or of using 
art merely as a suggestion of images and emotions, the perception of which 
infallibly interferes with, and sometimes entirely replaces the perception of the 
art itself. (280) 
What Lee proposes then, is theorising only where necessary to undo the pedagogical 
work of the reigning critical paradigms. If indeed she must present a body of theory 
that mediates access to the art work, the eradicative content of that theory compensates 
for the lamentable fact that the theory exists at all. She conceives her work 
negatively—not as instilling principles of criticism, but as removing precepts that 
interfere with perception. And even this anti-education must be rendered in a way that 
makes its mechanism and effects as efficiently unobtrusive as possible. It is striking 
that Lee describes her intervention thus: “my work has unconsciously enough, been to 
logically justify that perfectly simple, direct connection between art and ourselves” 
[my emphasis]. She abstracts herself, effacing voluntarism from pedagogy. What 
could be more conceptually empty than an education construed as negation, deletion 
acting without a will present to direct it? 
 Lee’s evacuative rhetoric shows how strongly she wants to believe that no one 
needs to learn how to engage art properly. Indeed, this fancy appears in her review of 
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Taine’s work, where she complains of a contemporary public “incapable of [an] 
appreciation, intense and almost instinctive, like that of the men of days of artistic 
progress and perfection” (27). Ideally, she would reduce the whole of aesthetic 
criticism to the commands “Perceive Art! Enjoy Art!” These actions she imagines as 
innate and natural to all, only contemporary man has forgotten how to exercise his 
perception (or more precisely, been alienated from it through aesthetic miseducation): 
I suspect that in former days (I confess I do not know exactly when), art may 
have been perceived pretty much in the same way in which we perceive nature: 
that the enjoyed perception of a beautiful statue, of a picture, of a grand song, 
may have come interrupting, with pleasant interludes of quiet self-unconscious 
pleasure, the matter of fact, but not monotonous business of life, even as my 
work now…is for ever being interrupted by the flicker of the lime-leaf 
shadows. (278) 
Notable here is the passivity of the perceiver, who need not learn any special 
knowledge to enjoy art, who need not even devote energy to observing. Instead, Lee 
endows art with special agency to invade quotidian affairs, filling one with “quiet self-
unconscious pleasure.” 
 This idyllic image of art and aesthetic pleasure that creep surreptitiously upon 
us is one we should keep near as we analyze Lee’s pedagogical thoughts further. It is 
her idealized alternative to a world in which professional interpreters and educators 
mediate our access to art. In this fantasy, the image is merely anodyne. However, re-
establishing this prelapsarian connection with beauty is so important that Lee is 
willing to imagine art’s encounter with us as a violent invasion—by whatever means 
possible, the pleasurable union must be established. The stage for this encounter is the 
Vatican Museum in Rome, which lends its name to Belcaro’s first pedagogical essay, 
“The Child in the Vatican.” 
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II Painting, Sculpture, and the Ideologies of Child Protectionism 
 
We might ask why a child’s aesthetic education is of interest to Lee, and how 
the specific task of educating children relates to the instruction of her adult readers. 
We should first recall that Lee romanticizes her own childhood, seeing it as that time 
when she enjoyed an unparalleled intimacy with art. Therefore, the essay is a nostalgic 
exercise that allows her to commemorate the formative stages of her girlhood. As a 
contemporary review of Belcaro states “The Child in the Vatican” is “mental 
biography showing how certain scenes or pictures or stories have fired trains of 
thought which have resulted in the formation of opinion” (Monkhouse 112). However, 
Lee’s essay is not simply a personal reminiscence.  It participates in a larger social 
effort to examine child impressionability. As the proceeding quotation suggests, Lee’s 
contemporaries considered childhood the ultimate state of human receptivity, a stage 
where environmental influences had enormous effects on all aspects of personal 
development, from the formation of moral character to the fixing of aesthetic 
susceptibilities. Therefore, the child furnishes a prime subject for people interested in 
teaching adults insofar as the optimal student must endeavor to become as absorbent 
as a child. Studying the child also shed light on how easily an adult could achieve the 
aesthetic (re)education that critics like Lee promoted.  If the effects that childhood 
experience had created in the individual were immutable, or especially difficult to 
change, adult aesthetic training might have been pointless. 
Lee might also have chosen the topic of a child’s aesthetic education in order 
to better assert her critical authority as a woman. When she adopted the pseudonym 
Vernon Lee, she claimed “I am sure that no one reads a woman’s writing on art, 
history or aesthetics with anything but unmitigated contempt” (qtd in Gunn 66). And 
yet, almost as soon as she had submitted her first articles for publication, her 
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pseudonym was exploded.  Writing about such topics as children’s education, the 
exposed Lee may have drawn less of the contempt she feared because separate spheres 
ideology had ceded women responsibility for the rearing and training of the young.20 
Finally, “The Child in the Vatican” recalls Pater’s imaginary portrait, “The 
Child in the House,” and is probably written in homage to it. As Lee sought to 
establish herself as an aesthete, acknowledging Pater would have shown her 
familiarity with the field of aestheticist criticism. But even at this early stage, Lee is no 
slavish imitator of her mentor. Pater’s narrative tracks a child’s developing aesthetic 
receptivity or “brain-building” as it courts impressions in the domestic realm. 
However, Lee situates aesthetic education in the Vatican Museum in order to 
foreground questions of pedagogical method more pressingly than Pater does. 
Although it is possible to be taught in the home, Pater’s titular child receives his 
aesthetic impressions haphazardly from the “influences of the sensible things which 
are tossed and fall and lie about us” (Miscellaneous 151). Undirected by governess or 
mother, he receives his education simply by being in the domestic environment. And 
lest Pater’s readers think they should manage children’s aesthetic education indirectly 
by scrupulous attention to interior decoration or landscaping, he reassures them “it is 
false to suppose that a child’s sense of beauty is dependent on any choiceness, or 
special fineness, in the objects which present themselves to it” (150). Pater’s domestic 
aesthetic education does not emphasize the virtues of art to train perception; any old 
“sensible” thing around the house will do, but through the educational site she chooses 
Lee specifies that art is necessary for aesthetic training. Furthermore, in contrast with 
the family dwelling, the museum is a site to which a child must purposefully be taken 
                                                 
20
 This cover would have had its limitations however. The female sphere was the domestic realm and 
the instruction of children fell to women (especially the mother) when that education was conducted 
within the private sphere of the home. As I point out below, “The Child in the Vatican” imagines an 
education that that takes children away from their proper places within the home. 
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and so questions of how a child’s aesthetic education must be conducted inaugurate 
Lee’s essay.  
“The Child in the Vatican” is deeply ironic. At the beginning of the essay, Lee 
ventriloquizes a pessimistic persona that speaks as if she 21could be the only possible 
authority on artistic interpretation. Deeply suspicious about the propriety and efficacy 
of educating children in the art museum, the pessimist insists that those who bring 
children there have misunderstood the nature of the young. She begins by saying, 
“There were a lot of children in the Vatican this morning: small barbarians scarce out 
of the nursery who should have been at home, at their lessons or reading fairy books or 
carpentering or doll-educating…or amusing themselves” (17). Thus she suggests that 
overzealous guardians have taken children too immature to appreciate art away from 
the home where they “should” be at lessons or imitating respectable pedagogy by 
“doll-educating.” In the public space of the museum, the project of formal aesthetic 
training cannot supplement private domestic education. It can only prevent the 
children from pursuing their own playful pleasures. Presenting herself as someone 
who cares about the well-being and happiness of the young, the pessimist explains 
why no child could enjoy the Vatican, telling the woeful story of youth who are nearly 
bored to death there.22  Later in her essay, Lee explicitly argues that children can find 
pleasure and intellectual profit at the Vatican, but even before she begins this 
counterpoint, she undermines the pessimistic argument through irony, letting 
inconsistency creep into the pessimist’s argument. 
The pessimist contrasts two youthful groups in the Vatican. A fortunate few 
have been “left to their own devices.” Free from instruction, they gleefully ignore the 
                                                 
21
 We shall assume the narrator is female. “Child” teaches its lesson through a “fairy-tale” and the 
narrator explicitly links such story-telling to the “nurse or peasant woman” (27). 
 
22
 Indeed, with her descriptions of inactive, cold, affectless children, the speaker nearly literalizes the 
figure of speech, “bored to death.” 
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art in the museum. For them, the museum is only valuable because it can be turned 
into a space for play. They “rush headlong through corridor and hall, looking neither 
to the right nor to the left” (21), and fill the rooms with “chattering and laughing” (17). 
Other children, “demure, weary, vacant” are led “by their elders” for edification (17). 
Their “dreary, vague” faces reveal that their aesthetic education is failing. They are 
“chilled, numbed by a sort of wonder unaccompanied by any curiousity, oppressed by 
a sense of indefineable desolation” (17). Given Lee’s distrust of teachers, might this be 
a portrait of spoiled pleasure, a scene portraying how mediatory didacticism interferes 
with children’s ability to engage art directly? No, this is not the pessimist’s message. 
If it were, the game-playing children might actually enjoy looking at the Vatican’s 
galleries, as well as racing through them.  Are the narrator indicting adults for their 
attempt to interest children in difficult art prematurely? No, if that were so, all artistic 
forms should have an equal opportunity to bore the child. We can imagine an abstruse 
portrait that would not move a three-year old, as equally as we can a statue that would 
not invite his interest. Strangely, the speaker only objects to sculpture as the subject of 
education. She insists that to children “all this world of tintless stone can give but a 
confused, overpowering impression of dreariness and vacuity.” This is because “this 
clear and simple art of sculpture, born when the world was young and had not yet 
learned to think and talk in symbolical riddles, this currently so outspoken art is, to the 
childish soul of our days, the most silent art of any”(20). 
 To recapitulate—at first, the essay appears to be arguing against introducing 
children to art because comprehending it is beyond their developing capacities. But the 
preceding characterization of sculpture paradoxically suggests that it is the essential 
lucidity of this “clear and simple art of sculpture,” this “currently so outspoken art” 
that makes it uninteresting or unintelligible to the Victorian child. Sculpture, emerging 
as an artistic medium in the world’s youth, is associated with an originary moment 
 108 
before learning and before art’s message had to be coded in and decoded from 
“symbolical riddles”(20). Modern children, born when the world is old, learn for their 
mothertongue a language of symbols. They are deaf to that direct address of sculptural 
expression. 
 The idea that every modern child must find sculpture uninteresting is absurd. It 
is more plausible that an ideology exists that wishes every modern children to be 
indifferent to sculpture, a paranoid ideology that deems exposure to statues pernicious. 
In support of this ideology, the pessimist confidently proclaims how children must 
react to art: “Certain it is that to this child, to any child, this Vatican must have seemed 
like the most desolate, the most unintelligible of places” (20) However, the narrator 
should not be able to utter such certainties since she  herself claims that to adults, 
childhood is a closed book: “What we were, how we felt, how we knew and 
understood and vaguely guessed things as children, none of us can know” (19).  Since 
inquiring into a child’s mind is like peering into the “soul of a dog or a cat,” childish 
subjectivity is something adults can “only speculate [about] and reconstruct on a 
general basis” (20).  And yet, this fundamental unknowability does not embarrass the 
speaker when she asserts that all children are interested in the “language of colour, of 
movement, of sound, of suggestion” (20). The imagined child, so immune to the 
enticements of sculpture, is drawn to the pictorial: 
Hence it is that the child who will one day become ourselves rarely cares to 
return to these sculpture galleries, or if it care to return to any it is to mixed 
galleries like those of Florence where instead of the statues it looks at pictures. 
And out of pictures, out of coarse blurs of colour in picture books…infinitely 
suggestive engravings in bible and book of travel; out of fine glossy modern 
pictures which represent a definite place, or tell a definite story; out of all this 
…do we get our original, never really alterable ideas and feelings about art. 
(22) 
Why does the narrator desire so to posit that we have unalterable aesthetic notions and 
feelings engendered by paintings and line-drawing? What undesirable influence does 
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sculpture exercise upon a child’s intellectual formation? To answer this question, we 
must examine the ways that some strains of art criticism have posed correspondences 
between specific artistic forms and the kinds of engagement they produce in 
spectators. For example, in The Renaissance, Pater’s Hegelian approach to art 
suggests that sculpture, specifically classical Greek sculpture, provides the artistic 
medium best suited to explain the principles of aesthetic criticism and to advance its 
practice.23  In the following passage Pater celebrates the Venus of Melos, contrasting it 
with typological medieval painting: 
That is in no sense a symbol, a suggestion, of anything beyond its own 
victorious fairness. The mind begins and ends with the finite image, yet loses 
no part of the spiritual motive. This motive is not lightly and loosely attached 
to the sensuous form, as its meaning to an allegory, but saturates and is 
identical with it. The Greek mind had advanced to a particular stage of self-
reflexion, but was careful not to pass beyond it. (164). 
For Pater the statue exists solely to showcase its triumphant beauty—it is art for art’s 
sake. Any “spiritual motive” the work possesses is inextricably fused with its 
“sensuous form” so that the spectator cannot allegorize the work, but must begin and 
end with the sculpture’s “finite image.” This fusion is particularly a feature of the 
medium of Greek sculpture as well as a product of the “happy limit” of Greek thought 
at a particular historical moment. In the stage of “self-reflexion” Pater lauds, Greek 
“thought does not outstrip or lie beyond the proper range of its sensible embodiment” 
(164).  Therefore, the sculpture conceived by the felicitously restrained mind cannot 
express or authorize thought that denigrates the sensuousness of the art in favor of an 
abstracting allegory. Moreover, the medium of sculpture inherently resists the 
excessive self-consciousness that Pater associates with symbolism. Characterizing 
sculpture in opposition to “architecture and those romantic arts of painting, music and 
                                                 
23
 Of course, later in his career, Pater theorizes music the exemplar of inextricable form and content to 
urge formalistic interpretation—see Plato and Platonism, and “The School of Giorgione.” These 
accounts do not seek to rank the arts historically, however. 
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poetry” (168), Pater notes how sculpture “contrasts with the romantic arts, because it 
is not self-analytical. It has more to do exclusively than any other art with the human 
form, itself one entire medium of spiritual expression, trembling, blushing, melting 
into dew with inward excitement” (168) In depicting the human form, sculpture 
becomes “pure form.” If, as Pater argues, painting, music and poetry as “the special 
arts of the romantic and modern ages” cannot express themselves as absolutely in pure 
form as sculpture can (168), these arts find themselves more susceptible to those 
moralistic, allegorical, historic or didactic interpretations that aesthetic criticism 
attempts to resist. As a potential object for allegorizing criticism, classical sculpture is 
undesirable as it proliferates formalist analysis by offering no hidden motive but only 
“a little of suggested motion, and much of pure light on its gleaming surfaces, with 
pure form” (169). As we have already seen, Lee excludes ancient sculpture from those 
arts that speak in “symbolical riddles.” For her, sculpture expresses itself clearly and 
directly; its message lies in its immediate spectacularity.  
By contrast, other art forms, from other eras, are associated with mediation. If 
we encounter sculpture in childhood, it might teach us to read all art formally, and it 
might teach us to crave direct contact with art’s sensuousness. But according to Lee, 
for modern people, the moment of coming face to face with statues is deferred long 
past childhood:  
To grow up in the presence of the statues; to become acquainted with antique 
art long before any other; to perceive the beauty and enjoyableness of a statue 
before seeking for the beauty and enjoyableness of a picture or a piece of 
music; this is the reverse of the artistic training which every individual man or 
woman obtains consciously or unconsciously in our own day; for we begin 
with the art born nearest our time, then proceed to those further; we go from 
music to painting and from painting to sculpture. But humanity at large 
received the opposite training in the last four and twenty centuries. (28) 
Lee imagines that if children are first exposed to forms of art that are not sculptural, 
they develop a particular critical orientation: 
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To the statues we return only quite late, when this long-formed, long moulded 
soul of ours has been well steeped in every sort of eclectic and artificial 
culture; has been saturated with modern art and modern criticism…saturated 
with every kind of critically distilled aesthetic essence, till there is not a flavour 
and not a scent, good or bad, sweet or foul, which may not be perceived in this 
strange soul of ours. Then we return to the statues; and having imbibed (like all 
things) a certain amount of Hellenic, Pagan, antique feeling, we try also to 
assimilate the spirit of the statues of Phidias or Praxiteles; we expound the 
civilisation, the mode of thought…as we occasionally, for a few moments feel 
actual, simple, unreasoning, wholesome pleasure in the sight of the old broken 
marbles. (23)  
 
Modern aesthetic education exposes the young to “modern art and modern criticism” 
and “every sort of eclectic and artificial culture” in order to inculcate a certain way of 
interpreting art. Lee describes a world in which we exercise taste purely to categorize 
art. If we steep our souls in “every kind critically distilled essence” we are only 
educating our aesthetic palate so we can recognize those essences in art objects that 
we encounter. Thus having “imbibed…a certain amount of Hellenic, Pagan antique 
feeling,” we can recognize Phidian sculpture and can “expound the civilisation [and] 
the mode of thought” that informs Phidian work. Yet Lee does not speak of enjoying 
these flavors, scents and essences. Practicing the critical methods of modern aesthetic 
education, we generally feel no “actual, simple, unreasoning wholesome pleasure” in 
the art object itself.  Instead, we enjoy theorizing or historicizing the art object. 
Naming this form of criticism “antiquarianism,” Pater writes that it works “by a purely 
historical effort, by putting its object in perspective and setting the reader in a certain 
point of view, from what gave pleasure to the past is pleasurable for him also” 
(Renaissance, 14). 
What appears to be the most discriminating perceptiveness, the most cutting 
criticism then, is really revealed not to be in contact with the object at all. That 
perception is earned only at the cost of insulating the critic from sculpture, from the 
proper critical orientation that medium provides the viewer, and from pleasure that 
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comes from a more direct access to statues. As it is now, that pleasure is theorized as 
something that only occasionally surges past the “artificial” culture and criticism in 
which the soul is steeped by premature exposure to other media. But Lee wants to 
change this situation. Arguing against antiquarianism she demands, “Could this… art 
have been for us more than…a historic fossil, by study of which…we can amuse 
ourselves reconstructing the appearance and habits of a long dead, once living 
civilisation? Or might these statues have been much more to us? Might they, perhaps, 
have shaped and trained our souls with their unspoken lesson?” She sets the scene for 
a different aesthetic education, one in which sculpture displaces the other arts as the 
original source of the impressions that form our subjectivity. This counterhistory of 
how subjectivity is formed is referred to as a “fairy tale” (23). 
Now, if we wanted to make practical use of “Child” we would simply say that 
Lee sees aesthetic education as a process to be begun early, while the child is most 
impressionable—that such an education must bring the child out of the privacy of the 
domestic sphere into public institutions and that sculpture (above all, Greek sculpture) 
is the medium best suited for introducing the child into serious art appreciation. But in 
resorting to a “fairy-tale” to supplement these practical points, Lee allows us to think 
more theoretically or philosophically about how this education is to be conducted. It is 
notable that she never prescribes the practical course that can be extracted from the 
essay, but chooses to tell a Gothic fantasy in which the statues themselves conduct the 
aesthetic education. In the section that follows we will examine the tropes and 
conventions with which this fairy-tale interrupts the essay’s description of a normal 
day at the Vatican. Analysis of this fantastic narrative will reveal a certain queer 
perversity in Lee’s pedagogy, perverse principles that lurk obliquely by the practical 
course we can develop from “Child”, but which are far more important for explaining 
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that fantasy of “conversion” which escapes the negative associations of teaching for 
Lee. 
  
III Gothicizing Greek Myth: Violating Innocence, Banishing Ignorance 
 
In Lee’s “fairy-tale,” the Greek statues at the Vatican are “merely stone 
imprisoned demons, dethroned gods of antiquity” that are desperate for worship (24). 
They had hoped for “restoration in the hearts of men” when “Winckelmann and 
Goethe came to them and adored” but they now realize “what men cared for was not 
them, but merely their own impertinent theories and grandiloquent speeches” (24). 
Therefore, the statues single out a visiting child to be their devotee and “cast a spell on 
it which would make it theirs” (24). Quite “unconscious of being . . . the victim of the 
statues,” the child goes about life regularly, but gradually begins to feel “strange 
symptoms” of giddiness and “brain-swimming” (26). These maladies occur because 
the “spell cast by the statues was not idle, the mysterious philter they had poured into 
it was working throughout that childish soul: the child was in love; in love with what it 
had hated; in love intensely, passionately with Rome. And…to the statues it returned, 
and in a way, grew up in their presence” (26). As it matures, the child realizes “that in 
those drowsy years of childish passions and day dreams, it had been learning 
something which others did not know” (26). 
Concluding this story of the child’s tuition, Lee educates her readers by 
deriving “consciously and perhaps wearisomely” what “unconsciously, vaguely, the 
child of our fairy tale must have learned from its marble teachers in the Vatican” (48). 
By examining how the Niobe statuary group was composed, she deducts the 
following:  
the only intrinsic perfection of art is the perfection of form and such perfection 
is obtainable only by boldly altering or even casting aside the subject with 
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which this form is only imaginatively, most often arbitrarily connected; and by 
humbly considering and obeying the inherent necessities of the material in 
which this form is made visible or audible. (48) 
By assigning agency to the statues, Lee avoids staging a scene in which a human 
teacher instructs a pupil by interposing interpretive theories between the learner and 
the art object. Instead, art acts to inculcate the principles of right criticism. And yet, 
although Lee personifies art so that it can teach the child, art acts impersonally as it 
teaches. Sculpture does not melt from its rigid posture like Galatea to address the child 
and coax it to accept aestheticist tenets. Instead, the child comes to know critical truth 
about art because it falls in love with art, and the charm that causes the child to love 
works upon an unaware subject. Because the child only discovers it has been learning 
after the process has been completed, it never feels as if its critical autonomy has been 
threatened by another’s instruction. Lee dreams of an education that never feels 
coercive, in which the transfer of knowledge is so efficient that it is undetectable 
except through the new epistemological abilities it grants the student. 
While it is important to note the uncanny sentience of objects that enables this 
scene of teacherless education, it is more critical to understand how Lee’s narrative, 
though its generic innovation, argues that students only acquire enlightenment because 
of an erotic event that radically alters their subjectivities. Lee calls her story a “fairy-
tale” but her term misleads us insofar as it suggests an anodyne, sanitized narrative. 
Rather, we find her darkly re-interpreting Heinrich Heine’s reflection on myth and 
cultural displacement, “The Gods in Exile.” Fin-de-siècle writers such as Pater were 
fascinated by Heine’s collection of medieval legends, narratives that did not dismiss 
pagan deities as superstitions, but used hegemonic Christian tradition to re-interpret 
those deities as mere demons within Christian mythos. Lee takes this source-material 
and embroiders it with Gothic tropes. We may recognize the Gothic genre mainly by a 
series of stock characters or plot schemes, but we might explain its essence and 
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genealogy by recalling the eighteenth century, when the Gothic novel, penned by 
writers such as Ann Radcliffe, arose to reinforce the Protestant ideology of a 
politically progressive Enlightenment England. This ideology proclaimed that 
although the Reformation had expelled irrational Catholicism from England, medieval 
barbarism, sexual anarchy and superstition flourished on the Catholic Continent. The 
Gothic novel throws its Protestant characters into the convents, catacombs and 
dungeon-filled castles that evoke this benighted world, exposing them to the 
supernatural horrors Catholics supposedly believed in as well as the mundane cruelties 
such debased Papists could inflict. For the novel’s hapless protagonists, the danger of 
becoming a Catholic is ever-present. From the 1850’s onward, Protestant Britain is 
gripped by anti-Catholic sentiment, an aversion expressed in denunciations of “papal 
aggression” and public outcry over conversion to Rome by notable Anglican figures 
such as Cardinal Newman. With its accounts of civilization threatened by barbarism, 
the Gothic attracted the aesthetes and decadents, who saw their own fin-de-siècle 
societies on the verge of collapse. Wilde, Pater and Ruskin all drew on the Gothic to 
inform their cultural criticism, but there is little analysis of how and why Lee does the 
same in Belcaro.   
Lee’s “fairy-tale” is her attempt to envision an aesthetic education that would 
focus upon the pleasure art’s form brings us. She argues that modern aesthetic 
education sees art as a mere “historic fossil” by which we can reconstruct “a long 
dead, once living civilisation” (23). She then links this stance to the order in which 
artistic media are studied. While modern children progress from the study of “music to 
painting and from painting to sculpture”, “humanity at large received the opposite 
training in the last four and twenty centuries” (28). Associating sculpture with 
aestheticist formalism, Lee argues that “the first standard of artistic right and wrong . . 
. was the standard of sculpture” (28), but that under the regime of modern aesthetic 
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education, the lessons sculpture teaches have been marginalized. When, as adults, we 
finally come to study sculpture, we are no longer receptive to its doctrine; we prefer to 
interpret art with theories that distract us from the sensuous, pleasurable immediacy of 
art.   
To perpetuate itself, the ideology that promotes modern aesthetic education 
draws on Gothic rhetoric to make it unthinkable to bring a child to a sculpture gallery. 
To exemplify this paranoid Gothicism, Lee constructs a narrator who denounces the 
Vatican Museum as  a “dreary labyrinth of brick and mortar, a sort of over-ground 
catacomb of stones, constructed in our art-studying, not art-loving times” (17). In this 
deathly Catholic space, the statues of Greek gods are portrayed as imperiled analogues 
to the Protestant protagonists of Gothic narrative. The sculpture gallery is both a 
“dismal scientific place of ostentation . . . where art is . . . ticketed and made dingy and 
lifeless” and “eminently a place of exile, or worse, of captivity for all this people of 
marble…who once stood each in happy independence against a screen of laurel or ilex 
branches” (18). The statues are “poor stone captives cloistered in monastic halls and 
cells or arranged like the skeletons of Capuchins in endless rows of niche, shelf and 
bracket (18). According to these overwrought descriptions, removing art from its 
original environment and placing it in a museum is an act of violence akin to 
imprisoning someone in a monastery. Hence the “sense of a sort of negative vandalism 
always clings” to collections of art, “especially to the galleries of sculptures, so 
uninhabited, so sepulchral” (18). Reinterpreting art-collecting through this distressing 
captivity narrative, the narrator suggests that children should not be brought to the 
Vatican because the themes of exile, incarceration and murder associated with 
curating will damage childhood innocence. “Grown up creatures…with powers of 
impression quite deadened by culture” are able to resist dwelling upon the traumatic 
circumstances that enable exhibition (19). They liberate the artwork from the gallery 
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through the imaginative trick of making a “fitting habitation for it in [their] fancy,” 
envisioning it as it would be in its original, historical setting (18). The child cannot 
perform this self-protective fantasy because it has not yet undergone the proper 
training that the adult has—recall that modern education, linked with non-sculptural 
artforms, produces a subject sheltered from impressionistic shock because it is 
“steeped in every sort of eclectic and artificial culture….saturated in modern art and 
modern criticism with mysticism and realism and sentiment and cynicism” (22). 
Through its initial hatred of Rome and its longing to “get away from the stuffy 
horrible Rome of the popes,” the child in the Vatican is coded as culturally Protestant, 
an expatriate British youth that yearns for its homeland. Therefore, its aesthetic 
education at the Pope’s palace, an education that makes it fall in love with the 
metonym for Catholicism, functions as a countercultural conversion, an apostasy. The 
child is overtly converted to the pagan worship of the “dethroned gods of antiquity,” 
not Catholicism, but this is Lee’s way of safeguarding her narrative from her 
contemporaries’ censure. After all, who could really worry about a fairy-tale in which 
the cult of Apollo seduces good Protestants? We began this chapter by examining 
Lee’s desire to educate Mary Robinson, whom Lee figures as the “nearest, most 
difficult, desired convert” (2). The child’s experience exemplifies the conversion Lee 
desires for her friend—indeed, we may even regard the child as a fictionalized version 
of Robinson. Hence, we can only fully understand Lee’s metaphor for intellectual 
movement in the context of Victorian concerns over religious conversion.  
Critics have not analyzed Belcaro by discussing the Gothic’s link to 
Catholicism.  When she analyzes the circumstances that inspired the text, Martha 
Vicinus overlooks the religious root of Lee’s supernatural conventions. During a 
winter vacation in Tuscany, Lee and Robinson had visited Belcaro, a “strange isolated 
villa castle” (2), and had stood on its battlements, surveying the picturesque Italian 
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countryside. From this experience, the text’s name is born: “Thus I have been haunted 
by this remembrance, this inner sight, this single moment . . . so that when it has come 
to giving a name for the book, I find there is already indissolubly associated . . . the 
name of Belcaro” (3). Vicinus writes: 
If Belcaro had been a gothic tale, we might assume that the castle was a 
metaphor for the female body being explored by the two young lovers. Instead, 
Lee chose a highly coded celebration of an erotic relationship, transposed onto 
the Italian countryside. The tactile descriptions of the rounded hills, flushed 
with sunlight, and the dense bushy ilex evoke the beauty of skin and hair. Lee 
courts and memorializes Robinson on the printed page. (606) 
Because she thinks of the Gothic primarily in psychoanalytic terms, focusing on the 
psychosexual symbolism of the two women exploring the architecture of Belcaro, 
Vicinus does not consider that the text’s most overdetermined gothic space is the 
Vatican.   
 Ruth Hoberman recognizes Lee’s Gothic conventions in “The Child in the 
Vatican” and also isolates them in her ghost stories, seeing those texts as exemplars of 
the “museum gothic.” In Hoberman’s materialist analysis, “Museum gothic endows 
objects with the power to trigger imaginative flights on the part of the viewer, flights 
which, while dramatizing the loss of aura intrinsic to the museal process, give the 
viewer the illusion of having in fact been in direct contact with the auratic object. 
These flights suggest that the truly auratic object can, in Benjamin’s words, “look 
back” – but only in the phantasmatic world of gothic” (477). In other words, 
Hoberman believes that when aesthetes write about animate art objects on show in the 
museum, they are attempting to restore the Benjaminian aura to those objects, thus 
distinguishing them from non-artistic commodities one might see displayed at the 
department store.24  The problem with her analysis of the Vatican Museum as a site for 
                                                 
24Benjaminian readings of Lee’s supernatural themes are prevalent. Kristin Mahoney follows Hoberman 
in seeing Lee’s work as a response to the decline of the aura. For Mahoney, modern consumer practices 
turn art objects “into bibelots whose history and aura have been eliminated” (51). However,  “Lee calls 
upon the established conventions of gothic and supernatural fiction, which rely upon the thrilling idea 
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her museum gothic is that it overlooks the Gothic’s historical association with 
Catholicism; she sees a museum, but no Vatican. Therefore, although Hoberman 
claims “The whole project of the museum, in fact, could be read as an effort to 
resacralize displayed objects to compensate for the large-scale, society-wide ‘decline 
of the aura’ Benjamin detects” (468), by neglecting the religious significance of Lee’s 
particular museum, she fails to reinforce her argument by recognizing Catholicism’s 
potential to symbolically resacralize the art-objects housed at the Vatican/museum. 
Hoberman does not appreciate the religious context that makes Lee’s Gothic 
conventions address Victorian anxieties about conversion as well as commodities.  
Now, why does Lee invoke these Gothic tropes to liken aesthetic education 
to apostasy? In part, the theme of apostasy allows her to attack the Protestant 
didacticism of the most renowned art critic, John Ruskin, whose errors she exposes in 
another essay in Belcaro. We have seen how Lee attacks professional aestheticians for 
their  fantastication  “whether it take the shape of seeking in art for hidden 
psychological meanings or moral values, or of using art merely as a suggestion of 
images and emotions” (280).  Such interpretive modes “infallibly” interfere with “the 
perception of the art itself” (280). Although he has taught “more of the subtle reasons 
for art” than any of his contemporaries, Ruskin is still guilty of fantastication, and is a 
particularly dangerous teacher because of his pervasive influence. While other 
aestheticians are followed by “small eclectic bands” Ruskin draws the public in its 
“universality” (202). Moreover, Lee deems the effect of Ruskin’s misguided criticism 
as far more damaging than other critic’s errors because he speaks authoritatively on a 
wider expanse of human experience. While other aesthetic critics diagnose the evils 
                                                                                                                                            
of the intrusion of the past into the present, to speak to the attractiveness of this possibility at a moment 
when the past seems to be disappearing all too quickly” (51). Mahoney uses the Gothic to argue for a 
“historicized consumption” of cultural artifacts, but because she fails to historicize the very Gothic 
conventions that enable her argument, she does not appreciate fully what those Gothic conventions 
meant to Lee’s Protestant Victorian readers. 
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“of not understanding quite well or of not appreciating quite correctly” (198), Ruskin’s 
philosophy is “of far greater importance than any other system of aesthetics” because 
he connects aesthetics to ethics, questioning “how much of our thoughts and our 
energies we have a right to give to art, and for what reasons we may give any portion 
of them” (198). It is Ruskin’s double allegiance to aesthetics and ethics that flaws his 
thought on either area, according to Lee: “to Ruskin's nature, compounded of artist 
and moralist, artistic engagement was a moral danger, a distraction from his duty—for 
Ruskin was not the mere artist, who, powerless outside his art, may, because he can 
only, give his whole energies to it; he was not the mere moralist who, indifferent to 
art, can give it a passing glance without interrupting for a moment his work of good” 
(203). In order to assure himself that taking pleasure in art is not a distraction from 
ethical engagement, Ruskin decides that “the basis of art is moral; that art cannot be 
merely pleasant or unpleasant, but must be lawful or unlawful . . . that the whole 
system of the beautiful is a system of moral emotions, moral selections, and moral 
appreciation; and that the aim and end of art is the expression of man's obedience to 
God's will, and of his recognition of God's goodness” (205). 
Ruskin horrifies Lee because he refuses to judge art primarily because of the 
pleasure it produces and because he subordinates artistic form and execution to moral 
meaning. Alluding to Torquato Tasso's chivalric romance La Gerusalemme liberata, 
she attributes Ruskin’s anxiety over aesthetic pleasure to a fear of art’s erotic appeal: 
This strange knight-errant of righteousness, conscious of his heaven endowed 
strength, felt that during every half-hour of delay in the Armida's garden of art, 
new rootlets were being put forth, new leaves were being unfolded by the 
enchanted forest of error which overshadowed and poisoned the earth, and 
which it was his work to hew and burn down ; that every moment of reluctant 
farewell from the weird witch of beauty meant a fresh outrage, an additional 
defiling of the holy of holies to rescue which he had received his strong muscle 
and his sharp weapons. (204) 
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Tasso’s poem follows a medieval Christian army of knights as they attempt to 
recapture Jerusalem from Muslim control. One knight, Rinaldo, is abducted by the 
Muslim witch Armida, who detains him from battle in her garden. Having abandoned 
his martial and Christian duty for carnal pleasure, Rinaldo becomes slothful and 
effeminate. When he escapes Armida, he shamefully beholds the tokens of his 
feminization: his “flowing hair/ With odours breathing,” his “luxurious air” and his 
idle sword (Tasso 335). Thus, when Lee describes Ruskin as a muscled knight, “the 
almost isolated champion of creeds and ideas” (201), and the avenging “believer not 
only in Good and in God, but in Christianity, in the Bible, in Protestantism” (201), she 
implies that his moralistic aesthetics develops from anxiety; he is a hypermasculine, 
religious subject who fears art will seduce him from his faith and cause him to misuse 
his God-given chastity, virtue and virility.25  When he dictates how much time others 
may devote to aesthetic pleasure for its own sake, he acts paternalistically, supposing 
that everyone is as averse or susceptible to art’s seductiveness as he is. By adopting 
his interpretive method, Ruskin’s student is insulated from art’s erotic allure. Unlike 
Ruskin, the genderless child that Lee imagines educated at the Vatican has no 
investment in virility, and no firmly held religious principles. Unafraid that art’s 
beauty will damage its faith or gender, it does not fear or resist being seduced by art, 
and is eventually converted by it. 
Lee’s discussion of Ruskin foregrounds the sexual danger art poses for some 
viewers when they approach it without theoretical mediation. As we have seen, “The 
Child in the Vatican” shows how under the pretense of safeguarding childish 
innocence modern aestheticians keep children from learning the aestheticist tenets 
                                                 
25
 Tasso’s work is devoutly Catholic, as is the knight Rinaldo. It may seem strange that in order to 
characterize Ruskin, Lee adapts La Gerusalemme liberata rather than a Protestant nationalist romance like 
The Faerie Queen.  But we might argue that casting Ruskin as Rinaldo rather than Redcrosse reflects 
Lee’s pervasive interest in conversion. Her allusion allows her to rewrite Ruskin’s religion. 
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taught by sculpture. But we have only emphasized how the sepulchral aura that clings 
to sculpture can interrupt childish blitheness. Lee shows how for the modern 
aesthetician sculpture might become a threat to the child’s social respectability, and 
how it might threaten the child’s erotic innocence.   The marble teachers that facilitate 
the child’s learning at the Vatican are not wholly the acme of antique art. To “the 
carefully trained of our day” they are a “very mixed company” (29), not the Elgin 
marbles or Venus de Milo, but “imposters of exploded reputation” and a “whole host 
of despicable others of every degree of lateness of epoch and baseness of work” (30). 
Some of the works are “things to shudder at, things, hewn stones (for the right-minded 
cannot call them statues)” (30).  Terms like “very mixed company” and “exploded 
reputation” designate more than the eclecticism of sculptural styles on display or the 
changing critical consensus on specific artworks; such phrases liken the statuary to 
persons whose compromised characters can barely be tolerated by polite society, 
people one can hardly trust with children.  
Lee betrays no fear and shows no indignation that abject teachers play a role in 
educating the child.  She refuses to deny the educational virtue of works that have fallen 
from classical standards; she associates no moral taint with their decadence. While 
affirming that some works are “ragtails and bobtail, nay unspeakable ruffians and 
outcasts” she insists they belong to the same antique stock as the artworks regarded as 
“artistic patricians and princes” and understands that this whole family promise to teach 
the child “the same lesson, if he would listen to them all” (30). In focusing on the child’s 
choice to listen or no, Lee leaves this education at the child’s pleasure, a promiscuous 
pleasure that may even be found among the things that would ruin its innocence.  These 
louche characters pose an erotic threat that the text dispels only by imagining that 
children have an incredible will-to-ignorance. According to the overprotective figures 
who object to children visiting the museum, when a child sees nude Greek sculpture, it 
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“does not recognise in it anything familiar; these naked or half-naked limbs are things 
which the child has never seen, at least never observed” (20). Unless we imagine Lee’s 
child as that exaggerated creature, the Victorian prude, the idea that the child has never 
observed nudity if given the chance seems questionable. More unbelievable still is the 
notion that “in these vague white things . . . with their fold of white drapery about them, 
the child recognises nothing: men? Women? It does not ask: for it, they are mere things, 
figures cut out of stone” (20). What about the stony matter of statues precludes 
recognizing or even wondering what the sex of the sculptured figure is? The text tries to 
explain away this childish incuriosity about the statues by mentioning the concealing 
“fold of white drapery” that swathes the body. Presumably, the gender cues transmitted 
by the styles of Greek dress are so incomprehensible to the modern child that they 
render the statues unrecognizable as male or female. Also, insofar as such clothing 
conceals the genitals, the child cannot ascertain the statues’ sex. But can we assume this 
draped clothing hides rather than accentuates aspects of form that declare the sex of the 
depicted figure? Is there nothing in the style of the drapery or the features of the face, or 
other attributes of the sculpture that might make a viewer ask what the sex of the 
sculpture is? This willfully ignorant account of Greek nudity will not acknowledge that 
the child can fully perceive, let alone enjoy, sculpture because it wants to maintain the 
child’s erotic innocence. To be kept unsullied by sexuality, the child must remain 
ignorant of any aspect of sexuality, like gender difference; even its own gender has been 
erased in the text. 
Instead of supporting a pedagogical philosophy that forbids aesthetic 
engagement because it corrupts, Lee proposes an education in which the repressed 
current of art’s sensuousness returns ferociously to overwhelm the student’s senses. 
We should recall her nostalgia for her childhood, a time when she enjoyed a “simple, 
direct connection” with art. Her fairy-tale forges such a bond for the Vatican child, 
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first by placing it in a position similar to the statues, a position that suggests the 
possibility of identifying with art rather than insulating oneself from it. Protectionist 
Gothic accounts of education present the Vatican museum as the place where art is 
imprisoned and endangered by the curatorial Catholic agents of “monastic halls and 
cells.” But in Lee’s narrative, the Vatican is where art comes to life to forcibly convert 
a child to a new set of beliefs. Both these narratives rely on the Gothic plot to make 
them meaningful, and we might wonder if by playing the role of the threatened victim 
in this plot, the child is enabled to sympathize more closely with art, to see it as an 
object of interest rather than a mere thing to be incurious about. In this way, Lee 
begins to diminish the distance between viewer and art-object that interrupts 
communion with the object.  
Lee collapses that distance entirely as she relates how the statues bewitch the 
child. Her fairy-tale is akin to such myths as that of Zeus’ abduction of Ganymede or 
Pluto’s theft of Proserpine. As they do in the myths, the gods prey upon the Vatican 
child, who plays the innocent role of “the chosen one, the changeling, the victim” 
(26).26 Contextualized in this way, the “absurd little story of the child in the Vatican” 
becomes a story that encodes aesthetic education as rape; the child is fated to become 
intimate with art through a process that resembles a violent sexual union 
 The particular god-statue Lee associates with the child’s aestheticist initiation 
is an “old noseless Vertumnus” wreathed in ivy leaves (28).27  As the Roman god of 
change, Vertumnus is aptly linked to Lee’s parable of education as conversion. He is 
best-known because of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, which recounts how the virginal 
                                                 
26
 It is useful to remember that the term “victim” derives from the Latin victima, a living creature killed 
and offered as a sacrifice to a deity. 
27
 In an act that indexes how its taste is being formed in the Vatican, the child eats one of these “bitter 
glossy” ivy leaves. Eating the ivy is also a rite that allows the statue-demons to take charge of the child. 
Just as Persephone ate six pomegranate seeds and was incorporated into the world of the dead for half 
the year, so is the child compelled to return repeatedly to the “over-ground catacomb” that is the 
Vatican. 
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goddess Pomona rejected all her suitors in order to tend to her gardening. To gain 
access to Pomona in her locked orchard, Vertumnus transforms himself into an old 
woman 28 who entreats Pomona to accept a consort (himself). If his counsel does not 
melt her heart he is prepared to assume his proper form and ravish her. As one 
classicist argues, the “dominant presence of deception, of metamorphosis as a means 
of persuasion, of images of violation and of the threat of violence encourages us to 
read [the story of Vertumnus and Pomona] as an example of seduction rather than 
mutual love” (Gentilcore 110). Therefore, by referring to Vertumnus, Lee evokes the 
erotic dangers the Vatican’s statues pose to the child and suggests that those dangers 
will transform it.   
The word “rape” derives from the Latin rapere “to seize or take by force.” 
Rapere is also the etymon for the words “rapture” and “ravish.” By connecting sexual 
assault to aesthetic education, Lee indicates that she feels aesthetic impressions should 
capture viewers’ attention and render them rapt. She details how the child’s rape 
makes it susceptible to aesthetic rapture. We learn how in the evenings it “would 
watch the bank of melting colours . . . left by the sun behind the black dome of St. 
Peter’s” (26). As it watches this sight, it feels “a vague acheless pain” (26). While the 
child’s playmates ignore the sunset to chatter, leaf through books and demand supper, 
the twilight scene enraptures it because of the changes the statues have worked upon 
its perception. Although Lee’s fairy-tale does not focus directly on the violence of the 
encounter between the child and the statue-demons, the sickening effects of being 
                                                 
28
 For Lee, Vertumnus may also be an emblem of the female homosociality or lesbian desire that 
inspires her to educate Robinson by writing Belcaro. She does not specify what form the sculpture of 
Vertumnus takes, but he is often depicted as the crone who teaches Pomona by telling her parables 
about marriage. Such portrayals stress how “disguise as a woman allows the god carefree access to the  
object of his lust, suggesting something like a community of women, a regularity of homosocial bonds 
between members of the same sex” (Ormand 97). Granted such access, the disguised god indulges in 
behaviors that appear lesbian. As Ovid writes, “to [Pomona] praised, he gave a few kisses, such kisses 
as never a true old woman gave” (qtd. in Ormand 97).  Vertumnus raises questions about how the 
pedagogical erotics between Lee and Robinson shape Belcaro, questions we will address in the final 
section of this chapter.   
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violated can be detected in the “strange symptoms” the child develops after it is forced 
to fall in love with art (26). Invoking the language of pathology in this way, Lee’s 
narrative prefigures contemporary case-histories of child sexual abuse. In these 
psychoanalytic accounts, the traumatized victim of abuse experiences hysterical 
symptoms, then recovers repressed memories of sexual violation. However, Lee’s text 
departs from our accounts in her judgment of violation. She does not condemn the 
actions of these demons who waylay the victim, but celebrates the perceptive powers 
the child gains from them. The ultimate pleasure the child receives from art outweighs 
the “vague acheless pain” that it feels when it first is compelled to love sculpture. 
What is clear then is that Lee appropriates the Gothic here to valorize the ways 
in which that genre imperils innocence, insofar as safeguarding that innocence means 
guarding the viewer from sensations, knowledge and pleasure. The best evidence of 
how destroying censorial innocence impels her pedagogy appears when we move from 
the allegory of the child to the object-lesson in sculptural analysis Lee provides for 
those who cannot experience the child’s fantastic education. Lee’s choice of the 
Niobides as the best subjects to explicate how aestheticism prioritizes the formal and 
material aspects of art is peculiar, but telling. Reckless Niobe, having boasted of her 
maternal superiority to the goddess Leto, affronts that deity’s own children. In 
vengeance, Artemis and Apollo rain arrows upon the hapless queen’s children, 
massacring all her blameless offspring. Those same gods Lee pictures as violating the 
child in the Vatican immolate the Niobides so that her readers may learn the principles 
of aesthetic criticism. We might expect our proper, immediate response to this 
murderous vision to be outrage, pity, or horror, all justifiable attendant emotions to 
imagining innocence sacrificed. Yet Lee is adamant about the goals of aesthetic 
criticism; the “more intense becomes our perception of the form, the vaguer becomes 
our recollection of the subject . . ..our sympathies cease to vibrate with pity, as we 
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look on this visible embodiment of the terrible tragedy. We are no longer feeling 
emotion; we are merely perceiving beauty” (34). Resisting a tale of innocence 
traumatically despoiled, Lee explores the simultaneously frightening and thrilling 
pleasure of encountering the aesthetic. 
In purposefully summoning the gothic to violate innocence, Lee was daringly 
working against the conventions used by other female aesthetes. In The Forgotten 
Female Aesthetes, Talia Schaffer argues that the Gothic was central to the 
development of women's aestheticist literature. She characterizes the Gothic novel as a 
“French Revolution-influenced demonization of the aristocratic order in which feudal 
spaces (convents, monasteries, and castles) are a site of unspeakable evil” (128). She 
then argues that in the nineteenth century Gothic literature, these spaces are 
transformed into domestic prisons for innocent and “helpless female victims in the 
grip of a masterful male intelligence (128).  “The Gothic home, the dark archaic twin 
of Ruskin’s ‘place of peace’ is central to aesthetic women, who described it both in 
popular fiction and in domestic manuals” (130).  Innocent gothic heroines found their 
freedom within the Gothic home by domesticating it. Through the powers of 
aestheticism, they could turn bare, oppressive rooms into salons for witty repartee or 
parlors in which to display fine objets d'art. By making the house into the home, she 
might even be able to transform her sadistic male captor. The woman's success in 
aestheticizing the gothic home then, was a visible sign of her triumphant innocence 
and purity. 
Although Schaffer emphasizes the domesticity of the Gothic space, as we have 
seen, the home is exactly what Lee was interested in forgetting when she re-imagined 
Pater’s “Child in the House” in the Vatican. When she appropriates the Gothic, but 
divorces it from the domestic sphere, she is freed to embrace its decadent and 
disturbing energies to a degree that other female aesthetes could not. As proof of this, 
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we might contrast how Lee and the novelist Ouida (Marie Louise de la Ramee) deploy 
Gothic rhetoric. Schaffer argues that Ouida’s writings are an occluded source for the 
aesthetic novel. In the 1880s, interested in the “trope of the passive girl placed in the 
dangerous situation” (128), Ouida constructs narratives of female resistance to male 
cruelty and “transforms Gothic discourses into depictions of aesthetic life, [examining] 
particularly the different ways men and women utilize aesthetic connoisseurship and 
epigrams” (124). One of these narratives is the play Afternoon (1883). 
    Afternoon begins when an unsophisticated young woman, Claire, is sent to a 
convent for cultivation by L’Estrange, her embarrassed new husband.  By staging her 
death, she escapes the “martyrdom, the death in life” of educational confinement. 
Twenty years later, matured into a renowned artist, she plots revenge on L’Estrange 
for judging and dismissing her as he would an art-object. Unrecognized by him, she 
captivates his heart through what Schaffer calls “the aesthete’s artistic finesse: by her 
talent for unanswerable witty repartee, and by her remarkable taste and artistic skills” 
(134). Thus, the Gothic plot of female persecution impels the narrative of Claire’s 
aestheticist self-fashioning. With the aid of a friend, Claire deploys her artistic powers 
in order to exact revenge on her husband, who wishes to marry her. Through 
epigrammatic wit and “double statements that preserve the literal truth of Claire’s 
secret identity,” the two women inform L’Estrange that his wife is still living and 
construct elaborate narratives that reproach him for having cruelly exiled her to the 
convent. This bewilders him into feelings of guilt, “entrapment and despair” (132). 
Schaffer claims, “The women’s weapon against the connoisseur’s objectifying gaze is 
a kind of verbal productivity that matches Claire’s artistic productivity” (135). When 
L’Estrange repents the callous way he objectified his wife, Claire reconciles with him. 
The regularity of marriage is restored to a home that has been beautified by Claire's 
aestheticism. 
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 Schaffer points out that Ouida's massive popular audience “demanded Gothic 
thrillers resolved by domesticity” (139). We might argue that popular desire for 
domesticity and resolution curbs the intensity of the Gothic plot. Although the Gothic 
plot is necessary to provide drama and sensation, it must quickly be brought under 
control so that the narrative route towards a happy marriage, family and home is clear. 
The innocent Gothic heroine must have her reward. In Afternoon, for instance, the 
harrowing details of Claire's convent life are swiftly dealt with in flashback. 
Furthermore, although Ouida sees the Gothic as a device that leads to aestheticist 
development, she is uninterested in imagining this development under Gothic 
conditions. Instead, the affects with which the Gothic is associated, and the settings 
and relationships in which Gothic pedagogy conventionally takes place precipitate, 
rather than characterize the aesthetic education Afternoon depicts. Although Schaffer 
proposes a parallel between the unpleasant feelings of guilt Claire arouses in 
L’Estrange and the despair she suffered during her convent education, if L’Estrange’s 
mental anguish is to redeem rather than break him utterly, it cannot approach the 
magnitude of Claire’s suffering. Her pain was so great that her staged suicide seemed 
like a plausible attempt to escape her dejection. To push L'Estrange so far might mean 
that Claire has no husband and no home to inhabit when the play ends. Therefore, 
instead of fully replicating her husband's role as a Gothic villain, Claire limits the 
sadistic potential of her revenge and employs her elusive epigrams to sting the 
conscience, when she could do much worse. 
Writing in the genre of criticism rather than the novel and not driven to satisfy 
the readerly expectations of a popular audience, Lee was free to explore the resources 
of the Gothic without taming it.   By contrast, in "The Child in the Vatican," Lee 
insists that the child learns through the violence inflicted upon it in the gothic spaces 
of the museum. 
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Considering Lee’s complaints about contemporary alternatives to aesthetic 
criticism, her choice of the Gothic as her pedagogical vehicle is inspired. Against the 
shell of modern culture and criticism that deadens perception she offers the Gothic’s 
interest in and evocation of extreme passions and bodily sensations. Against the 
interpretive mode that delays appreciation of the oldest of arts, prioritizing younger 
media and contemporary work, she portrays the anachronistic vitality of ancient forces 
amidst modernity. We might even see the Gothic fairy-tale itself as a frivolous 
interruption of the scholarly and serious essay form that Lee associates with 
educational texts, an attempt to disrupt the dry and systematic argument of truth and 
argument that she feared Belcaro could become. The Gothic is pre-eminently the 
genre that allows Lee’s reader to be exposed. For her, aesthetic education demands a 
vulnerability to the overwhelming pleasure art solicits, it demands a self-positioning 
that may very well feel like an assault, but which must be endured. It is only through 
the proximity to art that this vulnerability permits that aesthetic experience can 
radically alter the subjectivity of its student through conversion.  
 
IV The Queerness of Conversion 
 
Throughout this chapter we have kept in sight Lee’s desire to educate Mary 
Robinson, that friend figured as the “nearest, most difficult, desired convert” (2). We 
can only fully understand this metaphor for intellectual movement by considering 
Victorian concerns about religious conversion in Britain.  Catholic conversion was not 
a merely religious or sectarian problem. It could be figured as a threat to national 
security, a practice that undermined social institutions like marriage, a disruption of 
gender norms, an incitement to non-heteronormative sexuality, or the symptom of 
mental degeneracy or hysterical fanaticism. Of these ways of understanding 
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conversion, religious change as erotic deviance characterizes “Child” most strongly, 
especially when Belcaro is understood as a gift that one woman lovingly presents to 
another. As James Eli Adams reminds us, “Given its association (even in sympathetic 
accounts) with feminized subjects vulnerable to both psychological and bodily 
subjection, conversion also was widely associated with seduction” (9). A seduction is 
always a leading astray, a pleasurable diversion from the proper path. In tracking the 
errantry of the “wayward” child, who, separated from its guardians, becomes 
vulnerable, Lee’s fairytale attempts to seduce its reader with the spectacle of 
conversion.  
Recall Lee’s desire not to teach, but to show how far she has taught herself. If 
we adopt the understanding that poses the titular child as Lee’s presentation of her 
young self, the essay takes on an exhibitionist allure. By writing this fantasy, which is 
primarily an idealized portrait of self-culture, Lee invites us to be instructed by 
pedophilic visions of her raptured and converted by art, overwhelmed by erotic 
intensity. If we deem this identification of the author and the child as too direct, too 
unsophisticated, we may prefer to see the child as a substitutive and identificatory 
figure for we readers, but above all for the text’s primary addressee, Robinson. After 
all, Robinson is the desired convert that the child exemplifies. Such a reading raises 
questions of Lee’s voyeuristic investment in the fantasy of her beloved in a seductive 
scenario. Indeed, there is no reason these readings must exclude each other. The 
former is the accomplished act that instructively serves as the possibility of the latter. 
Juxtaposed, the two offer the prospect of a union between author and reader, teacher 
and student, friend and friend.  
Knowing of the erotically fraught relationship between Lee and Robinson, we 
may be tempted to ask: is Lee’s interest in conversion an attempt to imagine or 
describe a shift in sexual subjectivity and the new perceptive powers such a shift 
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might bring? Is Lee narrating her own aesthetic education as a kind of initiation into 
lesbian identity? Does “The Child in the Vatican” document or fantasize about an 
aesthetic experience that would shift Robinson’s sexual nature fundamentally—
perhaps to lesbianism? These readings are tantalizing but must remain suggestive. 
Certainly, from the mid-century onwards, the terms conversion and perversion, both 
linked to religious transgressions, begin to take on the sexual overtones they will 
assume for Freud and the Victorian sexologists. Additionally, Lee’s child looks like 
the textual precursor to the constructions of queer sexualities as the result of traumatic 
seduction. It is in response to the experience of erotic predation that Lee’s child has 
been fundamentally changed. It gains its knowledge unconsciously, through the 
experience of forceful love. The singular nature—both aesthetic and sexual—it 
consequently develops might be understood by how Lee singles it out from other 
children who occupy themselves with quotidian juvenile pursuits while it alone bursts 
into tears at stray notes of music or watches rising fog wreath the Eternal City. Such 
lonesome sentimentality has its queer associations, especially around male figures. But 
to read the education here as a mythic account of the development of lesbian 
subjectivity in Lee or Robinson is, if not necessarily anachronistic, perhaps too 
narrow. Apart from the biographical context Belcaro exists in and the association of 
conversion itself with the erotics of feminized subjects, no textual signifiers exist to 
link the child’s transformed subjectivity to lesbian specificity. With its suggestiveness, 
however, Lee’s text allows us to pose the question of what an aesthetic education 
might look when it is motivated by desire between women, and allows us to reflect on 
how this might be different from accounts of aesthetic education organized around 
male homoerotics. 
Writing on aesthetic Platonism, Stefano Evangelista argues that from “the 
1860s sexuality starts to be used as a critical category in the study of literature and the 
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arts in a way that anticipates the concerns and methods of feminist and ‘queer’ 
criticism today. Sympathetic commentators isolate a prestigious cultural tradition in 
which the shared element of homoerotic desire is used as the enabling factor for the 
interpretation and revision of critical history” (231). Evangelista is describing the way 
in which Victorian Hellenism historicized and suspended moral judgments around 
Greek pederasty, emphasizing how the erotic-educational relationship between men 
was seen as civically and artistically productive. As we have seen, it is this 
philhellenic discourse that allows Pater to find the key to Winckelmann’s critical 
powers in his sexual temperament. Filled with the enthusiasm described in the 
Phaedrus, Winckelmann divines the laws and conditions that govern the artwork.  Yet, 
as Yopie Prins reminds us, “denied access to formal education in Greek and Latin, 
Victorian women had a different relationship to classical discourses than their 
counterparts” (78).  Even assuming their ability to read the Platonic texts on love, they 
would find little there that valorized erotic attachments between women, leaving them 
to adapt the androcentric texts to their own use, or to fabricate gynocentric discourse 
out of different sources, such as the poetic fragments of Sappho. When we think of 
this troubled relationship to classical discourse, it seems notable that Lee uses tropes 
associated with contemporary religious discourse and the Gothic to inform her account 
of aesthetic education and an epistemology based in eroticism. The classical figures in 
her account, to be sure, but she foregrounds a different way to access it than her male 
counterparts would have done. Another key difference comes in the way that the art 
object is related to eroticism. In the accounts of critical formation that emerge from 
aesthetic Platonism, art, represented by the dramatic Platonic text or the Greek statue, 
serves to reveal to the young man in question his true nature, one taken to be essential, 
unchanging yet hidden. The discovery of this obscured nature is presented as a 
remembering, with the classical artifact serving as a mnemonic. We have explored 
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Pater’s exploration of memory as an alternative to education in the previous chapter, 
but to add another example, we might turn to John Addington Symonds Memoirs, and 
his feelings upon reading the Phaedrus. He writes: “Here in the Phaedrus and the 
Symposium…I discovered the true liber amoris at last, the revelation I had been 
waiting for, the consecration of a long-cherished idealism. It was just as though the 
voice of my own soul spoke to me through Plato, as though in some antenatal 
experience I had lived the life of a philosophical Greek lover”(99). Now both 
Symonds’ fancy of antenatal existence and Pater’s conception of critical experience 
felt as déjà vu make erotic subjectivity a part of cultural tradition—one does not find 
the source of one’s own erotic subjectivity in any circumstances in the present so 
much as locate it in a history one has been separated from, but which exists to be 
discovered. This retrospection grounds epistemology in a problematic way for those 
whose erotic subjectivities are excluded from tradition; according to Pater’s logic in 
Winckelmann, we might wonder if a woman could be a true critic of Greek art. Even 
less radically, does a male whose homoerotic desire finds no affinity with Greek 
pederasty still capable of understanding that enthusiasm that is the secret of 
understanding Greek art? 
We detect Lee’s skepticism to how aesthetic Platonism enshrines classical 
tradition in her caricature of aesthetic appreciation as gymnastics. The ancient 
gymnasium was imagined as the institution which created the canonical beauty of 
Greek art. As Pater writes in Greek Studies, “It was the Dorian cities, Plato tells us, 
which first  shook off the false Asiatic shame, and stripped off  their clothing for 
purposes of exercise and training in  the gymnasium; and it was part of the Dorian or 
European influence to assert the value in art of the unveiled and healthy human form.” 
The ascetic athletic ideal of Greek art also became a model for criticism among the 
Platonic aesthetes. Consider two of Pater’s critical statements: “Surplusage! [the 
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writer] will dread that, as the runner on his muscles”(Appreciations 16). “Burn always 
with this . . . hard gem-like flame is success in life” (Renaissance 189).  Both of these 
conjure a commitment to aesthetic discipline that is akin to the athlete keeping himself 
lean and fit in the gymnasium and palaestra. Yet Lee’s vision of the gymnasium is 
quite different. For her art cannot fulfill its functions when  
its enjoyment is a sort of deliberate mental gymnastics which our desire for 
well balanced activity or our wish to display a certain unnecessary gracefulness 
of intellectual motions, impose upon us, setting aside a certain portion of our 
time for counteracting in the artistic gymnasiums (rows of soaped poles and 
hurdles and ladders and expanses of padded floor quite as unlike as may be 
from the climbable trees and walkable brooks we ought to meet in our walks) 
called galleries, concerts etc. the direful slackening of our muscles and 
stiffening of our joints almost inevitable in our cramped intellectual shop life 
of today. We writhe, clinging with arms and legs, up the soaped poles of 
aesthetic feeling, slipping and rising again, straining and twisting, to plop down 
at last on the padding and the sawdust, we dangle, with constrained grace, high 
in aesthetic contemplation, flying with a clutching swing from idea to idea and 
then we think an hour or two, every now and then, of such exercise is (except 
brutal slumber) all that can be required as repose in our intellectual life” (278-
279). 
Lee’s satire of exercise here suggests that the discourses authorized by romantic 
investment in the Greek gymnasium depend on an irrecoverable ideal—one not suited 
for modern times. To duplicate or attempt to realize that mode of existence renders 
one as silly or grotesque as those bodies that no longer wrestle in the palaestra, but 
writhe up the “soaped poles” of aesthetic feeling. Contemporary times demand 
different modes of exercise, as in the leisurely country walk evoked above.  Although 
the desire for frenzied intellectual activity, metaphorically represented through 
athleticism, means to counteract the current unhealthy effects of commodity culture—
“the direful slackening of our muscles…almost inevitable in our cramped intellectual 
shop life of today”—this classically influenced exercise, which, compared to the 
break-neck pace of everyday life, seems like “repose,” is only wearying over-exertion. 
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Of what use then is subscribing to a model of aesthetic contemplation authorized 
solely by ancient Greece? 
 Lee’s Gothic-inflected metaphor of conversion offers one solution to this 
epistemological problem. While Pater and Symonds appeal to a particular historicized 
desire to enable their criticism, the desire that grounds Lee’s aesthetic education is 
always seen as operating in the present—the art object serves not to remind the viewer 
of her kinship with lovers from the past, but itself alters her capacity to love in the 
present. We might imagine conversion as a critical and erotic re-orientation that takes 
place with reference to no fixed polarity. Thus, the emphasis on conversion in Lee’s 
project enables an education that has fewer restrictions on which kinds of students it 
applies to. Even if we cannot see conversion as a dedicated lesbian metaphor for 
aesthetic education, it opens the possibility for a discussion of lesbian aesthetics and 
pedagogy. 
In the previous chapter, we mentioned Pater’s retelling of the romance of 
Abelard and Heloise. There he insists that Abelard’s philosophy was saved from being 
abstract theory because of his loving handling of his student: “he tries to find a ground 
of reality below the abstractions of philosophy, as one bent on trying all things by their 
congruity with human experience, who had felt the hand of Heloise” (5). Belcaro 
occupies a vexed position. As it labors to educate Lee’s beloved, it is constantly in 
danger of becoming a theoretical work that will only obscure Robinson’s access to 
aesthetic pleasure, constantly in danger of restoring to Lee that “magisterial” endowed 
chair she has rejected in turning to aesthetics. But Pater is not alone in the ability to 
imagine erotic desire that dispels abstraction. As Belcaro closes, we see Lee 
touchingly alluding to the gothic conventions she hopes will help her and her lover to 
maintain contact with the concrete world of art and not the abstraction of theory. She 
embodies that in the mode of speech that closes the text.  While Belcaro begins with 
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Lee’s desire to convert Robinson, it ends with Robinson hearing Lee’s confession, a 
situation that evokes the auricular confession derogated in the gothic discourse of 
Anglican Evangelicals and Broad Churchmen. “And thus…I will -confess to you that 
more nearly appealing to me, dearer also, than antique bas-relief or song of Mozart, 
has been the vague remembrance, evoked by trivial word or sight, -of that early winter 
afternoon on the ilex girded battlements of Belcaro” (284). She continues: 
And, moreover, I will even confess (as severest self-chastisement to a writer -
on art, as complete expiation of aesthetic dogmatism and fantastications), while 
we walk across the warm grass….I foresee that many a time in the future there 
will arise between me and the fresco or picture at which I am looking, a vision 
of this old world garden… that, sometimes, there will come into my head 
something— something ill-defined, pleasurable, painful—which will make me 
read only with my eyes ; which will make me (worst humiliation) lose the 
thread of my theories, of my thoughts, of my sentence. And, after this 
confession, I think I can say no more. (285) 
 In taking up the confessing role, Lee renounces the pastoral authority she would to 
effect a conversion, and endows Robinson with it, a renunciation that imitates her 
forsaking of professorial authority. But more importantly, she assures Robinson that 
the memory of their love and intimacy is what guarantees that she will remain 
grounded in aesthetic formalism, reading only with her eyes at the cost of abandoning 
her theories. Humiliating as the loss of expression might be, it recalls how Lee 
“humbly” reinvents herself as a student of aesthetics and though the vision of that love 
momentarily interposes between the art object and the critic, unlike the opaque body 
of theory that obscures sight of the art object, the nostalgic vision of love acts as a lens 
to sharpen critical powers. In the concluding aphasiac sentence, Lee’s text performs 
the loss of language she prophesies, and in losing the ability to speak, escapes the 
danger of didactic theory, even as treats her reader to imagining her enraptured, silent 
in one of those moments of erotic nostalgia that commemorate her loving relationship 
with Robinson.  
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CHAPTER 3 
“Strange Legacies of Thought and Passion”: Oscar Wilde’s Epistemology of 
Inheritance 
 
I  Pedagogy and the Risk of Loss 
 
  In his early career, Oscar Wilde was optimistic about training people to be 
better aesthetes. After graduating from Oxford in 1879, he sought an academic career 
and applied for fellowships in classics and archaeology. Rejected for these 
postgraduate positions, he simply assumed donnish authority, promoting himself in 
his calling cards as “Professor of Aesthetics” and “critic of Art.”  At a time when his 
most substantial claim to fame was his weakly received poetry, educating the public 
about aesthetic issues and capitalizing on his identity as a brilliant Oxford graduate 
offered him the best way to earn a livelihood. Hence, in his introduction to Rennell 
Rodd’s poetry collection, Rose Leaf and Apple Leaf (1882), Wilde identifies himself 
as one of the “many young men in England who are seeking…to continue and perfect 
the English Renaissance” (3). This “younger school” of artists and aesthetes were 
students of John Ruskin, who “by the magic of his presence and the music of his lips 
taught us at Oxford that enthusiasm for beauty which is the secret of Hellenism…and 
filled some of us, at least, with the lofty and passionate ambition to go forth into far 
and fair lands with some message for the nations and some mission for the world” (5). 
Wilde departs from Ruskin’s teachings because “the keystone to his aesthetic system 
is ethical always” while for the young aesthetes “the rule of art is not the rule of 
morals” (6). But even as Wilde rejects Ruskin’s moralism, he believes in his 
pedagogical vision. It is partially this desire to instruct others that sends Wilde to 
expound aesthetic principles on his transatlantic lecture tour in 1882. America, 
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Canada, Mexico, Australia and Japan are “the far and fair lands” he envisions as he 
evokes the aesthete as globe-trotting missionary, and it is through lecturing abroad that 
Wilde sets down his financial foundation and courts new audiences for his plays and 
cultural criticism. 
We might well think that Wilde whole-heartedly adored teaching. Following 
the footsteps of Matthew Arnold, he applied for the position of inspector of schools. 
Furthermore, he delighted in writing dialogues that are modeled on Plato’s texts. 
Modernizing the pedagogical homosociality of the Greeks, Wilde’s aristocratic 
dandies smoke cigarettes, flirt with one another, and expound aesthetics over 
Chambertin and ortolans. But despite the social pleasures education made available, 
despite the opportunity that aesthetic education offered for raising the standard of 
beauty in the world, much of Wilde’s work, especially from his late career, is marked 
by the fear that teaching could damage the teacher. Perhaps that fear is best 
demonstrated in a line Wilde’s prose-poem, “The Teacher of Wisdom” (1894): “The 
pearl of great price thou hast divided, and the vesture without seam thou has parted 
asunder. He who giveth away wisdom robbeth himself. He is as one who giveth his 
treasure to a robber” (867-8). Wilde echoes this idea in another text, “The Portrait of 
Mr. W. H.” (1889): “Influence is simply the transference of personality, a mode of 
giving away what is most precious to one’s self, and its exercise produces a sense, 
and, it may be, a reality of loss. Every disciple takes away something from his master” 
(1196). In Robert Ross’ introduction to his collection of Wilde’s Miscellanies, we 
learn that Wilde’s unfinished play La Sainte Courtisane was to have “expanded 
Wilde’s favourite theory that when you convert someone to an idea, you lose your 
faith in it” (xiii). The extant fragments from the first draft of the play communicate the 
theme of loss quite effectively. The voluptuary Myrrhina tempts the hermit Honorius, 
and he attempts to convert her to his beliefs. A pedagogical chiasmus occurs, for as the 
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courtesan and the holy man convince each other, they lose their own beliefs.  Honorius 
cries, “Myrrhina, the scales have fallen from my eyes and I see now clearly what I did 
not before. Take me to Alexandria and let me taste of the seven sins” (705). Myrrhina 
replies, “Do not mock me Honorius, nor speak to me with such bitter words. For I 
have repented of my sin and I am seeking a cavern in this desert where I too may 
dwell so that my soul may become worthy to see God” (705). 
In these scenarios, to teach is not to share knowledge, which cannot be 
communally possessed by more than one owner or divided and dispersed. To teach is 
to expend scarce and valuable resources, without any promise of eventual returns. 
Wilde does not improve this grim scenario by describing a Bataillean pleasure in 
giving or wasting one’s treasury of learning, nor does he suggest that giving away 
knowledge might leave room for more interesting or complex ideas.29 Without these 
qualifications, his notion of teaching seems wholly negative, especially since he does 
not see teaching as a mere transference of knowledge or skills. To influence another is 
to give away “personality”; it reduces the self in some way. 
In the preceding chapters, we have considered Pater’s concern over how the 
teacher’s comportment and emotional expression may endanger the student and we 
have seen how for Lee, the formal teacher and his systematic theories can insulate the 
student from the sensuous immediacy of art. It is these concerns that move Pater and 
Lee to propose theories of innate knowledge. Like Lee and Pater, Wilde knows that 
the interpersonal work of education can never cease, and his oeuvre is a persistent 
effort to instruct his audiences, even when he loses hope that they will ever listen to 
him. Yet he fantasizes that amid the necessary work of education, there might exist 
                                                 
29
 Myrrhina and Honorius receive new beliefs to replace their old ones, but seem unable to enjoy their 
new identities as holy woman and sinful man. Instead of devoting herself to holy contemplation, she is 
consumed by guilt for having tempted Honorius, and spends her time in self-recrimination. Honorius 
wishes to go to Alexandria, but seems not to know the way, for in the last lines of the fragment, he is 
still engaged in conversation with Myrrhina. 
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methods for learning wherein individuals would need only to rely on themselves. 
Wilde differs from Pater and Lee in the following way: while they are pre-eminently 
concerned with the student’s well-being in the pedagogical encounter, Wilde’s 
fantasies are motivated by his concern for the teacher and the teacher’s loss.  
Wilde has two kinds of fantasies about learning without teachers. The first, 
which originates in his early texts, has to do with the influence of environment on the 
critical senses. In his American lecture, “The English Renaissance of Art,” he claims 
“the truths of art cannot be taught: they are revealed only, revealed to natures that have 
made themselves receptive of all beautiful impressions by the study and worship of all 
beautiful things” (23). Drawing on Plato’s Republic, he then argues that if children are 
brought up in an environment of beautiful things, the spirit of art will “insensibly and 
gradually draw the child’s soul into harmony with all knowledge and wisdom, so that 
he will love what is beautiful and good and hate what is evil and ugly (for they always 
go together) long before he knows the reason why” (23). Insofar as Wilde has 
concerns about the effect of authoritarian teachers on students, the idea that the spirit 
of art may instruct us eliminates the need for those teachers. But Wilde has another 
type of fantasy about teacherless education that appears in his later texts, and it is this 
that seems to emerge to assuage his anxieties about loss. If in the first set of fantasies 
the spirit of art alters the “soul” or the “temperament” so that they become more 
receptive, sensitive instruments for discerning the truth about art, the second kind of 
fantasy imagines that the critic holds within himself an immense trove of memories, 
impressions, or personalities. These comprise the sum of his innate knowledge of art, 
inform his critical decisions, and constitute, through their infinite variety, a kind of 
psychic superabundance to counter the loss teaching inflicts.  Attempting to imagine 
the mechanisms by which this interior wealth comes to be hidden within the self, 
Wilde considers that it is stored there mystically, through processes associated with 
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anamnesis. But fancying that the hereditary transmission of knowledge is possible, he 
abandons the concept of anamnesis to base self-education in organic memory. 
 
II The Impoverishing Effects of Philanthropy and Pedagogy 
 
“The Teacher of Wisdom” follows one who from “his childhood had been as 
one filled with the perfect knowledge of God” (867). He gathers many disciples and “a 
great multitude also of people [who] followed him from each city” (867). But his 
stunningly successful instruction only brings him “sorrow and fear” (867). Surrounded 
by so many disciples, he becomes paranoid about their intentions and he deems each 
of them “an enemy that walks in the noonday” (867). The teacher’s Soul informs him, 
“God filled thee with the perfect knowledge of Himself and thou hast given this 
knowledge away to others. The pearl of great price thou hast divided, and the vesture 
without seam thou hast parted asunder. He who giveth away wisdom robbeth himself, 
He is as one who giveth his treasure to a robber” (867 – 8). Realizing he has only a 
mite of wisdom left, and that “his faith was leaving him by reason of the number of 
those who believed in him” (868), the teacher retires to the desert to become a Hermit, 
praising God that “He had suffered him to keep some knowledge of Him and of His 
wonderful greatness” (868). Eventually, the Hermit is moved to teach a young 
Robber30 his knowledge of God in an attempt to keep this “young man of evil and 
beautiful face” from entering the “City of the Seven Sins” (868). Imparting this 
teaching, the Hermit is bereft of all knowledge of God and enveloped by a “great 
darkness” which symbolizes his new state of despair and ignorance (870).  
                                                 
30
 Wilde’s characterization of the Robber as student neatly realizes the simile that the Hermit’s Soul 
uses to describe pedagogy. 
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Confronted with the preceding scene, we seem to see the pedagogical economy 
described by “The Portrait of Mr. W.H”: a disciple takes something away from his 
master and a teacher loses what is most precious to him. But Wilde, refusing to close 
his prose-poem on such a scene of dejection, draws on the (conflicting) conventions of 
queer sentimental narrative31 and Christian eucatastrophe to restore the Hermit’s loss. 
In the process, the loss is redefined more specifically and nobly as self-sacrifice. As he 
lies forlorn and depressed, the Hermit is unexpectedly kissed and comforted by a 
beautiful man “with feet of brass and hair like fine wool” (870). This Christ-figure 
asks him why he weeps and tells him that by expending his perfect knowledge of God, 
he has earned the perfect Love of God. By redeeming a sinner through what might 
superficially seem an act of Christian selflessness, the Hermit guarantees that God will 
reward him with an even greater treasure than the knowledge he possessed. Or, read 
another way, having sacrificed all that is precious out of desire and compassion for an 
undeserving man, the Hermit is rewarded by the love of a better man who will wipe 
his tears and assure him that he is His own. The Christian system within which Wilde 
frames this pedagogical narrative is overseen by an interested agent on whose behalf 
the teacher teaches; this agent can intervene to redress the teacher’s loss. But what 
happens when teaching cannot be performed in a system that rewards the teacher, or at 
least requites him for his ruinous self-sacrifice? 
                                                 
31
 If this were merely a Christian parable, the reluctant teacher would offer the knowledge of God to the 
Robber out of a selfless concern for his soul. But Wilde’s parable suggests he acts out of homoerotic or 
scopophilic desire. The Hermit enjoys looking at the beautiful thief as he passes to and fro on his daily 
robberies. He watches the young man so intently that he cries “no man has looked at me before in this 
manner. And the thing is a thorn and a trouble to me” (869). When the Robber decides to go to the City 
of the Seven Sins, which is three days journey away from the Hermit’s cave, he threatens to break the 
routine that the holy man enjoys gazing upon. For three days, the teacher follows the Robber 
maintaining sight of him and entreating him to return to the desert and not to enter the City. Desperate 
to keep the Robber from passing beyond the gates of the City he himself will not enter, the Hermit 
finally divulges his theological knowledge. 
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Gilbert, the aristocratic spokesman of Wilde’s “The Critic as Artist” (1890), 
would be appalled by the way in which “The Teacher of Wisdom” glorifies the 
Hermit’s selflessness. He condemns the nineteenth century as a “thoroughly selfish 
age” that deifies “self-sacrifice” (181). In other words, if, unlike the Hermit, people 
might no longer hope to be rewarded for their selflessness by God, they will turn self-
sacrifice itself into a god, into a goal, into an ideal. Hence it is a time of 
“philanthropists and sentimentalists…who are always chattering to one about one’s 
duty to one’s neighbour” (181). Gilbert warns against these dutiful types, for in their 
zeal for self-sacrificial service to others they are “dominating [their neighbour’s] 
lives” (182). Furthermore, he insists that “just as the philanthropist is the nuisance of 
the ethical sphere, so the nuisance of the intellectual sphere is the man who is so 
occupied in trying to educate others that he has never had any time to educate himself” 
(182). For Gilbert, “the development of the race depends on the development of the 
individual, and where self-culture has ceased to be the ideal, the intellectual standard 
is instantly lowered, and often, ultimately lost” (181). Devoting himself unreservedly 
to his students then, the teacher forgets to envision and execute his own program of 
development.32 Unable to challenge himself to be better than he is, the intellectual 
                                                 
32
 I read self-culture here as a deliberate, self-conscious process, a definition that conflicts with critics 
such as Stephen Arata. Arata rightly notes that Wilde often “rejects humanist notions of the organic and 
autonomous individual” and he is also correct that for Wilde a “fully realized individual is defined not 
by authentic interiority but by a drive to become ever more inauthentic, ever more complex’ and 
multiform’” (61).  But Arata is too quick to link Wilde’s anti-humanism with “an undirected and largely 
alogical process of accretion” (61). For Arata, self-development and self-culture are Spencerian 
evolutionary terms that define growth as “the coherent and directed realization of a potential latent in 
(and thus essential to the individual” (61). Therefore, he sees Wildean individuals as random 
aggregations of personalities who find their identity through constant, undirected change. But merely 
because Wilde rejects an authentic self that is realized through development does not mean the process 
of becoming a Wildean individual is not directed, logical, or deliberate. I say this to foreground the 
importance of personality for the Wildean individual. If, as Arata suggests, personality is acquired by 
accidental processes, and if the Wildean individual is constituted by random change, we are hard-
pressed to explain why the transference of personality associated with pedagogy in Wilde should be 
experienced as the loss of something precious. 
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heights to which he can urge his students are curtailed more than they might have been 
otherwise.  
When Wilde likens teaching to philanthropy, he is probably thinking of the 
aesthetic education carried out by practitioners of missionary aestheticism.  Diana 
Maltz describes missionary aesthetes as disciples of Ruskin who “believed that 
exposure to art and to bourgeois manners would ‘elevate’ the poor and inculcate habits 
of self-regulation” (185).  Hence they “worked accordingly to provide free concerts,  
playgrounds and public gardens in working-class neighborhoods, lobbied for extended 
museum and gallery hours on Sundays, and encouraged artists to open their studios to 
the poor” (186). In The Picture of Dorian Gray, before Lord Henry seduces Dorian to 
an entirely different lifestyle, the boy is at risk of being taken to London’s East End in 
order to amuse and enlighten the poor by playing piano duets with the philanthropic 
Lady Agatha.  
One reason Wilde opposes aesthetic philanthropy is for its authoritarian, 
intrusive and condescending mission to “elevate” the working-classes and make them 
conform to bourgeois standards of comportment. Using aesthetic education to 
discipline the poor, missionary aesthetes rarely asked their students how they would 
like to shape their own lives aesthetically, given the means. Although missionary 
aestheticism offered working class people some skills and spaces with which they 
could pursue the “self-culture” Gilbert idealizes above, it failed to critique the 
economic system that prevented the poor from actually realizing the full benefits of 
aesthetic education. Lord Henry dismisses his Aunt Agatha’s piano-playing and notes, 
the problem of the East End is “the problem of slavery, and we try to solve it by 
amusing the slaves” (36).  Destroying the extant economic system, Wilde argues in 
“The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” would actually create the conditions that would 
give people time to be interested in art and to view their own lives as material for them 
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to fashion aesthetically. Freed from necessity of working just to survive, the poor 
could “choose the sphere of activity that is really congenial to them, and gives them 
pleasure” (233). They could develop their personalities in a way that currently only 
“the poets, the philosophers, the men of science, the men of culture—in a word, the 
real men, the men who have realized themselves” do, assisted by private property 
(233).  
 Make no mistake, however. Lord Henry is no radical socialist. Although he 
critiques philanthropy and the conditions that make it necessary, he intimates, “I don’t 
desire to change anything in England except the weather” (37). As he entreats Dorian 
not to become a missionary aesthete, he argues that charitable education is wasteful 
expenditure on irredeemable subjects. “Don’t squander the gold of your days, listening 
to the tedious, trying to improve the hopeless failure or giving away your life to the 
ignorant, the common, and the vulgar. These are the sickly aims, the false ideals, of 
our age” (23). Lord Henry shares this pessimism with Wilde. In The Vulgarization of 
Art: The Victorians and Aesthetic Democracy, Linda Dowling reminds us that when 
aesthetes like Wilde affirmed every individual’s right to criticize art without recourse 
to any authority, they were faced with “the crushing ugliness of late Victorian 
landscapes and especially cityscapes—now hideously defaced with the consequences 
of millions of individual aesthetic choices, each the result of ‘judging for yourself’” 
(90). According to Dowling, Wilde suffered as an artist, “finding himself implicated in 
and economically determined by the aesthetic preferences of  a vast new democratic 
audience, its numbers swollen by working classes newly educated into ‘Board School 
ignorance’ and newly endowed with leisure and money undreamt of by their 
predecessors” (91). Empowered by the rise of consumer capitalism and better access 
to formal education, the working and middle classes were able to demand that art 
reflect their tastes and standards, even when those standards did not align with the 
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high-cultural ideals of the aesthetes. The aesthetes had assumed that their own tastes 
comprised the normative standard that the working-classes would unquestioningly 
adopt or eagerly aspire to once they were given increased opportunities to judge art 
freely. When the working classes began to express their vision of what art was, and 
what it should do, it must have seemed to Wilde and his fellow aesthetes that they 
were “trying to improve the hopeless failure,” squandering their time and intellectual 
resources on “the ignorant, the common and the vulgar.” 
 The struggle between the aesthetic philanthropist and the vulgar working- and 
middle-classes is just the most extreme manifestation of the struggle between teacher 
and student that Wilde feels is present in any pedagogical situation. Hence even 
though Gilbert speaks to Earnest, a young man of the same learning and class as he, he 
begs his friend not to cast him in the position of educator: “Don’t degrade me into the 
position of giving you useful information. Education is an admirable thing, but it is 
well to remember that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught” (136). Gilbert 
then portrays the horrible effects of teaching others: 
If you meet at dinner a man who has spent his life in educating himself…you 
rise from table richer, and conscious that a high ideal has for a moment 
touched and sanctified your days. But oh! my dear Ernest, to sit next to a man 
who has spent his life in trying to educate others! What a dreadful experience 
that is! How appalling is that ignorance which is the inevitable result of the 
fatal habit of imparting opinions! How limited in range the creature's mind 
proves to be! How it wearies us, and must weary himself, with its endless 
repetitions and sickly reiteration! How lacking it is in any element of 
intellectual growth! In what a vicious circle it always moves! (181) 
In deriding the educator here, Wilde draws on The Renaissance. There, Pater claims 
that in life “our failure is to form habits: for after all habit is relative to a stereotyped 
world, and meantime it is only roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, 
things, situations seem alike” (189). There are reasons that teachers are forced to 
repeat themselves, to become creatures of habit. If we consider how the “vulgar” 
public ignored the intellectual standard of the aesthetes, we can easily imagine an 
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aesthetic critic repeating her message in lectures and in books, intent on being listened 
to. But for Wilde, such a scene reveals pedagogical failure more than it promises an 
imminent educational success. Viewed through a Paterian lens, repetitious pedagogical 
tactics are a symptom of weakening aesthetic capacities. Forming a fixed way of 
responding to an ever-changing world is a perceptual failing that renders the teacher 
unreceptive to what his senses might teach him and unresponsive to the varied needs 
and demands of the individuals he wishes to inform. Furthermore, because the 
educator locks himself into a “vicious circle” by habitually repeating the same 
opinions he loses the chance to expand his range of knowledge by listening to others 
or challenging his own opinions through study and reflection. As he expounds his 
material, his words are not the sign of his plenitude of knowledge; they only betray his 
intellectual lack. This intellectual deficiency is not merely defined by lost chances to 
learn more, rather, by contrasting the educator with the self-educated man, Wilde 
suggests that the teacher’s “repetitions” and “sickly reiteration” siphon away what 
little knowledge he might possess. We infer that when guests meet the self-taught man 
at dinner, they do not just meet him, surely they “rise from table richer” because they 
have engaged him in table talk. But no dialogue is mentioned in regard to the self-
educated man. Because of this omission, he seems to enrich his dinner companions 
merely through his proximity, or his silent contact: he is a “high ideal” who “has for a 
moment touched and sanctified [their] days.” 33 Because his conversation is withheld 
from readers, the self-cultured man becomes an exemplar of reserve; although he 
challenges others to aspire to his high ideal and enriches them, it is as if he gives 
                                                 
33As Wilde wrote this part of Gilbert and Earnest’s dialogue, he may have been thinking about Plato’s 
dialogue, Symposium. There, Agathon says to his great teacher, “Come and lie down beside me 
Socrates, so that by contact with you, I can share the piece of wisdom that came to you in the porch” 
(7). In Agathon’s fancy, just being close to wisdom is enough to make him wise; he does not 
necessarily learn through a process that transfers knowledge from one man to another. 
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nothing away in the process. By contrast, the educator spews words repetitively; he 
lacks reserve.  Speaking so much carries a cost, one that Wilde describes by 
employing the same tropes of degeneration that were associated with his dangerous 
pedagogy in America. His use of the term “creature” and his description of the 
teacher’s “sickly reiteration” suggest someone so enervated by pedagogical 
expenditure that he has devolved into an animal. 
 Given Wilde’s visions of students as robbers, of teachers degraded and 
animalized by teaching, of knowledge as capital that is squandered by being 
transferred from teacher to student, we might well wonder why anyone in Wilde’s 
texts teaches anyone else. As we will see in the next section, for all his interest in the 
dialogue as a form for education, for all his eroticization of the relationship between 
master and student, Wilde constantly toys with the fancy that we might acquire or 
possess all the knowledge we might ever wish to know, that we need learn from no-
one else, but merely must look within to find what we wish to know.  
 
III  Wildean Anamnesis and Self-Culture  
 
In “The Critic as Artist” Gilbert insists that the alternative to being educated by 
others is “self-culture,” and links this process not only to the Bildung of Goethe’s 
German Romanticism but to Greek philosophy. Following the aesthetic Platonism of 
critics like Pater, Wilde turned to dialogues like the Phaedrus and Symposium for 
models of autodidacticism. As we have seen, Pater had employed the theory of 
anamnesis in “Winckelmann” and Plato and Platonism to propose that novice 
aesthetes innately knew how to criticize art, but had forgotten the methods of 
criticism.  Therefore, aesthetes learned by reminding themselves of what they already 
knew, not by receiving guidance from teachers. As he also attempts to make the 
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relation of teacher and student unnecessary, Wilde also imagines that whatever one 
could wish to learn is already known to one, although it may be occluded. Uncovering 
this knowledge is one of the modes of “self-culture and self-development” that he 
praises in the epigraph above, a way of becoming conscious of aspects of the self that 
a person does not know. He gives accounts of how this knowledge comes to be hidden 
within, and how it may be revealed in a number of texts written within a short period 
of each other: “The Portrait of Mr. W.H.,” “The Critic as Artist” and The Picture of 
Dorian Gray. These texts record Wilde’s initial delight in anamnesis and then his 
disappointment that it could not underwrite a fantasy of innate knowledge.  
 Although we have examined anamnesis before, we have understood it in the 
context of Plato’s Meno, which only attempts to explain how education can be 
conceived as a form of reminiscence. The Phaedrus gives a much more detailed 
account of how knowledge comes to be inscribed within us, and why we seek to recall 
it. According to Socrates, before the soul is incarnated, it glimpses the godly realm of 
Forms or Ideals, of which earthly reality is merely a shadow. A soul that has won the 
clearest view of this true reality “will become a lover of wisdom or of beauty, or…will 
be cultivated in the arts and prone to erotic love” (35).  After incarnation, a person 
yearns to see the realm of Forms again and with the aid of certain simulacra, 
constantly strives to remind itself of the Forms, the most easily recalled of which is 
Beauty. Hence, when a philosopher or artist sees among young men  “a godlike face or 
beautiful form that has captured Beauty well, first he shudders and a fear comes over 
him, like those he had felt during that earlier time, then he gazes at him with the 
reverence due a god” (39). Overwhelmed by the beauty that enables him to recapture 
the heavenly vision, the philosopher falls in love, and feels as if he is going crazy—
this is the state known as mania. Because the beloved’s beauty allows the lover to 
recall true Beauty, the lover cannot bear to be separated from him.  
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 It is this Platonic myth that Wilde modifies to describe how Dorian Gray 
enables Basil to teach himself. When Basil sees Dorian, he feels the “terror” of 
coming under the youth’s “external influence” and tries to flee (11). His erotic desire 
for Dorian overwhelms him:  “I knew that I had come face to face with some one 
whose entire personality was so fascinating that if I allowed it to do so, it would 
absorb my whole nature, my whole soul, my very art itself…I have always been my 
own master; had at least always been so, till I met Dorian Gray” (11). Losing self-
mastery, Basil would descend into the erotic mania that Plato describes, the crazed 
state that makes the soul renounce its autonomy and “sleep like a slave, anywhere, as 
near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to get” (41).  As he tries to escape 
Dorian, Basil thinks, “Something seemed to tell me that I was on the verge of a 
terrible crisis in my life. I had a strange feeling that Fate had in store for me exquisite 
joys and exquisite sorrows” (11).  Clearly, Dorian signals the approach of a decisive 
stage in Basil’s life, but as the artist tries to avoid the affective extremes of joy and 
sorrow, he risks losing the intellectual benefits of Dorian’s beauty. The words “crisis” 
and “criticism” both come from the same roots Greek roots, meaning “to decide”, “to 
discriminate” or “to judge.” A crisis is a time that generates a critical assessment of a 
situation. In this text, it marks the deciding point at which, if Basil chooses correctly, 
he will be rewarded with new critical powers, new powers of discriminating the world 
around him.34 Eventually, Basil does choose correctly, asking to be introduced to 
Dorian and submitting to the erotic mania that drives him to see Dorian daily: “I 
couldn’t be happy if I didn’t see him every day. He is absolutely necessary to me” 
(14). Dorian’s “merely visible presence” inspires Basil by suggesting “an entirely new 
                                                 
34
 The critical importance of this moment is also seems marked by Wilde’s personification of Fate. At 
the moment the passage turns to the matter of judgment, Fate selects and stores “exquisite joys and 
exquisite sorrows” for Basil as if it were a connoisseur picking out artworks for a client. 
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manner in art, an entirely new mode of style” (14). Because of Dorian’s personality, 
Basil “can now recreate life in a way that was hidden from him” because he can “see 
things differently” (14).  
The critical power of Basil’s new sight inheres in his ability to discriminate 
between the mundane aspect of worldly objects and the true Ideal values for which 
they are only simulacra. He portrays this difference between the reality and the ideal in 
the conscious style he adopts under Dorian’s inspiration. In the terms of Plato’s myth, 
Dorian has allowed Basil to recall the occulted reality that his soul once knew. It is 
Lord Henry who reveals the Platonic import of Basil’s apocalyptic encounter with 
Dorian, attributing the painter’s new artistic style to a “wonderful vision to which 
alone are wonderful things revealed; the mere shapes and patterns becoming as it 
were, refined and gaining a kind of symbolical value, as though they were themselves 
patterns of some other and more perfect form whose shadows they made real…Was it 
not Plato, that artist in form who had first analyzed it” (34)? 
We might wish to say that Dorian teaches Basil how to see anew; that he 
instills some principle into the painter. After all, Basil claims that some “subtle 
influence passed” passed between his friend and him, and this usage links Dorian’s 
effect to the pedagogical economy of loss that we are arguing that Wilde attempts to 
escape. Lord Henry imagines that to influence somebody is like conveying “one’s 
temperament into another as though it were a subtle fluid or a strange perfume” (33) 
and states, “To influence a person is to give him one’s own soul” (19). But Dorian, as 
we first find him, makes Lord Henry’s transferential model of teaching impossible 
because he has nothing to give, nothing to lose. He is curiously devoid of content,  a 
“dream of form in days of thought” as Basil insists (14), “some beautiful brainless 
creature” as Lord Henry says more acidly (15). He is all innocence, whiteness, 
absence, blankness. For Basil, he represents no clearly written dogma; rather he is 
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only the “suggestion” of a new manner, someone who “unconsciously” defines merely 
“the lines of a fresh school” of art. “He is never more present in [Basil’s] work than 
when no image of him is there” (15). Because Dorian is so empty, we see that Basil’s 
new style is something wrought out from within himself, a product of cultivating 
himself under the encouraging effect of the man he loves. 
In this early episode of The Picture of Dorian Gray, Wilde presents a subtle 
and attractive fantasy of anamnesis. He presents the idea that Dorian might enable 
Basil to remember the reality of things fairly realistically, as a matter of simple 
inspiration. Only Lord Henry’s allusion to Plato makes it clear for readers that this is a 
rewriting of the fantastic narrative of the Phaedrus. By contrast, “The Portrait of Mr. 
W. H.,” the other text in which Wilde examines anamnesis, is skeptical about the 
concept and the criticism it enables. “Mr. W. H.” originally appeared in the June 1889 
issue of Blackwood’s, but Wilde revised the text, intending to publish the magazine 
story as an expanded novella. (This second edition never appeared during Wilde’s 
lifetime. Donald L. Lawler and Charles E Knott note that “the expanded version of 
"The Portrait of Mr. W. H." was probably begun sometime in late 1889 or early 1890 
but perhaps not completed until 1893 or even later” (390).) The expanded version was 
then lost during the auction of Wilde’s household in 1895. This chronology 
foregrounds for us that Wilde was conceiving, writing, and revising “Mr. W.H.” at the 
same time that he was working on The Picture of Dorian Gray, which first appeared in 
Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine in 1890 and was then published as a novel in 1981. 
The growing skepticism displayed towards the concept of reminiscence in “Mr. W. 
H.” may represent Wilde’s developing thinking and critique of what appears rather 
unproblematically in Dorian Gray. 
 The original version of  “Mr. W. H.” has little to say about anamnesis or 
Greek philosophy, but as Lawler and Knott point out, the revision contains “whole 
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sections in which the theme of love and Platonic friendship is explored” (394). Lawler 
and Knott attribute the strange development of these Platonic sections to the influence 
of The Picture of Dorian Gray. In their reading, Dorian Gray is a kind of gestational 
work in which Wilde works out his opinions on neo-Platonism: “the theme of neo-
Platonic ideals of friendship and their inspiration of esthetic forms has its origin in 
“The of Mr. W. H.,” reappears in Dorian Gray, and receives its fullest treatment and 
justification in the enlarged, revised version of the former story” (394 n). 
“The Portrait of Mr. W. H.” recounts how a young actor, Cyril Graham, 
purported to discover the secret identity of the fair youth to whom Shakespeare’s 
Sonnets are addressed. He concludes that they are dedicated to a boy actor named 
“Willie Hughes.” Unable to convince his friend Erskine of his theory, Graham has a 
portrait forged as proof that Willie Hughes existed, and was indeed the Mr. W. H. of 
the Sonnets. Erskine is convinced until he discovers the forgery, whereupon Graham 
shoots himself, leaving a suicide note that asks Erskine to publicize his literary theory. 
Erskine, unconvinced of the theory’s truth, does not intend to make it known, but in 
telling of his friendship with Cyril Graham, he inadvertently interests the narrator of 
“Portrait” in the theory. The narrator sets out to corroborate Graham’s scholarship and 
build on his case. But when he has presented his proofs to Erskine, he finds he can no 
longer believe in his findings, a cause of “bitter disappointment” (1196). Erskine, 
however, is fully converted to the Willie Hughes theory. It is then the narrator 
speculates, “Influence is simply the transference of personality, a mode of giving away 
what is most precious to one’s self, and its exercise produces a sense, and, it may be, a 
reality of loss. Every disciple takes away something from his master.” 
Like The Picture of Dorian Gray, “Mr. W. H.”  is a layered and complicated 
meditation on the erotics of pedagogy, and the many ways in which teachers and 
students influence and counterinfluence each other. The narrator wishes to become a 
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kind of teacher. He vows to Erskine, “I will not rest till I have made you recognise, till 
I have made everyone recognise, that Cyril Graham was the most subtle 
Shakespearean critic of our day.” But when this desire is fulfilled, and Erskine is 
converted, he feels only sadness. Our interest in the text is before this moment of loss. 
We will examine the narrator’s solitary engagement with the Sonnets, and the means 
by which he reads them and provides evidence for his critical claims. 
The narrator draws on the Phaedrus’ myth (as well as The Republic) when he 
posits that the soul, “like the Philosopher of the Ideal City,” is “the spectator of all 
time and of all existence” (1195). It has “senses that quickened, passions that came to 
birth, spiritual ecstasies of contemplation [and] ardours of fiery-coloured love” (1195). 
Because the soul’s comprehensive vision, quick senses and contemplative habits make 
it is a source of knowledge about everything that has ever existed or will ever exist, it 
follows that critics only need to consult their souls if they wish to understand the 
meaning of an art object or the appropriate method of appraising it. In this way, Cyril 
Graham discovers the “true secret of Shakespeare’s Sonnets” (1153). He relies “not so 
much on demonstrable proof or formal evidence, but on a kind of spiritual and artistic 
sense,” an inner conviction that comes from his soul. This mystic knowledge is not so 
easily won because the soul itself is hidden.  As the narrator of “Mr. W. H.” observes, 
“the soul of each one of us is to each one of us a mystery. It hides in the dark and 
broods and consciousness cannot tell us of its workings.  Consciousness, indeed is 
quite inadequate to explain the contents of personality” (1194). Fortunately, although 
art “even of the fullest scope and widest vision, can never show us the external world” 
it can “show us our own soul, the one world of which we have any real cognizance” 
(1194). The narrator describes this process of self-discovery in the passage below: 
We sit at the play with the woman we love, or listen to the music in some 
Oxford garden, or stroll with our friend through the cool galleries of the Pope’s 
home at Rome, and suddenly we become aware that we have passions of which 
we have never dreamed, thoughts that make us afraid, pleasures whose secret 
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has been denied to us, sorrows that have been hidden from our tears. The actor 
is unconscious of our presence; the musician is thinking of the subtlety of the 
fugue or the tone of his instrument; the marble gods that smile so curiously at 
us are made of insensate stone35. But they have given form and substance to 
what was within us; they have enabled us to realise our personality; and a sense 
of perilous joy, or some touch or thrill of pain, or that strange self-pity that 
man so often feels for himself comes over us and leaves us different. (1194) 
Now, this process of realizing one’s personality could mean discovering myriad 
hidden aspects of the self. The Sonnets change the narrator’s life by revealing to him 
that in his past life he has been Shakespeare. As the playwright, he “had lived it all”, 
watching his plays performed in the Globe, the “round theatre with its open roof and 
fluttering banners” (1194). Having identified with Shakespeare, the narrator attributes 
the interpretations he derives from his intensive close-readings to his memory; they are 
not newly discovered insights: “Week after week, I pored over these poems, and each 
new form of knowledge seemed to me a mode of reminiscence” (1196).  
 But it is not the mere fact of having been Shakespeare that allows the narrator 
to interpret the Sonnets. It is by understanding the nature of Shakespeare’s sexuality 
and discovering that he shares that sexuality that the narrator comprehends the poetry. 
As Stefano Evangelista writes, in “Mr. W. H.,” “reading produces self-knowledge, i.e. 
the awareness of one’s own sexual preferences, and generates a retrospective 
autobiographical narrative in which homoeroticism is prominently rewritten into the 
individual histories of intellectual development” (242). 
What the narrator remembers most vividly from his past life is “a romance that 
without my knowing it had coloured the very texture of my nature, had dyed it with 
strange and subtle dyes” (1194). The relationship that occurred in the past, but that 
still affects the narrator’s nature is that between Shakespeare and Willie Hughes. 
                                                 
35
 We might wonder here if Wilde had read Belcaro. Both Lee’s and Wilde’s texts here choose the 
Vatican as an important site where the aesthete comes into fuller, queerer awareness of both art and 
herself. By insisting on the inanimate nature of sculpture, and the indifferent nature of the artwork, 
Wilde eschews the Gothic atmosphere Lee employs to narrate how the critic discovers his critical 
powers. 
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Because he has “been initiated into the secret of that passionate friendship;” he alone 
discerns that it is modeled after a pederastic relationship (1194). His mystic vision 
serves as evidence of what he has already hypothesized about the Sonnets: that 
Shakespeare had read Marsilio Ficino’s translation of Plato’s Symposium, and that the 
dialogue had inspired the playwright to raise male-male “friendship to the high dignity 
of the antique ideal, to make it a vital factor in the new culture, and a mode of self-
conscious intellectual development” (1174). For the narrator, the Sonnets memorialize 
the Platonic romance between Shakespeare and Willie Hughes, and as the products of 
the erotic desire between Shakespeare and his beloved, the poems self-reflexively 
consider how the couple’s love enabled them to produce everlasting artistic works:  
When he tells us of the marriage of true minds and exhorts his friend to beget 
children that time cannot destroy, he is but repeating the words in which the 
prophetess [Diotima] tells us that ‘friends are married by a far nearer tie than 
those who beget mortal children, for fairer and more immortal are the children 
who are their common offspring.’ (1174) 
At first, the narrator’s fancy of having loved and lived as Shakespeare is merely the 
key to understanding a very limited set of cultural texts, the Sonnets. But suddenly his 
vision of homoerotic love in Elizabethan England is used to authorize a much broader 
sway of textual interpretation. Breaking out of his daydream about being Shakespeare, 
he announces: 
And yet it was in this century that it had all happened. I had never seen my 
friend [Willie Hughes], but he had been with me for many years, and it was to 
his influence that I owed my passion for Greek thought and art, and indeed all 
my sympathy with the Hellenic spirit. (ΦιλοσοΦήσας µετ έρωτος!) How that 
phrase had stirred me in my Oxford days! I did not understand then why it was 
so. But I knew now. There had been a presence beside me always. Its silver 
feet had trod night’s shadowy meadows, and the white hands had moved aside 
the trembling curtains of the dawn. It had walked with me through the grey 
cloisters, and when I sat reading in my room, it was there also. What though I 
had been unconscious of it? The soul had a life of its own, and the brain its 
own sphere of action. (1195) 
In addition to being to key to Shakespeare’s art, Willie Hughes is responsible for the 
narrator’s “sympathy with the Hellenic spirit” and his “passion for Greek thought and 
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art.” The untranslated Greek phrase explains how this can be so. Meaning “to love 
wisdom with eros” it is Wilde’s rendition of the Phaedrus 249A. Pater alludes to the 
same section of the dialogue when he refers to Winckelmann’s ability to interpret 
Greek art because he is a “lover and philosopher at once.” Socrates argues that the 
man “who practices philosophy without guile or who loves boys philosophically” will 
be granted quickest and easiest entry to the world of Forms for which we constantly 
yearn. In other words, intergenerational same-sex desire between males is the best 
guarantor of the all-encompassing vision associated with the world of Forms. As 
Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff write, “Eros is indispensable to paederasty 
because it provides the only entry into its real purpose: helping oneself and one’s 
beloved to recall what the soul had seen in its travels around the heavens” (xxv). 
Wilde’s narrator does not claim to see the entire world of Forms when he reads the 
Sonnets and views his life from the vantage of the pederastic Shakespeare. Instead, he 
has a comprehensive vision of his personality and the nature of art. Wilde clearly 
means for the “mode of reminiscence” the narrator experiences to evoke the 
recollection examined by the Phaedrus. If reading books is one way of triggering the 
process of reminiscence that grants the reader critical knowledge, loving boys is 
another.  
 Now the narrator imagines that he has loved a boy, Willie Hughes, in the past. 
But what about the present? What would mark him as a pederastic lover when he asks 
his audience to imagine sitting “at the play with the woman we love?” The narrator 
imagines that he has incorporated his long-dead beloved and loves him in spirit form. 
He acknowledges that in this life he “had never seen his friend” but still knows that 
“he had been with me for many years.” Notice that the invisible Hughes is associated 
with the pronoun “he.” But, when the narrator continues to speak of “the presence that 
had been beside him always” but of which he had been “unconscious,” the pronoun 
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“he” changes to “it,” and the narrator notes that the “soul had life of its own” of which 
the mind is unconscious because “the brain [has] its own sphere of action.” With this 
strange grammatical shift, the narrator turns the friend into his soul itself. Walking 
beside him in the cloisters and meadows, at his side at sunrise, his soul enjoys a lover-
like intimacy with him. 
Now, so far, “Mr. W.H.” sounds merely like a rewrite of Pater’s 
“Winckelmann.” In both texts the process of reminiscence, or anamnesis, allows a 
critic to discover that he shares a certain type of erotic sensibility with historical 
figures. That shared temperament becomes the key to interpreting art. We might think 
of anamnesis as another name for queer historical recovery. But if Pater uncritically 
celebrates Winckelmann’s strong identification with classical culture, and presents 
Winckelmann’s scholarly achievements as a kind of mystical process, Wilde seems 
more skeptical about the kind of knowledge produced by this erotic identification. 
For the narrator, Willie Hughes and the homoerotic desire he enables becomes 
the key to more than “Greek thought and art” or to Shakespeare’s works. The narrator 
claims “it is not too much to say that to this young actor, whose very name the dull 
writers of his age forgot to chronicle, the Romantic Movement of English Literature is 
largely indebted.” Later he writes that he has had a mystic vision that conveys the 
“true secret” of Willie Hughes’ death (1192). The actor had been “one of those 
English comedians…who were slain at Nuremburg in a sudden uprising of the people, 
and were secretly buried…by some young men who had found pleasure in their 
performances, and of whom some had sought to be instructed in the mysteries of the 
new art” (1192, 1193). In this way, “the boy-actor whose beauty had been so vital an 
element in the realism and romance of Shakespeare’s art, had been the first to have 
brought to Germany the seed of the new culture, and was in his way the precursor of 
the Aufklärung or Illumination of the eighteenth century, that splendid 
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movement…begun by Lessing and Herder, and brought to its full and perfect issue by 
Goethe (1192). In this way, the narrator has queered the Aufklärung and Romanticism 
by fiat, and insofar as Goethe is the fruit of the Aufklärung, he too is claimed as a 
queer figure.36  Now, these claims about Romanticism and the Enlightenment are 
based on no textual evidence. Their sweeping nature is ludicrous. By associating the 
actual physical presence of  Shakespeare’s supposed lover with all these intellectual 
movements, Wilde turns literary scholarship into a game of “Where’s Willie?”; he and 
the desires he stands for are always responsible for any intellectual culture we might 
name. It is difficult to take the critical practice that enables such grand claims 
seriously. Wilde skewers the narrator’s project by suddenly letting his own belief in 
his theories collapse, as if under the massiveness of its claims. When this happens, he 
exclaims, “I have been dreaming and all my life for these two months has been unreal. 
There was no such person as Willie Hughes.”  Even the renunciation of his 
overreaching theories is excessive. Realizing that he has deceived himself, he is 
“struck with a sorrow greater than any [he] had felt since boyhood” (1197).  In 
response to this we might paraphrase a quip from “Mr. W.H.” itself: “To cry for a 
literary theory? It seems impossible.” One must have a heart of stone to read this line 
without laughing. All this groundless grandeur and wild theorizing suggests that Wilde 
is criticizing and parodying an overblown style of queer scholarship. 
The narrator’s critical methods are a version of what Chris Nealon describes as 
the “simple but enduring lesbian and gay practice of listing famous homosexuals from 
history—a gesture of genealogical claiming for which literary historian Rictor Norton 
finds evidence as far back as the sixteenth century” (5). These “modest, defiant lists of 
homosexuals…now form part of a wider array of lesbian and gay projects of historical 
                                                 
36
 Wilde would have observed how Pater’s queers Goethe by imagining him as a potential lover for 
Winckelmann. 
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and cultural reformation that aim to uncover a sense of what Norton calls the ‘cultural 
unity’ of homosexual experience in history” (6). In addition to Shakespeare, in the 
course of his argument the narrator names Michelangelo, Montaigne, Giordano Bruno 
and Ben Jonson as great artists who have had romantic intellectual relationships with 
other men. In naming these figures, he traces an intellectual and erotic genealogy, 
links male same sex desire with cultural production and associates himself with the 
scholarly efforts of “Mr. Symonds” and “Mr. Pater” both of whom he refers to as 
scholars of neo-Platonism. But the naming Wilde’s narrator does is hardly the 
“modest” affair that Nealon describes. For what we can never forget as we read this 
novella is that there is no proof for the existence of “Willie Hughes.” In their texts, 
Pater and Symonds create intellectual genealogies through painstaking critical work, 
producing the names of queer precursors by scouring their texts and lives for the 
faintest trace of same-sex desire. The name “Willie Hughes” has nothing to give it 
substance, and yet it is used to authorize an overly-ambitious strain of a gay critical 
theory, a theory that presents itself as the master hermeneutical key, a gay critical 
theory that can measure the queer import of all it assesses because it induces, not 
uncovers, gayness in everything it touches. Careful scholarship would indeed show 
that Romanticism or the Enlightenment contain many queer aspects, but surely those 
aspects cannot be attributed a priori to “Willie Hughes,” or the particular mode of 
same-sex desire he is associated with.  
The genealogical practices that Nealon describes are driven by identification 
and the desire to be represented.  Listing the names of famous gay figures across 
history, the critic projects his desire into these figures, recasting the way they loved to 
match the way he loves, seeing them as versions of himself. In this way, he establishes 
a family resemblance with these celebrated fathers or brothers whose sexual identities 
he feels have been repressed by the dominant historical record. When we learn that the 
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forged portrait of Willie Hughes displays a man of “quite extraordinary personal 
beauty, though evidently somewhat effeminate” (1151), we should be unsurprised to 
hear that Cyril Graham, originator of the Willie Hughes theory is “wonderfully 
handsome” and “effeminate…in some things” and “always cast for the girls’ parts” 
when he acts (1152, 1153). As much as the portrait conforms to Shakespeare’s 
descriptions of the fair youth, it has also been shaped to mirror Cyril Graham himself.  
Similarly, the narrator’s claim that he once was Shakespeare carries genealogical 
identification to its extreme; for him it is simply not enough to claim similarity to gay 
forebears, one must claim identity with them. David Halperin argues for the value of 
the practices Nealon describes by noting that although identification may distort 
historicist understandings of how sexuality affects culture, it often “gets at something, 
something important: it picks out resemblances, connection, echo effects. 
Identification is a form of cognition” (15). For Halperin, “the tendency to refashion 
past sexual cultures in the shape of our own” can usefully reveal “a lot about our own 
historical situation, the functioning of contemporary sexual categories, our standard 
ways about thinking about the past” (15). But the understanding that identification 
offers is impaired unless we are self-conscious and critical about processes of 
identification. The narrator is not. “Identification is desire,” according to Halperin. 
The narrator’s critical practice exemplifies what happens when desire –the desire to be 
represented in all culture, throughout history—goes unchecked. 
If for certain subjects transhistorical identification is a process associated with 
gain, for others identificatory processes inflict loss and create an impoverished field of 
erotic possibility. The collapse of identification into desire that Halperin points to has 
a particular history in accounts of same-sex desire. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick describes 
the paradigm clash that occurred in the late-nineteenth century as different descriptive 
models of same-sex desire struggled for hegemony. There was the inversion model, 
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that of pederasty and finally, that of homosexuality. The first two models assume fixed 
differences between partners, for example, between the effeminate Urning and his 
masculine partner, or between the insertive older partner and the younger receptive 
partner. But homosexuality stresses the sameness between partners. As Sedgwick 
writes: “The homo- in the emerging concept of the homosexual seems to have the 
potential to perform a definitive de-differentiation—setting up a permanent avenue if 
potential slippage—between two sets of relations that had previously been seen as 
relatively distinct: identification and desire” (Epistemology 159). Sedgwick argues that 
the plot of The Picture of Dorian Gray is marked by this battle between definitional 
terms. For her although “Wilde’s own eros was most closely tuned to the note of the 
pederastic love in process of being superseded” by the rise of homosexuality, the 
novel does not celebrate the resilience or triumph of the pederastic model (57). Rather,  
 the suppression of the original defining differences between Dorian and his 
male admirers—differences of age and initiatedness, in the first place—in 
favor of the problematic of Dorian’s similarity to the painted male image that 
is and isn’t himself, seems to re-enact the discursive eclipse . . . of the 
Classically based pederastic assumption that male-male bonds of any duration 
must be structured around some diacritical difference. (Tendencies 57)  
Using Sedgwick’s reading, we may argue both Dorian Gray and “Mr. W.H.” are 
affected by this “discursive eclipse.” In both texts, Wilde memorializes a dying way of 
understanding his desires and records the rise of an impoverished (for him) way of 
understanding erotic desire, a new mode of stultifying sameness. As he theorized 
sexuality and pursued sexual experiences, Wilde found himself confronting what 
Sedgwick describes as a “‘homosexual homo-genization’” that is “critically routine” 
in our own time because “it so efficiently fills so many modern analytic, diagnostic 
and (hence) even deconstructive needs” (58). In other words, for us, if it is to be 
interpreted, all same sex desire between men must be assimilated under the sign of 
 164 
“homosexuality,” and even when we speak of desire between men that names itself 
“homosexual,” we theorize this passion as man’s desire for his mirror image.  
Sedgwick suggests Wilde’s resistance to homo-genization when she notes that 
although Wilde’s desire seems primarily pederastic he “did not only desire boys” (58). 
On the whole, Wilde’s “desires seem to have been structured intensely by the crossing 
of definitional lines—of age, milieu, initiatedness, and physique” (58). 
Intergenerational relationships would have given Wilde opportunity to cross the 
categorical boundaries Sedgwick lists, but it is transgression, not his desire for men or 
boys, that is the most important characteristic of Wilde’s eroticism. To identify 
Wilde’s passion for crossing boundaries is to emphasize what is most queer about him. 
As Sedgwick reminds us, “Queer is a continuing moment, movement, motive—
recurrent, eddying, troublant. The word queer itself means across—it comes from the 
Indo-European route –terkw, which also yields the German quer (transverse)” (xii). As 
a queer subject, he had the capacity to transgress even his primary erotic desire 
because he had an erotic appreciation of alterity. As a queer subject, he would have 
had a heightened sense of how the transhistorical identification practiced by the 
narrator of “Mr. W. H.” constituted a form of “homosexual homo-genization.” But if 
The Picture of Dorian Gray only records the rise of this homo-sexual critical 
tendency, “The Portrait of Mr. W.H.” insists that it is ridiculous and inadequate.  
After the narrator of “Mr. W.H.” has his vision of Shakespeare’s life, he 
exclaims, “How curiously it had all been revealed to me! A book of Sonnets, 
published nearly three hundred years ago, written by a dead hand and in honour of a 
dead youth, had suddenly explained to me the whole story of my soul’s romance” 
(1195). But then, strangely, he remembers witnessing “the opening of a frescoed 
coffin…at Thebes” (1196).  Within the sarcophagus is the mummy of a young girl 
whose “little withered hands held a scroll of yellow papyrus covered in strange 
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characters” (1196).  The narrator laments “How I wished now that I had had it read to 
me! It might have told me something more about the soul that hid within me, and had 
its mysteries of passion of which I was kept in ignorance” (1196). As he juxtaposes 
the “dead hand” of Shakespeare with the “little withered hands” of the mummified 
girl, and the “book of Sonnets” with the “strange characters” on the “scroll of yellow 
papyrus,” Wilde suggests an alternative cultural and erotic tradition that can explain 
art, a tradition routed through Egypt, not Greece.37 For one moment, the narrator 
considers that “the whole story of [his] soul’s romance” might not have been 
explained by the Sonnets, and imagines that there are “mysteries of passion” that 
might only be revealed when he reads a different script. But it is exactly this ability to 
think of myriad forms of desire and their relation to culture that the narrator puts aside 
when he brusquely makes Willie Hughes the seminal figure of the Enlightenment or of 
Romanticism. 
When he loses his faith in the Willie Hughes theory, the narrator wonders if he 
had been “merely influenced by the beauty of the forged portrait, charmed by that 
Shelley-like face into faith and credence” (1197).  He considers that it is “the pathetic 
tragedy of Cyril Graham’s death” that made him so credulous. Whatever the specific 
cause, he knows he was “under the influence of a perfectly silly enthusiasm” (1197.  
The instant he committed his beliefs to writing and sent them to Erskine, he exorcizes 
that zeal (1196).  As he mocks the excesses of his ardour and records how easily it was 
dispelled, the narrator allows Wilde to show the dangers of the erotically based 
aesthetic criticism that Pater had imagined in The Renaissance. As we have seen, Pater 
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 We cannot explain this alternative tradition fully, but Wilde may have associated it with female 
homoerotic desire. As he mourns the destruction of Sappho’s poems in his essay “English Poetesses,” 
he imagines a mummy who safeguards a written text: “Of her poems, burnt with other most precious 
work by Byzantine Emperor and Roman Pope, only a few fragments remain. Possibly they lie 
mouldering in the darkness of an Egyptian tomb, clasped in the withered arms of some long-dead lover” 
(102). 
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had coded enthusiasm as pederastic desire, praised Winckelmann as the “quick 
susceptible enthusiast,” and attributed the art critic’s acumen to his queer passion. In 
his zeal to make desire the basis for aesthetic criticism, he had envisioned forms of 
knowledge that lay buried in the mind, forms that could only be accessible to those 
who felt same-sex desire. But in “Mr. W. H.,” Wilde imagines that knowledge is not 
something that lies fully formed, waiting to be discovered by those with the right 
erotic orientation. Rather, much of what the critic finds in the past has been placed 
there to satisfy some personal need or desire. While Pater casts “enthusiasm” as a 
particular way of knowing what objectively exists, Wilde sees how “enthusiasm” can 
become an irrational and uncritical creativity that imagines what it wants to know into 
existence. For him, enthusiasm destabilized anamnesis as a metaphor for recovering 
forgotten knowledge from the self.  
With its links to mystic visions, romantic identification and fevered 
enthusiasm, anamnesis could never ground Wilde's fantasy of innate knowledge with 
any seriousness. We might suggest that this is why he begins to think about heredity's 
relationship to memory in "The Critic as Artist" and in the second half of The Picture 
of Dorian Gray. According to Laura Otis, “nineteenth-century organic memory 
theory...proposed that memory and heredity were essentially the same and that one 
inherited memories from ancestors along with their physical features” (2). She 
continues “the theory of organic memory placed the past in the individual, in the body, 
in the nervous system; it pulled memory from the domain of the metaphysical into the 
domain of the physical with the intention of making it knowable” (3).  
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IV Organic Memory: Heredity and Possibility of Innate Knowledge  
 
Dorian Gray is celebrated by “many, especially among the very young men, 
who saw, or fancied that they saw, in Dorian Gray the true realization of a type of 
which they had often dreamed in Eton or Oxford days, a type that was to combine 
something of the real culture of the scholar with all the grace and distinction and 
perfect manner of a citizen of the world. To them he seemed to be of the company of 
those whom Dante describes as having sought to ‘make themselves perfect by the 
worship of beauty.’ Like Gautier, he was one for whom ‘the visible world existed’” 
(100). When Dorian comes of age, he is “almost immediately offered” the role of 
expert in the art of gracious, tasteful, cosmopolitan living, but although he eagerly 
accepts this authority, he does not want to be limited to the role of “mere arbiter 
elegantiarum, to be consulted on the wearing of a jewel” (101). Emphasizing the 
scholarly aspect of his image, he wishes to “elaborate some new scheme of life that 
would have its reasoned philosophy and its ordered principles, and find in the 
spiritualizing of the sense its highest realization” (101).  
Influenced by Lord Henry’s Paterian sermons, Dorian dedicates himself to a 
life of courting sensuous impressions, and seeks to “concentrate himself upon the 
moments of a life that is itself but a moment” (101).  But he realizes that the age he 
lives in is governed by an “uncomely puritanism” that attempts to “starve [the senses] 
into submission or to kill them by pain” (101). Because Dorian wishes to make the 
senses “elements of a new spirituality, of which a fine instinct for beauty was to be the 
dominant characteristic” he decides to quicken and nurture them by pursuing whatever 
impulses might strengthen his perceptive powers. By avoiding the “asceticism that 
deadens the senses” as well as the “vulgar profligacy that dulls them” (101), Dorian 
hopes to defamiliarize his environs, changing them into “a world in which things 
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would have fresh shapes and colours, and be changed” (102). We should stress here 
Dorian’s aversion to “vulgar profligacy.” Either he believes that indulging 
immoderately in certain sensuous experiences is a mark of vulgarity, or he believes 
that the unlearned, common people pursue a special type of licentious behavior that 
endangers aesthetic susceptibility. Whatever the case, when he pursues aesthetic 
experience, he does not see himself as indulging indiscriminately in aesthetic 
pleasures. In theory at least, he regulates aesthetic experience, and must be devising 
criticism that can judge the relative merits of aesthetic moments and objects as well as 
the proper exposure one can have to them. It is important to remember the 
discriminatory kernel that is supposed to lie at the center of Dorian’s aesthetic 
experimentation because so often it can appear to be an undirected, uncritical process. 
For example, we hear that he would 
often adopt certain modes of thought that he knew to be really alien to his 
nature, abandon himself to their subtle influences, and then, having as it were, 
caught their colour and satisfied his intellectual curiosity, leave them with that 
curious indifference that is not incompatible with a real ardour of temperament, 
and that indeed…is often a condition of it. (102) 
Now, this describes an enthusiasm, and a process of understanding, but very little 
judgment. Dorian “abandons[s] himself” to the influences he studies, and takes on 
“their colour,” but when he leaves these modes of thought for others, what does he 
think of them? How do they rank as sources of pleasure? How do they affect the 
capacity of the senses to feel a range of sensations?  It is possible that the “curious 
indifference” Wilde mentions here is a codeword for critical detachment, but if so we 
never see Dorian’s critical faculty in operation. More often it seems as if boredom and 
weariness govern Dorian’s shift from theory to theory or object to object. Because 
Wilde desires to stress the freedom Dorian has to pursue whatever impressions he 
likes, he underemphasizes the grounds from which Dorian makes critical judgments. 
Thus we hear “he never fell into the error of arresting his intellectual development by 
 169 
any formal acceptance of creed or system, or of mistaking for a house in which to live, 
an inn that is but suitable for the sojourn of a night” (103). But how does Dorian 
distinguish an inn from a house? Under what set of rules does this misrecognition of 
intellectual spaces constitute a “mistake” or “error”? What governs his decision to 
move on to a new system or creed? Why one system and not another? How does he 
decide which, of many systems could afford him most pleasure to examine at any 
moment? And yet, although the grounds for all these choices remain mysterious, in 
theory they must exist, since Dorian is aware that a “vulgar profligacy” will damage 
the very senses he hopes to cultivate. He cannot afford to abandon himself carelessly 
to any and all influences. 
As Dorian experiments and fashions himself into a decadent version of a 
Paterian aesthete, he is ostensibly deriving the “reasoned philosophy and ordered 
principles” that he wishes to teach others. These would comprise the basis of his 
aesthetics. But ironically, the narrative that relates how he might prepare himself to 
educate others fantasizes that education is needless, because critics need no one to 
teach them how to judge art or impressions. They have inherited that knowledge.38 
This idea of inherited critical powers first appears in “Mr. Pater’s Last Volume,” 
                                                 
38
 Dorian’s desire to instruct others is merely a premise that allows the novel to relate how he educates 
himself; the text preserves its anti-didactic bias by never depicting Dorian teaching anyone.  Occupied 
in his preparatory self-culture, he spends all his time training for an educational career that seems never 
to commence formally. While it is rumored he corrupts others with his influence, it is unclear whether 
the downfall of these people is really due to Dorian’s deliberate example and his lessons in aesthetics. It 
is also unclear whether those who might be corrupted by Dorian are truly students of his New 
Hedonism, or merely of imperfect theoretical formations that precede the “reasoned philosophy” and 
“ordered principles” of New Hedonism in its fully articulated form.    
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Wilde’s March 1890 39review of Pater’s Appreciations (1889). In the review, Wilde 
ascribes the modernity of the text’s essays to Pater’s comprehensive understanding:40 
For he to whom the present is the only thing that is present, knows nothing of 
the age in which he lives. To realise the nineteenth century, one must realise 
every century that has preceded it, and that has contributed to its making. To 
know anything about oneself, one must know all about others. There must be 
no mood with which one cannot sympathise, no dead mode of life that one 
cannot make alive. The legacies of heredity may make us alter our views of 
moral responsibility, but they cannot but intensify our sense of the value of 
Criticism; for the true critic is he who bears within himself the dreams and 
ideas and feelings of myriad generations, and to whom no form of thought is 
alien, no emotional impulse obscure.41 (234) 
As he wanders through the gallery of his ancestral portraits and contemplates “those 
whose blood flowed in his veins” Dorian is identified with the critical model 
embodied by Pater in Wilde’s review. He wonders  
at the shallow psychology of those who conceive the Ego in man as a thing 
simple, permanent, reliable and of one essence. To him, man was a being with 
myriad lives and myriad sensations, a complex multiform creature that bore 
within itself strange legacies of thought and passion, and whose very flesh was 
tainted with the monstrous maladies of the dead. (111) 
Dorian attempts to determine how each ancestor has contributed to his aesthetic 
susceptibility. For instance, he attributes his “passion for the beauty of others” to his 
mother (289). Studying the portrait of another nobleman, he wonders if his actions are 
merely “the dreams that the dead man had not realized” (288). As Dorian reflects upon 
the genealogical sources of his “temperament,” the portraits seem to come to life: His 
“mother laughed at him in her loose Bacchante dress” and her eyes, “still wonderful in 
their depth and brilliancy of colour” seem “to follow him wherever he went” (289). In 
                                                 
39
 Wilde delivered the finished draft of Dorian Gray in March 1890, which suggests he lifted the 
passage from the novel in order to complete the review of Pater’s collection. It is impossible to tell 
which was written first, although readers encountered the review before they read the novel, and would 
have contextualized Wilde’s self-plagiarism according to that chronology.  
40
 Wilde derived the idea of modernity as the sum of all preceding intellectual history from Pater. In The 
Renaissance, Pater casts the Mona Lisa as “the symbol of the modern idea” because she embodies the 
“idea of humanity as wrought upon by, and summing up in itself, all modes of thought and life” (99). 
41
 Here Wilde seems to be evoking Terence’s phrase “Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto.” I am 
a man, therefore nothing that is human is alien to me. 
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similar fashion, another ancestor seems “to look curiously at him” with her “oval 
heavy lidded eyes” (289). These uncanny moments mark the portrait-gallery scene as 
one of criticism. If as Wilde writes, “There must be no mood with which [the critic] 
cannot sympathise, no dead mode of life that [the critic] cannot make alive,” Dorian 
exercises his powers of judgment by resurrecting his dead in the attempt to understand 
their personalities, and in turn, his own.  
 Jonah Siegel allows us to see how Dorian’s genealogical interests relate to 
criticism. He writes, “To talk about criticism, for both Pater and Wilde, is to talk about 
an unavoidable practice imposed by the realization that modernity is not simply in 
possession of the fragments of the past, but composed of those very fragments” (230). 
In the same way that Dorian realizes he is the sum of his ancestor’s legacies, when the 
critic attempts to understand contemporary aesthetic objects, he does not view them as 
absolutely original objects isolated from historical influence; in order to judge them he 
must be able to comprehend cultural elements of older eras that inhere in 
contemporary texts. The critic is able to understand these older elements because he 
can sympathise with them. Lord Henry exemplifies a critic who uses this historicism 
to make critical judgments. When he first attempts to understand Dorian Gray’s 
beauty, he seeks out the story of the younger man’s parentage and situates it as the 
“interesting background” that “posed the lad, made him more perfect…Behind every 
exquisite thing that existed, there was something tragic” (33). Lord Henry 
aestheticizes historicism by understanding Dorian as if he were a model in a tableau 
vivant. Standing in the foreground, Dorian can only be truly appreciated in relation to 
the tragic genealogical background that informs the nature of his pose. 
Lord Henry may have gotten his regard for historicism from the “poisonous 
book” he gives to Dorian. This novel concerns a young Parisian who attempts to “sum 
up . . . in himself the various moods through which the world-spirit” had passed by 
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“trying to realize in the nineteenth century all the passions and modes of thought that 
belonged to every century except his own” (97). According to the criteria from “Mr. 
Pater’s Last Volume,” the Parisian is pursuing an aesthetic education that will enable 
him to become a critic. Because Dorian believes that one has “ancestors in literature, 
as well as in one’s own race, nearer perhaps in type and temperament. . . and certainly 
with an influence of which one was more absolutely conscious” (113), he sees the 
Parisian as the “prefiguring type of himself” (98), but he has an important insight the 
Parisian does not: one does not attain sympathy with bygone modes of thought and 
feeling merely by the active process of making oneself sympathetic, one already has a 
sympathetic capacity because one has inherited the passions and thoughts that will 
enable one to identify with cultures that seem alienated by the passage of time.   
In “The Critic as Artist,” Wilde further explores the nature of heredity, 
detailing the process by which heredity can endow the critic with insight. According to 
Gilbert, as the “last of the fates and the most Terrible,” Heredity supplies the “warrant 
for the contemplative life” because it reveals “the absolute mechanism of all action” 
(177). To attempt acting, rather than to merely be an engaged spectator of life is a 
waste of energy in a world where behavior and character is already determined by 
unchangeable biological laws.  
But although in the sphere of practical and external life [heredity] has robbed 
energy of its freedom and activity of its choice, in the subjective sphere…it 
comes to us, this terrible shadow, with many gifts in its hands, gifts of strange 
temperaments and subtle susceptibilities, gifts of wild ardours and chill moods 
of indifference, complex multiform gifts of thought that are at variance with 
each other and passions that war against themselves (177). 
According to this fanciful theory we have not merely inherited our ancestors’ 
physiognomies or their dispositions to disease; rather, we have inherited their very 
memories, desires and   affective capacities. Accordingly, “it is not our own life that 
we live, but the lives of the dead, and the soul that dwells within is no single spiritual 
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entity, making us personal and individual, created for our service and entering into us 
for our joy. It is something that has dwelt in fearful places….It is sick with many 
maladies, and has memories of curious sins” (177). But this soul becomes our tutor, 
for in its “bitter” wisdom, it is “wiser than we are” (177). 
The soul enables our aesthetic education by leading our imagination “away 
from surroundings whose beauty is dimmed to us by the mist of familiarity, or whose 
ignoble ugliness and sordid claims are marring the perfection of our development. It 
can help us to leave the age in which we were born, and to pass into other ages and 
find ourselves not exiled from their air. It can teach us how to escape from our 
experience, and to realise the experiences of those who are greater than we are” (177).  
All this is made possible because “the imagination is the result of heredity. It is simply 
concentrated race-experience” (178). We profit by recapitulating the lives of our dead 
forebears, and assuming their experience. For example, “The pain of Leopardi crying 
out against life becomes our pain” (178).  “Ours is the anguish of Atys, and ours the 
weak rage and noble sorrows of the Dane” (178).  
Having established that Wilde wished to attribute aesthetic capability to 
heredity, we should pause to consider why. As we’ve seen, formal pedagogical 
relationships are debilitating not only because of the losses (of knowledge, of 
credence, of the soul) they produce but because they rob teachers of the time for self-
development. In The Picture of Dorian Gray, self-development means the 
development of one’s personality. The novel’s strategies for this multiplication of 
personality are numerous. Dorian doubles his personality when he consents to sit for 
Basil, and as he develops his secret life the scandal and rumor that follow him tell tales 
of a dozen different Dorians, none of whom resemble his public respectable persona. 
Unlike other women, who are “limited to their century” (44), Sybil Vane assumes 
multiple personalities by virtue of her acting; she appears “in every age and in every 
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costume” and is “all the great heroines of the world in one (47). The novel’s narrator 
advises “insincerity” as “a method by which we can multiply our personalities” (111). 
Now, as Dorian notes, it is only a “shallow psychology” that assumes that the ego is 
“simple, permanent, reliable and of one essence.”  By contrast, Dorian’s deep 
psychology takes heredity as a scientific demonstration of how the self is inherently 
multiple, a being with inherited “myriad lives and myriad sensations.” Dorian takes 
this innate multiplicity as a challenge and inspiration; as he adopts “certain modes of 
thought that he knew to be really alien to his nature” he attempts to deepen the 
diversity that is already a part of his nature.  
If the pedagogical encounter produces a gap in the self through which the 
“soul” flows out when the pedagogue exercises influence, Wilde’s notion of the 
complex, multiform, composite soul reveals his desire for an interior fullness that 
could never be exhausted by social encounters.42  By holding the “dreams and ideas 
and feelings of myriad generations” within him, Wilde’s critic does not need to seek 
instruction from others, and if this capacity to unlock the critical gifts bequeathed by 
heredity is universal, no one need seek instruction from him. But even if this fancied 
critic were to attract students, the loss of personality or knowledge he would incur by 
dealing with them seems less costly if the soul is a multiplex conglomeration rather 
than a singular entity.  In the very review in which Wilde suggests Pater’s essays are 
formed by the spirit of heredity he claims Pater “has no rival in his own sphere, and he 
has escaped disciples” (236). Wilde claims that Pater is free from students because his 
                                                 
42
 We should note here that although Lord Henry does see teaching as an activity in which one gives up 
one’s soul to the student, he thinks of this activity as a lending than an absolute loss.  For Lord Henry, 
to influence another is to “project” oneself into “a gracious form” for but a moment—just long enough 
to hear one’s views echoed to one with interest, with “all the added music of passion and youth.”  The 
pedagogical intercourse Lord Henry idealizes here is modeled upon pederasty, and assumes that the 
student is a youthful, enthusiastic object of physical desire. If the student did not meet these criteria, it is 
probable Lord Henry would see the exercise of influence in the negative way that Wilde’s other 
teachers do. None of Wilde’s teacher figures identifies the exercise of influence as a pleasurable loss in 
itself.  
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critical style is so fine, so unique, that it is inimitable and unteachable, but we might 
well think that Pater escapes the disciples in another sense: through the graces of 
Heredity, he has become an irreducible hoard of psychic richness. He is not subject to 
the vampiristic tendencies of his students.  
At this point, it may seem that “the scientific principle of Heredity” truly is 
“the warrant for the contemplative life.” Heredity provides the critic with a space of 
independence in which to pursue his own self-development and education. However, 
this autonomy is precariously situated. The gothic rhetoric with which Wilde describes 
Heredity makes it a force that is constantly drawing the critic into relation with his 
undead relations, figures whose desires threaten to displace the critic’s own desire, and 
whose passions and thoughts have a life of their own that the critic cannot control. 
This gothic rhetoric frames the scene in which Dorian looks at his picture-gallery, but 
is most clearly apparent in “The Critic as Artist,” which best explains the mechanisms 
by which heredity underwrites the practice of criticism. It is to that dialogue we will 
turn to consider why the theory of hereditary transmission fails Wilde.  
 
V “That Terrible Shadow” – Wildean Heredity and the Rhetoric of the Gothic 
 
“Beneath every face are the latent faces of ancestors, beneath every character their 
characters”—Henry Maudsley, The Pathology of Mind 
 
In order to describe Heredity to Earnest, Gilbert resorts to the Gothic. Heredity 
is “Nemesis without her mark,” and a “terrible shadow” (177). Thanks to her, and her 
“many gifts” we discover that “it is not our own life that we live, but the lives of the 
dead.” The very soul within us is tainted by death and disease; like some ghoul it has 
“dwelt in fearful places and in ancient sepulchres has made its abode.”  
Why does Gilbert describe inheritance in this way? Why this preoccupation 
with the morbid and macabre? The traits we inherit need not be the traits of our dead 
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forebears. By presenting hereditary gifts as legacies, Wilde ties them unnecessarily to 
death. But it is not the mere linkage of inherited thoughts and passions to death that 
might send a frisson through us as we read.  For even if Heredity brings the property 
of the dead, such gifts need not be haunted objects. Yet by insisting that by accepting 
the gifts of heredity, we come to live the lives of the dead, Wilde turns the story of 
cultural inheritance into the horrific tale of our dispossession by our dead. 
This Gothic image of Heredity is a mark of how difficult Wilde found it to 
escape from legacy bequeathed by his mentor, Pater. As we’ve seen, when he first 
began to call himself Professor of Aesthetics and “critic of art” Wilde had publicly 
claimed to be Ruskin’s student at Oxford, and had expressed his differences from 
Ruskin’s moralism. As far as I can find, Wilde’s review of Appreciations is the first 
published document in which he connects Pater with his university education.  Wilde 
recalls his “undergraduate days at Oxford; days of lyrical ardour and of studious 
sonnet-writing” (24). Pater, smiling, had asked him “Why do you always write poetry? 
Why do you not write prose? Prose is so much more difficult” (24). To understand 
what Pater meant, Wilde “carefully studied his beautiful and suggestive essays on the 
Renaissance” and “fully realized what a wonderful self-conscious art the art of English 
prose-writing really is” (24). Pater’s essays became “’the golden book of spirit and 
sense, the holy writ of beauty’” (24). Acknowledging his wild enthusiasm for the 
essays, Wilde confesses, “It is possible, of course that I may exaggerate about them. I 
certainly hope that I do; for where there is no exaggeration there is no love, and where 
there is no love there is no understanding” (24). 
Wilde’s defense of exaggeration is underwritten by erotics of reading Pater 
would have delighted in, and indeed is an homage to Pater, who argues that the true 
critic is a lover, and that aesthetic criticism begins when critics seek to explain how 
texts have touched them. But if Wilde was Pater’s student he was also his rival. His 
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desire to outshine the older man is evident in the simultaneously self-promoting and 
ingratiating tone of his review, a tone of which he seems conscious. He writes, “I must 
not allow this brief notice of Mr Pater’s new volume to degenerate into an 
autobiography. I remember being told in America that whenever Margaret Fuller 
wrote an essay upon Emerson the printers had always to send out to borrow some 
additional capital ‘I’s’, and I feel it right to accept this transatlantic warning” (24). 
Wilde checks himself when he realizes that his reminiscences of Oxford 
threaten to displace discussion of Pater’s text. But even this realization offers him a 
chance to remind readers of his transatlantic travels, during which he was hailed as the 
apostle of Aestheticism. Josephine Guy notes that Matthew Arnold’s death had left 
vacant a position “at the very centre of cultural life” for both Wilde and Pater to claim 
(xxxiii). Pater poised himself to seize this place by publishing Appreciations, the lead 
essay of which “seems designed to confirm Pater’s authority as literary (rather than 
art) critic—perhaps the pre-eminent literary critic of the time” (xxxiii). Guy argues 
that as “Wilde was in the process of composing his first major critical statement to 
appear under signature for a serious periodical…Pater may have appeared, suddenly 
and surprisingly as the most likely inheritor of Arnold’s mantle” (xxxiv). In the 
absence of Wilde’s own magisterial books of criticism, those lectures constitute his 
only claim to be a cultural critic of international renown, one who drew more crowds 
and publicity than the shy Pater ever could.43 
The commercial and critical success of Appreciations would have been clear 
signs to Wilde that Pater had fully rehabilitated his reputation after the scandal of The 
                                                 
43
 Until 1889, the majority of Wilde’s critical writing had been on topical subjects and appearing in the 
form of unsigned contributions to publications like The Pall Mall Gazette. He had not yet produced long 
pieces for prestigious journals like Nineteenth Century or Fortnightly Review and he had not published 
a book of criticism. As Guy argues, critical collections like Appreciations and Intentions “conferred a 
particularly desirable form of cultural capital, one rendered especially attractive from the 1880s 
onwards by the growth of the new journalism, with its emphasis on sensation, populism and 
disposability” (xiv). 
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Renaissance’s publication in 1873. This process had only begun with the publication 
of Marius the Epicurean (1885), which purported to explain more clearly what had 
been misunderstood in The Renaissance’s conclusion. Responding to the outcry over 
the conclusion, Pater had suppressed it from the second edition of The Renaissance, 
but by 1888, he was secure enough to restore it. With Pater’s ascendancy, Wilde’s 
critical texts are marked by the question of how to situate themselves with respect to 
him. In Intentions, Wilde veers from revering Pater to ridiculing him to ignoring his 
influence altogether. Guy attributes these conflicting responses not so much to Wilde’s 
personal feelings about his mentor, but to his attempts to associate or disassociate 
himself with Pater’s cultural authority: in other words, Wilde was determining 
whether it would be better to challenge Pater’s claim for the Arnold’s throne or 
whether it be better for him to take some slightly less magisterial chair for himself, 
helped by his association with the Oxford don. And yet, to be identified as Pater’s 
student was also to risk being branded an inferior version of Pater, just as when Wilde 
had claimed Ruskin as his master, he had been labeled a “penny-Ruskin.” 
Read within the context of Guy’s narrative, the last lines of Wilde’s review 
reveal one strategy to deal with the problem of Pater’s influence: “But in Mr. Pater, as 
in Cardinal Newman, we find the union of personality with perfection. He has no rival 
in his own sphere, and he has escaped disciples. And this, not because he has not been 
imitated, but because in art so fine as his there is something that, in its essence is 
inimitable “(26).  
Wilde credits Pater with defying mimesis and “escaping disciples” in order to 
declare his own independence from his mentor.44 If Pater’s art can be imitated, but is 
                                                 
44
 When Wilde celebrates one party’s freedom from another, he is usually celebrating the disappearance 
of both parties entanglement with the other. For example, with the dissolution of philanthropy, it is not 
merely the poor who escape the indignity of accepting charity; the rich are relieved of their 
responsibility to give. 
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in its essence inimitable, it can leave no trace in the art of those who may appear to be 
his ardent followers. Unmarked by this evidence, as Wilde aspires to fame as a 
renowned cultural critic; he can never be cast as a derivative of Pater’s style or 
substance. However, Wilde’s vision of Pater, safeguarded and secluded in “his own 
sphere” is not merely designed to disavow the Oxford don’s influence; rather it 
dramatizes one of Wilde’s oldest fantasies. As early as 1886, piqued by the ingratitude 
of one of his acolytes, Wilde had quipped “The only schools worthy of founding are 
those without disciples” (Ellmann 213).  Insofar as Pater defied imitation and escaped 
followers, he exemplified an aloof inimitability that Wilde sometimes craved, a 
freedom from the enervating or vampiric desires of those who sought to learn from 
him. We might argue this then: even as Wilde sought to distance himself from Pater, 
he was compelled to return constantly to Pater’s texts and his teaching for models of 
how one could refuse the exchanges involved in education. When the narrator of “The 
Portrait of Mr. W.H.” reads the Sonnets and experiences analytical reading as a “mode 
of reminiscence” Wilde is reworking the revelatory experience of anamnesis that Pater 
depicted in “Winckelmann.” When Wilde imagines Pater as the modern critic whose 
hereditary legacies bestow him with innate critical knowledge, he is making a Paterian 
reading of Pater’s character, endowing him with the omniscience of The 
Renaissance’s Mona Lisa. As the “symbol of the modern idea” she stands for “the idea 
of humanity as wrought upon by, and summing up in itself, all modes of thought and 
life” (99). La Gioconda is also the source of the tomb-haunting rhetoric with which 
Wilde depicts Heredity in “The Critic as Artist.” Like the vampire, the Mona Lisa “has 
been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave” (99). Her beauty is the 
product “of strange thoughts and fantastic reveries and exquisite passions” and she 
possesses a soul afflicted with maladies. 
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In his reading of The Picture of Dorian Gray, James Eli Adams quotes the 
scene wherein Dorian examines his ancestral portraits and states, “The trappings of 
charnel-house Gothic should not obscure Wilde’s subtle invocation of a complex and 
momentous intellectual genealogy to authorize his ‘new Hedonism’” (220). Adams 
then reveals this lineage, arguing that when Wilde explores heredity, he is 
contextualizing Pater’s claims about cultural transmission and modernity with respect 
to Victorian science rather than Greek philosophy: 
Wilde recasts Pater’s various tropes of tradition and inheritance in 
emphatically biological terms so that the modernity of Pater’s Gioconda 
becomes a fusion of “legacies” at once cultural and physical, which conflates 
history and heredity. Culture is thus envisioned as a force not only proved upon 
the pulses, in Keats’s phrase, but flowing within them. Modern science might 
thus give renewed authority to a form of Platonic anamnesis, under which 
introspection yields encounters with myriad lives that are both a collective 
cultural legacy, as in Leonardo’s portrait, and a biological inheritance inscribed 
in one’s very body—the two legacies joined in Dorian’s contemplation of the 
portraits of his ancestors. (221) 
The link that Adams traces between Pater and Wilde is undeniable, but what is curious 
about his reading is that he presents “the trappings of charnel-house Gothic” as pure 
Wildean ornament, as mere decadent excess that threatens to hide Wilde’s intellectual 
lineage. But surely, the morbid rhetoric Adams identifies is a clear marker of Wilde’s 
intellectual kinship with Pater. To think otherwise is to overlook the Gothic nature of 
the grave-haunting Gioconda that Adams himself cites as the basis for Wilde’s 
reformulation of Paterian thought. Faced with the question of Wilde’s intellectual 
paternity, although Adams knows the object of his analysis is the decadent Pater of 
“Leonardo da Vinci,” he seems to yearn for a sanitized, un-Gothic Pater associated 
with Hellenism. When he writes that Wilde’s “[m]odern science might thus give 
renewed authority to a form of Platonic anamnesis” we might think he is analyzing 
Pater’s essays “Winckelmann” or “Diaphaneitè,” both of which take up that term. The 
Mona Lisa is certainly a figure for reminiscence, but insofar as she is a figure for 
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modernity, she is not the ideal emblem for memory in its specifically Hellenic guise as 
anamnesis.45  As Adams forcibly associates Leonardo’s portrait with the renewal and 
recasting of the classical doctrine of anamnesis, he is able to forget the morbidity that 
is at the heart of Pater’s description of Lady Lisa.   This amnesia produces this 
problem: when Adams dismisses the Gothic by reducing it to mere “trappings” he 
makes it difficult to see how this Gothic rhetoric is a considerable force that disrupts 
the content of Wilde’s theories. By taking seriously the stench of the charnel-house in 
Wilde’s work, and by relating it to the Paterian Gothic, we can see how Gothic 
rhetoric affects each author’s model of critical consciousness differently. 
Because she holds within her the totality of history, La Gioconda possesses a 
critical consciousness similar to the one Wilde’s critics aspire to. Yet she maintains a 
serenity that is absent in Wildean critics. It is the Mona Lisa herself, not her ancestors, 
who witnesses time passing, she herself who has died over and over again and then 
returns to live in one century as Leda or in another as St Anne. Experiences impress 
themselves on her individual soul as it passes through history. Pater uses the gothic to 
imagine the omniscience of the undead, and as the embodiment of this gothic undeath, 
Lady Lisa has no fears of the dead or dying. She is untroubled by the history she has 
witnessed, or her recurring deaths: “all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres 
and flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded the changing 
lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the hands” (99). Since Pater suggests that La 
Gioconda’s enigmatic smile was elicited by “mimes and flute-players” we understand 
that for her history’s passage is light entertainment.46 
                                                 
45
 As we have seen, for aesthetic Platonists like Pater and Wilde, anamnesis is a term associated with 
Hellenism and male same-sex eros. The Mona Lisa may possess some of “the animalism of Greece,” 
but she is also a figure antithetical to Greek classicism. If she were set “for a moment beside one of 
those white Greek goddesses of beautiful women of antiquity” they would be “troubled” (98). 
46
 In this reading I differ slightly from Andrew Eastman, who believes La Gioconda’s eyes and mouth 
express her icy irony and utter detachment. But we agree that despite her many face and lives, Mona 
Lisa history as if she were always the same. As Eastman writes she “eludes the protean identity of 
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Unlike Pater’s serene Gioconda, whose knowledge is rooted in her own diverse 
experiences, Wilde’s critics are troubled because they have inherited and incorporated 
the experiences of undead others, experiences they can never assimilate or lay claim 
to. As Jeff Nunokawa states, for Wilde, Heredity is “the agent of insinuation who 
annuls the boundaries of our own individuality by inculcating strange desires in place 
of our own” (119). Although Heredity “delivers and defines our own essential genetic 
character” it “fills us with affects that are not our own,” affects that may seem 
intolerable because “being the desires of another, they never cease to be implausible as 
our desires” (117). Nunokawa reveals the gothic face of heredity, but as soon as he 
shows it to us, he masks it again—too quickly for us to understand all the implications 
of that face: 
As common for all their strangeness, as “the tears we shed at a play,” these 
alien desires, as light as the natural need they displace is heavy, whose endless 
deferral is as easy to bear as that of the other would be impossible to live with, 
are calculated by Wilde, with all the rhetorical resources at his disposal, as a 
central benefit of art. The synthetic fervors he pictures our systems absorbing 
belong to a genus of inorganic affects what Wilde praises as “the exquisite 
sterile emotions that it is the function of Art to awaken, “exquisite sterile 
emotions which offer a safe substitute for the potent ones they replace. (117) 
As Dorian Gray knew, we have ancestors in art, and it is to this idea that Nunokawa 
turns to reassure us when he contemplates the strange susceptibilities and 
temperaments that the Wildean critic inherits. In “The Critic as Artist” Gilbert claims 
“Art does not hurt us” (116). Instead it offers us a shield from “the sordid perils of 
existence” (117). No matter then, that Heredity seems to dispossess us, Nunokawa 
says, we can be assured that it will not hurt us, since the influences we have inherited 
are “synthetic fervors” and “inorganic affects.” The problem with this move is that it 
ignores the full context in which Wilde means his theory of hereditary transmission to 
be read in. When Wilde says the imagination is “concentrated race-experience,” when 
                                                                                                                                            
mythical embodiment, experiencing the panoply of different incarnations “but as the sound of lyres and 
flutes’ her famously elusive gaze suggesting her ultimate disengagement” (83).   
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he insists that we live the lives of the dead, he clearly numbers human ancestors 
among the forebears of the critic. Their organic affects prove to be far less bearable 
than those artificial emotions that Nunokawa concentrates on form his arguments. 
Harboring the “impossible desires” of the dead within their hearts, Wilde’s hereditary 
critics are disturbed by a terrible self-division. But critics who overlook how 
degeneration theory and decadence inform Wildean heredity may minimize or miss 
this inward division. 
 Reading The Picture of Dorian Gray, James Eli Adams claims that if we 
understand Wilde’s inheriting subject in “the larger context of the rise of evolutionary 
theories of culture” that subject “represents a claim to cultural authority 
that…promises to repair the rupture of ‘completeness’ and ‘harmony’” (221). He then 
attributes Wilde’s fantasies of hereditary transmission to Herbert Spencer’s 
evolutionary theory, which, as he points out, has a teleology missing from Darwinian 
evolution (220).  Spencerian teleology would posit the final product of the 
evolutionary process as a coherent, fully realized organism whose constituent elements 
worked purposefully together in synergistic union. Therefore, insofar as Dorian is a 
Spencerian, and sees himself as the summation of all history, he would regard himself 
as a complete, harmonious system. As Adams attempts to evoke the sense of this 
inward tranquility, he repeatedly suggests synthesis. For example, when he considers 
how the legacies of heredity are represented in the body, he concentrates on their 
“fusion,” not merely to suggest that Wilde is melding together theories of biological 
and cultural inheritance, but also to suggest that any conflicting aspects of cultural 
inheritance have been reconciled because they have been summed together in a 
dialectical fashion. In other words, the myriad inherited elements that are housed in 
Dorian’s body are not co-existent and potentially conflicting; they are dissolved and 
commingled in the very blood that flows within his pulses. Adams can come to this 
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view because he derives his account of Wildean heredity by reading The Picture of 
Dorian Gray in isolation from “The Critic as Artist.” While Dorian speaks of the 
“myriad lives and myriad sensations” that constitute critical man, that “complex 
multiform creature,” he does not stress the how elements struggle against each other. 
In the “Critic as Artist,” Gilbert imagines the subjectivity of the critic as an 
anarchic zone where inherited thoughts “are at variance with each other” and where 
inherited passions “war against themselves.” Wilde deviates from the Spencerianism 
Adams describes when he indicates no teleological or discriminatory principle that 
would select one embattled passion above another. Neither does he envision a time 
when this inner conflict is resolved by the triumph of one mood over another, by 
establishing an equilibrium of balanced warring passions, or by setting up a cyclical 
system in which one mood holds sway and then gives way to another before regaining 
its rule. Without some set of regulations to govern these inherited passions, which 
have a life of their own quite apart from the will or rational consciousness of their 
owner, how would the critic use them to enable his work? Presented with an object or 
aesthetic experience about which he has inherited a number of contradictory attitudes, 
how is the critic enabled to make a judgment about the object at hand? Gilbert himself 
does not explain how, when he says: 
For who is the true critic but he who bears within himself the dreams, and 
ideas, and feelings of myriad generations, and to whom no form of thought is 
alien, no emotional impulse obscure? And who the true man of culture, if not 
he who by fine scholarship and fastidious rejection has made instinct self-
conscious and intelligent and can separate the work that has distinction from 
the work that has it not, and so by contact and comparison makes himself 
master of the secrets of style and school, and understands their meaning, and 
listens to their voices, and develops that spirit of disinterested curiosity which 
is the real root, as it is the real flower of intellectual life, and thus attains to 
intellectual clarity, and having learned “the best that is known and thought in 
the world,” lives—it is not fanciful to say so—with those who are the 
Immortals. (170) 
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Now, the preceding passage seems to trace the development of critical capability. At 
first, the critic judges unconsciously, by “instinct.” His instinct seems informed by 
what he has inherited: “the dreams, and ideas, and feelings of myriad generations” are 
unconscious principles that allow him to make aesthetic judgments. Because Wilde 
associates true criticism with self-awareness, we might describe these principles as 
proto-critical. So far, this account sounds as if it could describe Pater’s Winckelmann, 
who guided by his Hellenic, queer nature, “followed the clue of instinct, of unerring 
instinct” in order to read Greek art (176). But the difference between Pater and Wilde 
is this: for Wilde, the concept of instinct hides an underexplained moment of 
adjudication between conflicting, proto-critical elements while for Pater, “instinct” 
refers to Winckelmann’s ability to grasp the rules of criticism immediately or in 
themselves, not because he instinctively distinguishes the correct or better interpretive 
principles from incorrect or worse ones. The very metaphor of instinct as an unerring 
clue, or thread, suggests this. If we trace a rope through a labyrinth, we suspend 
judgment, making no decisions about which of two forking paths to take. In a sense, 
the right path becomes the only path since it follows the course of the thread that 
charts the way.   For Pater, instinct does not describe an unconscious decision-making 
process; rather, it is the process by which the mind responds to aesthetic impressions 
by apprehending or evolving the critical principles that correspond to stimuli. Hence 
“that world in which others had moved with so much embarrassment seems to call out 
in Winckelmann new senses fitted to deal with it.” He “catches the thread of a whole 
sequence of laws in some hollowing of the hand, or dividing of the hair” (154). 
Now, as Nunokawa reminded us, heredity is responsible for the unique 
combination of inherited aspects that defines the individual’s “own essential genetic 
character.” Insofar as the critic has the agency to adjudicate between the competing 
claims of his hereditary legacies, the power to choose, and the rationale behind 
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choosing should be rooted in that aspect of his personality that owes itself to no 
ancestor’s influence. But Wilde cedes this agency when he insists “it is not our own 
life that we lead, but the lives of the dead, and the soul that swells within us is no  
single spiritual entity making us personal and individual, created for our service and 
entering into us for our joy” (177). We might say that for Wilde, “instinct” is the name 
for some internal choice of which the critic knows the result, but it is a choice that has 
been made by the dead, without any input from their host. It is not surprising then, that 
when Dorian Gray surveys the portraits of his ancestors he wonders if all his choices 
have been determined by them, if all his deeds merely fulfill the desires that the dead 
could not satisfy in life, but harbor still in the grave. Looking at one portrait, he asks: 
Was it young Herbert’s life that he sometimes led? Had some strange 
poisonous germ crept from body to body till it had reached his own? Was it 
some dim sense of that ruined grace that had made him so suddenly, and 
almost without cause, give utterance, in Basil Hallward’s studio, to the mad 
prayer that had so changed his life? (111) 
In his speech, Gilbert seems to attribute agency to the critic by arguing that that 
through his “fine scholarship and fastidious rejection” the critic is able to make 
instinct into a “self-conscious and intelligent” hermeneutical system. Yet we must 
wonder how this is done. The critic’s ability to reject a failed art object fastidiously 
means he already possesses a form of critical self-awareness, but Wilde doesn’t 
describe where this critical awareness comes from, or what its authority is. In this 
drama of critical formation, “fine scholarship and fastidious rejection” arrive like a 
deus ex machina in order to bring the critic’s instinct under his conscious control. But 
if the critic in training is making instinctive claims about his aesthetic experiences, 
claims which are never said to be incorrect, only unconscious, why does he need or 
want to follow the hermeneutical system that underwrites the process of “fastidious 
rejection”?  
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What we see here then is that Wilde’s decadent notion of Heredity cannot 
underwrite his fantasy of independent aesthetic education. Heredity allows Wilde to 
imagine the critic a subject with incredible interior depth and complexity, as one who 
has inherited an immeasurably abundant collectivity of sensations and susceptibilities, 
legacies that should make him an autonomous critic. His education does not depend on 
others, but upon introspection and processes of self-cultivation. But as soon as the 
critic’s autonomy is established, it collapses because of the tainted model of 
inheritance that is Wilde’s Paterian legacy. 
Now, we have been attempting to situate Wilde in a tradition of liberal 
aesthetics. When he explores anamnesis, then heredity, he is attempting to write a 
personal myth that explains the aesthetic freedom of the individual, the capacity of the 
individual to have and express an aesthetic judgment that needs no authorization from 
any other person. But as “The Critic as Artist” and The Picture of Dorian Gray show, 
the specifically Gothic and decadent nature of Wildean inheritance undermines any 
notion of the individual as self-governing, private, and impervious to the invasive 
influence of other people.  This conflict between a Gothic element that is hostile to the 
autonomous individual and a discourse that promotes liberal individualism is not a 
minor or isolated confrontation in Wilde’s work. Nils Clausson argues that The 
Picture of Dorian Gray is characterized and structured by this conflict itself.  The 
novel is “disjunctively situated between two conflicting genres, each of which is 
related to one of the two antithetical literary and cultural discourses that the novel 
engages but cannot successfully integrate: namely, self-development . . . and Gothic 
degeneration” (342).We can agree with Clausson’s generic analysis of Wilde’s novel, 
and extend his diagnosis of genre trouble to “The Critic as Artist,” but we need not 
agree with the conclusions he draws from his readings. For Clausson, Dorian Gray is 
“flawed work, riven by generic dissonances” (363). He complains that the “Gothic 
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plot of degeneration takes over and eventually supersedes the incompatible Paterian 
plot of self-development and individual liberation” (343). When Wilde allows the 
Gothic plot to predominate, he dashes the “progressive hopes held out by the Paterian 
plot of self-actualization” (362), compromising the political project Clausson believes 
the novel could have advanced (344). Although Clausson acknowledges that the novel 
is a “provocative and important work” he is clearly disappointed by it (363). 
I want to eschew the dejected tone described above, a tone it is all too easy to 
adopt because the expectations of my project and of Clausson’s criticism often 
overlap. The keywords of his essay—“self-development”, “individual liberation”, 
“self-actualization”—all betray his fervent wish that Wilde’s text celebrate a self-
possessed individual who is realizing its desires. If we expect Wilde to follow the 
footsteps of his fellow aesthetes Pater and Lee, we too might be disappointed by the 
Gothic fantasy he devises to explain innate knowledge. Lee’s Vatican child and 
Pater’s ideal critic, exemplified by Winckelmann, are autonomous agents who judge 
as they please, and who are certain that their judgments are their own. They never 
wonder, unlike Wilde’s critics, if “it is not our own lives that we lead, but the lives of 
the dead.” I do not want to dismiss Wilde’s gothic narrative as merely a disruptive 
element, a textual flaw he haphazardly acquired from Pater because he was not careful 
enough to correct it. The conflict between the gothic element and the text’s narratives 
of development can teach us something about aestheticist pedagogy. To illuminate this 
lesson, let us turn to Nancy Armstrong’s work on individualism and the fin-de-siècle 
resurgence of the gothic. 
In How Novels Think: The Limits of British Individualism from 1719 – 1900, 
Armstrong compares the bourgeois realist novel with the genre of romance. Her latter 
term is wide-ranging, but the romances she actually analyzes are all Victorian gothic 
novels. For her, mainstream Victorian fiction, represented by the bourgeois realist 
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novel, “concerned itself with the problem of how to harness the individual’s energy 
for social purposes” and imagined a “social body composed of individuals positioned 
each according to his or her worth” (105). By contrast, the late Victorian romance 
imagined a social collectivity in which “the boundaries distinguishing individuals no 
longer exist” (105). Romance plots imagine “an alien form of energy that ripples 
through the human aggregate,” fusing countless individuals together. Under the assault 
of this invasive force, the individual loses discreteness to become merely one of  
“many points of intensification through which …desires circulate to form one all-
encompassing and mindless mass of humanity” (105). The “individual’s private 
storehouse of ideas is not only infiltrated but also transformed by an alien desire that 
overwhelms the internal faculty of judgment” (24). Armstrong illustrate her point with 
Dracula, arguing that when the eponymous vampire “infects the individual with his 
blood [he] robs that person of individuality” (). When Dracula feeds his blood to his 
victim, his mind melds with hers and his will becomes hers; she joins a family of 
vampires who replicate Dracula’s desire and who attempt to bring others under his 
control. Armstrong could easily have used “The Critic as Artist” or The Picture of 
Dorian Gray to illustrate her arguments. In Wilde’s texts, the fearsome force of 
heredity both constitutes and threatens the unique character of the individual. When 
Wilde’s aesthetic critics in training opine that “the soul that dwells within us is no 
single spiritual entity making us personal and individual,” they are merely pointing out 
that when we use the concept of heredity to understand kinship, we may find it 
impossible to distinguish between what is uniquely ours and what is the resurgent trait 
of some forebear. Heredity reveals to us that our name is Legion; we are merely a 
collective of alien ancestral subjectivities. 
Armstrong argues that fantastic narratives of infiltration and possession allow 
their readers to “take pleasure in [a] destructive creativity that temporarily overthrows 
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the norms of realism in order to expose its limitations as the limitations of 
individualism itself (135). For her, texts associated with the genre of romance are 
hostile to liberal individualism; they attempt to think of a world in which the ideal 
subject would need not be self-standing, autonomous, and afraid of melding with 
others in a corporate identity or community. Valorizing the vampire as an enemy that 
undermines individualism, Armstrong argues that if readers can bring themselves to 
identify with the monster and the fantastic narratives that feature it, they could learn 
how to reject a “realism designed to maintain the autonomy of nation, family, and 
individual” (139). 
Making a critical move parallel to Armstrong’s, we might ask this: if Wilde’s 
gothic heredity threatens the borders that demarcate the aesthetic critic from other 
people, must that be such a bad thing?  Determined to preserve the aesthetic sphere as 
a zone where the perceiver retained absolute authority to judge art, the aesthetes 
assured their followers that all people inherently possessed the attributes they needed 
to be self-sufficient and independent art critics. They freed their listeners from needing 
to consult experts for an authoritative reading of an aesthetic object. Yet when they 
aesthetes celebrate the critic’s self-sufficiency, they often come close to celebrating 
atomism. In its most paranoid form, the aesthetes’ praise of critical autonomy sounds 
like a rejection of all intercourse with others. To the suspicious aesthete anxiously 
guarding the individual’s right to expression, other people pose an ever-present threat. 
They may influence, change or subvert the individual’s impressions in ways he cannot 
detect. They may ridicule his judgment rather than respectfully disagreeing with it. 
Recall that when Pater grows wary about the risks other people pose, he redefines 
social intercourse, claiming that the essential or prototypical dialogue is the “dialogue 
of the mind with itself” (Plato 129). It is this same wariness that causes him to claim 
that the central business of education is to interest a young man in himself, a goal 
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Pater deems far more important “than …making him interested in other people or 
things” (Plato 80).  Pater confronts the danger that social interaction poses by 
reinforcing the borders of the self, making the individual self-sufficient and keeping 
other people far away from the individual. But if these strategies are the only or 
primary response to the threat posed by other people, the aesthetic critic cannot admit 
that some people will find pleasure in interacting with others as they explore the 
aesthetic realm. Moreover, some individuals have no desire to have a private, utterly 
idiosyncratic impression of an artwork. Pater believed that  “in aesthetic criticism, the 
first step towards seeing one’s object as it really is, is to know one’s own impression 
as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly” (Renaissance xix). However, 
the Aesthetic Movement was home to several artistic and critical partnerships whose 
members represented their collaborative thinking and writing processes as a melding 
in which the subjective boundaries between collaborators were lost or blurred. Perhaps 
the most famous of these partnerships occurred between Katherine Bradley and Edith 
Cooper, who wrote poetry as if they were a single entity named Michael Field. For 
subjects like Bradley and Cooper who experience their full vitality as “we” not “I,” the 
injunction to know “one’s own impression” might be dangerously divisive, an edict 
that seeks to estrange one part of a whole from its mate.  
Bradley and Cooper were friends with Wilde, and as they read his texts, they 
may have identified with Wildean characters who invoke the Gothic to describe their 
subjectivities as collective rather than single, as permeable rather than inviolably 
bounded. Yet this recognition could only have been partial. When Michael Field 
describes merging and collaboration, they are wholly positive processes. By contrast, 
the Gothic model of intersubjectivity Wilde imagines is indissociable from 
degeneration, monstrosity, and morbidity. These negative qualities cause Nancy 
Armstrong to give only qualified approval to the anti-individual politics of the late-
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Victorian romance.  According to her, although the romance is interested in non-
individualist modes of understanding the subjectivity, because it has been developed 
during the hegemony of the liberal bourgeois realist novel, it cannot help but portray 
those modes as monstrous and ultimately unlivable. Because romance “equates the 
pleasure of escaping the limits of individualism with the loss of humanity itself [it] 
ultimately compels us to defend individualism at any cost” (135). In other words, for 
Armstrong, the agents that refuse autonomy in Gothic narratives are entities we cannot 
want to be, at least not permanently. Endowed with an inhuman and supernatural 
strength, they demolish the walls and structures that separate individuals; they free us 
from the strictures of individualism by assimilating us into their own monstrous, 
collective bodies. But we cannot remain alive if we are to enjoy the freedoms these 
Gothic agents bring. 
Armstrong overstates her case. For certain subjects, the risk of becoming 
inhuman is not necessarily a deterrent to a particular political course. (One might think 
of Lee Edelman, whose queer ethics in No Future is grounded in the concept of 
becoming undead and embodying the death drive). Nevertheless, even if some of us 
readily identify with or become the monstrous agents of Gothic narrative, others of us 
cannot. We might take the Gothic elements that appear so strangely in Wilde’s 
pedagogical narratives as a provocation then, a challenge to find non-Gothic rhetoric 
and non-Gothic plots with which we could refuse liberal conceptions of individualism. 
The virtue of Wilde’s work on aestheticist pedagogy is its peripatetic nature. 
When we read his work, we can never be satisfied with one position or one solution to 
a problem because his texts never settle for these resting points.  To follow Wilde in 
quest of an answer is wearying, frustrating. However, as he refuses to give us a final 
answer, he models an unceasing process of critique that we can adopt in order to think 
more deeply about those answers that others settle upon. Wilde has no stable myth of 
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innate knowledge. As we have seen, he adopts, then abandons an epistemological 
myth based upon anamnesis, and his attempt to ground innate knowledge in heredity 
also fails. Yet Wilde’s incoherent myths help to show the limits of his fellow 
aesthetes’ projects, and in so doing can help further the ideals that he shares with 
them.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Here Endeth the Lesson, or Towards an Erotics of Art 
 
Imagine that today Pater, Wilde, or Lee were to return from the grave like one 
of the revenants that so often haunt aestheticist texts. Visiting the classrooms of some 
Oxford college—Brasenose or perhaps Magdalen—they might be appalled to find that 
their critical texts had become objects of formal literary study. Today, students rarely 
approach aestheticism’s critical texts without professorial aid, yet Jonathan Freedman 
writes of grateful nineteenth-century readers who turned directly to aesthetic criticism 
in order to learn how to gather the greatest aesthetic experiences “from this artist, this 
natural scene, and not from that one or that one” (Professions 56). For these readers, 
the works of aesthetes such as Pater or Lee were illuminating, accessible guides to art. 
When The Renaissance first appeared, one reviewer praised its “considerable learning 
and acumen” but assured readers that Pater did not “parade” his intelligence in his 
pages, which contained “not a single sign of more than common study or of recondite 
knowledge” (Stephens 80).  Nowadays, aestheticist guidebooks are read as texts that 
demand their own guides. The aesthetic conventions that govern them have made them 
puzzling artistic masterpieces in their own right. As common use of English has 
changed and as standards governing critical and argumentative style have shifted over 
the last century, the style of aestheticist textbooks has arguably become more difficult 
for its readers to comprehend. Furthermore, texts like The Renaissance, Belcaro and 
Intentions have increasingly become abstruse intellectual documents. The decades 
have distanced contemporary audiences from the personal professional quarrels and 
philosophical debates in which the texts participate.    
 195 
 While Pater’s Victorian critic believed he could be understood after merely 
“common study,” nowadays, the critic Adam Phillips (and those like him) stresses the 
text’s difficult nature: 
The Renaissance now looks like what we have come to think of as a modernist 
text. It is densely self-referential: providing intermittently, an implied 
commentary and critique of itself. It is also, through the endless qualifications 
of its elaborate style, drawing attention, sometimes obtrusively, to its own  
medium. . . . It even includes in its first two sentences a hint about how to read 
it. (vii) 
In Phillips’ description, Pater’s text is only “now” becoming comprehensible to 
readers through the category of modernism. Twentieth century audiences are just 
beginning to understand and manage the strangeness of the aestheticist textbook by 
categorizing it and by listing its characteristics. Despite readers’ dawning 
understanding, the text will not be mastered with ease. The language with which it is 
written “obtrusively” draws the reader’s attention from its arguments. Although it is 
“densely self-referential,” as if advertising that it has some message to impart, it is 
ultimately coy, reticent: the critique of itself it can offer is only “implied.” It will not 
clearly state how it wants to be read; it will only “hint” how it should be engaged. 
Phillips implies that only a special personality who can discern The Renaissance’s 
subtextual critique, grasp its hints or overlook its distracting, ornate style. He is one of 
these perspicacious persons—a critic—and that is why he is writing an introduction 
for the Oxford World’s Classics edition of Pater’s text. Here then is an ironic 
circumstance: the very texts which argued that the people needed no guide to help 
them interpret aesthetic experience currently require critics who can contextualize, 
historicize and explicate them. 
We have examined Pater, Lee, and Wilde’s fantasy that art itself might come to 
life and aid its observers to appreciate it correctly. The idea that art itself could stir, 
address its viewers, and instruct them in the ways of connoisseurship allowed 
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aesthetes to imagine an ideal world in which experts did not reserve the final word on 
aesthetic judgments. This animation can never happen, but nevertheless, the aesthetes’ 
fancy suggests practical steps we can take in order to promote the ideal they 
envisioned.  When the aesthetic critics dream of living art that erotically engages and 
enlightens the observer, they are imagining a world in which intimacy with art might 
generate comprehension. For them, art seems like a vital thing because it is immediate. 
Hence Pater’s Gaston de Latour craves  “a poetry, as veritable, as intimately near, as 
corporeal, as the new faces of the hour, the flowers of the actual season” (27). Dorian 
Gray also experiences art as an ineludibly proximate living force. After he has first 
heard Lord Henry’s oratory, he thinks: “Words! Mere words! How terrible they were! 
How clear, and vivid and cruel! One could not escape from them” (21). 
When we teach then, we must ask ourselves, how do we make aestheticist texts 
vivid and vital for our students? If texts seem to have a vitality the more “intimately 
near” that we can come to them, then how do we encourage our students to approach 
texts closely? How do we need to present the process of textual analysis in order to 
make intimacy with texts a prerequisite for intellectual inquiry? Once we orient 
students towards texts, once they have begun to scrutinize the texts, how can we defer 
the moment when we must interrupt their communion by interposing our critical 
judgments and our critical prescriptions between the readers and the text?  
One name for the process of becoming intimate with a text is “close-reading.” 
By deferring questions of sociological context, political import and aesthetic value, by 
diligently considering the way a text’s constituent parts produce this set of meanings 
or negate that mode of interpretation, readers focus on the immediate impressions the 
text gives them. To close-read is to scrutinize the text’s account of itself, to understand 
the text through the terms it offers readers most eagerly. If, as Pater writes, gaining 
knowledge of a text is like getting to know a person, the techniques of close-reading 
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are akin to the observational practices that acquaint us those we wish to know most 
deeply. Close-reading is a type of benign dismemberment, a fetishistic dissection of 
the text. Confronted by the plenitude of a novel or poem, we excise a few words or a 
passage, scrutinizing the parts in order to understand the whole. As Roland Barthes 
writes “To scrutinize means to search: I am searching the other’s body, as if I wanted 
to see what was inside it. . . (I am like one of those children who take a clock apart in 
order to find out what time is)” (71). To read closely is to enter a deeply sensuous—
even erotic—relationship with cultural objects, a relationship so intimate, that readers 
may feel they are merging with the texts they engage. Describing her literary 
experiences as a young person, Eve Sedgwick captures this lovingly close union: “For 
me, a kind of formalism, a visceral near-identification with the writing I cared for, at 
the level of sentence structure, metrical pattern, rhyme, was one way of trying to 
appropriate what seemed the numinous and resistant power of the chosen objects” (3). 
Close-reading is not a simple or obvious approach to reading texts; students are 
often confused by it and resistant to learning it. When we are encouraging them to 
become intimate with texts, we must keep in mind technology like internet search 
engines and online encyclopedias. Confronted by a challenging text, students often 
turn to Internet tools such as Google or Wikipedia, tools that make it easy for them to 
locate literary criticism that will explicate baffling textual characteristics. If the text is 
canonical, enjoyed a recent critical vogue or is currently popular as a teaching text, 
students need not grapple with it in order to derive their own reading of it; they can 
find a wealth of online commentary that will supply them with opinions of texts to 
which they can subscribe. Although we must teach students to evaluate and employ 
the critical and theoretical arguments of others, aestheticist texts ask that readers first 
know their own impressions of the objects they engage. Non-canonical or newly 
recovered texts on which there is a dearth of critical material are vital to any syllabus 
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on aestheticism. If we introduce these underanalyzed texts alongside canonical ones 
and stress comparative approaches towards understanding them, students will form 
readings based less upon the criticism of others than upon on the immediate 
impressions they derive from the paired texts. For example, by contrasting Wilde’s 
“Critic as Artist” with Lee’s little discussed “A Dialogue on Poetic Morality” students 
might discover for themselves how an aesthete’s gender affects her use of the dialogue 
as an pedagogical genre.  
Students who have started to close-read aestheticist texts are apt to notice their 
intertextual and referential nature. Critical texts such as Belcaro and The Renaissance 
necessarily list and describe a variety of artworks. Additionally, even aestheticist 
novels such as Marius the Epicurean and The Picture of Dorian Gray sometimes seem 
little more than bibliographies or museum catalogs. Aestheticist poetry follows this 
trend as well; each ekphrastic poem that composes Michael Field’s Sight and Song is 
titled after the painting that inspired it. Observing this referential characteristic, we 
might argue that not only do aestheticist texts ask that their readers attend to their own 
formal peculiarities, they also direct their readers to become familiar with other works 
of art. For example, as if to make it easier for readers to pursue particular aesthetic 
experiences, Field’s poems report the institutions where particular paintings can be 
found. If readers cannot or have not actually encountered the works to which an 
aestheticist text alludes, that text’s argument or narrative is compromised because it is 
not as vividly present to the reader as it wishes to be. 
Aestheticist texts imagine that their readers are Europeans who can easily visit 
the Grosvenor or make a grand tour of the continental museums, but contemporary 
students of aestheticism are not necessarily as well-placed as the texts suppose. When 
we teach aestheticist literature, we must devise ways for students to approximate the 
experience of viewing in person the objects described and catalogued by the text. 
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Anyone who has taught The Renaissance in a literature class will know that many 
students are quite content to read Pater’s descriptions of Botticelli’s Madonnas without 
actually looking closely at any of Botticelli’s work. Even Pater’s paean to 
La Gioconda does not cause such students to re-view the Mona Lisa; they trust that 
their memory of the iconic painting is all they need to understand Pater’s purple 
passage. Luckily, technology has made it possible for us to show high quality 
photographs of paintings and sculpture or to play recordings of musical or theatrical 
performances. Many of the institutions the aesthetes were urging their readers to visit 
now have virtual exhibitions that are accessible through the internet. Some of the 
institutions in which we teach are even privileged enough to have art museums and 
library archives that possess works by artists the aesthetes championed. Close-reading 
is the fundamental skill that allows students to examine the form of aestheticist 
literature, to see how aestheticist texts say what they say. But if we are to make what 
aestheticist texts say seem vibrant, we must also make what they say seem more 
immediate to the student. The interdisciplinary study of aestheticism ensures that 
students experience the process of reading literature in the most sensuous way 
possible, in a way that engages the senses most fully by giving them a superabundance 
of material to act upon. 
The aesthetes explicitly argued that if their readers could experience the 
artwork that inspired their criticism and fictional narratives, readers would better 
understand those texts. For example, Vernon Lee insists that her critical ideas about 
aesthetics “have come mainly in the presence of works of art” (6), emphasizing that 
thought is generated and enlivened by setting—the “real, living, shimmering setting” 
one occupies as part of a particular public at a specific place and time (6). When she 
describes her ideas separate from the setting occupied by the artwork, she evokes 
death. “In order to endure, they had, these ideas, to be removed out of all this living 
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frame-work; to be written down . . . to be made quite lifeless and inorganic and dry 
and stiff” (6). Convinced that “art questions should always be discussed in the 
presence of some definite work of art” Lee experiments with her critical style in order 
to approximate for the reader some sense of the vivacious, sensuous objects that 
inspired her.  She crafts Belcaro as an artificial setting “which should in a manner be 
equivalent to that original real setting of place and moment, and individuality and 
digression: equivalent as an acre of garden, with artificial rocks, streams, groves, 
grottoes, places for losing your way, flower-beds etc, is equivalent for all the country 
you can travel over in five or six years” (8). 
As they languorously unfold their arguments, Belcaro’s lengthy, syntactically 
complex sentences slow readers, who must amble through the text, just as they might 
amble through an art gallery’s chambers. Having retarded readers’ progress, Lee 
confronts them with such a surfeit of polished writing—adjective upon recherché 
adjective, parenthetical remarks, strings of appositives—that they can hardly avoid 
examining the aesthetic qualities of her own writing. And yet, as she writes, her 
primary goal is not to call attention to her own text as a work of art, but to direct 
readers towards sensuous representations of other artists’ work. Those who frequent 
museums may have desultorily followed labyrinthine paths through this and that room, 
only to be arrested by the sight of a painting that dominates a wall or a lone bust that is 
spotlight in the darkness of an antechamber. Just as readers are about to become 
frustrated by Lee’s cheerful digressiveness and verbosity, she rewards their patience 
by displaying an absorbing natural scene or aesthetic object; Belcaro teems with 
ekphrastic passages that detail art objects for the mind’s eye.  
Lee’s ekphrastic criticism demonstrates how we may modify critical style in 
order to promote intimacy between our students and the art objects they observe.   She 
suggests is that it is not enough for criticism to direct the reader towards a particular 
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art object. Although criticism wishes the reader to come into contact with the artwork 
itself,   this encounter may not be immediately possible. In advance of the aesthetic 
rendez-vous, criticism must provide its reader with the sense of the object that is to 
come; it must perform and evoke the attributes of the art object as best it can with the 
resources of literary style. Some contemporary criticism endeavors to do this and it 
deserves incorporation into courses on aestheticism. In Against Interpretation, styling 
herself as heir to Wilde and Pater, Susan Sontag calls herself a “pugnacious aesthete” 
and argues: “The aim of all commentary on art now should be to make works of art—
and, by analogy, our own experience—more, rather than less, real to us” (13). 
Therefore, criticism should “supply a really accurate, sharp, loving description of the 
appearance of a work of art” (13). In calling for this descriptive criticism, Sontag 
might have in mind Wilde’s definition of the critic as “he who can translate into 
another manner or a new material his impression of beautiful things” (Dorian Gray 4); 
Lee’s evocative criticism is merely one means of achieving this Wildean translation, 
and contemporary critics might emulate or modify when they need to present texts for 
analysis. 
Aestheticist texts ask teachers to minimize their role in the educational process. 
Rather than represent themselves as authorities to be consulted for the right 
interpretation of an painting, or the proper theory with which to understand a novel, 
teachers should train students to consult aesthetic objects themselves for the answers 
to questions about art. However, when we teach about aestheticism, we may find that 
our very field of study drives us to assert ourselves as experts.  
Many teachers observe a discrepancy between the level of expertise they 
believe themselves to have and the level of expertise attributed to them by students, 
the subjects who wish to know. Many teachers are troubled because they feel they 
must instruct without possibly being able to know everything about their objects of 
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study. However, the discursive boundaries of certain fields of study may cause some 
of us to feel these anxieties more acutely than others. As Andrew Eastham observes, 
scholarship and pedagogy that concern Aestheticism must be interdisciplinary:  
It’s reasonable to assume that any teacher working in this area has at some 
point had to temporarily forge an intellectual identity well outside the confines 
of their research: it is arguably simply not enough to be a literary scholar to 
teach Aestheticism and Decadence, and we may have to temporarily don the 
mask of the critic of painting, architecture, music or dance. (Eastham, 
“Teaching” n.p.).  
For Eastham, since Aestheticism and Decadence are fields that encompass “such a 
vast array of European literary and artistic reference” teachers “cannot hope to master 
all contexts” (n.p.). He lists the myriad theoretical sources that inform the work of just 
a few aesthetes, implicitly asking his readers if they are thoroughly conversant with 
“Kant, Schiller, Fichte and Hegel, British Empiricism, Spencer’s Sociology and the 
Natural Sciences” (n.p.). Even if teachers claim that they are “master of these 
intellectual traditions, another scholar will claim that late Victorian periodicals” or 
some other source are vital for explicating aestheticism Eastham concludes, “Any 
teacher thus faces a choice; do we limit the archive to a space where the teacher 
retains a safe grasp on academic authority, or do we open our study beyond the 
borders of our knowledge – allow for a sea of textual echoes that we will never quite 
have control over?” (n.p.) 
 Addressing his colleagues, Eastham presents the issue of delimiting the 
pedagogical archive as a set of choices that primarily affect the instructor’s sense of 
control. We should remember that when mastery-seeking teachers shrink the archive’s 
perimeter, students lose access to texts. They miss the chance to encounter texts that 
have been abjected from the archive and they lose direct routes of access to the texts 
and bodies of knowledge that are being taught. There would be little point in 
attempting to maintain academic authority if that mastery could not be ostentatiously 
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performed and therefore, teachers who shore up authority by merely teaching what 
they already know well guard their authority jealously. They interpose their textual 
interpretations between the student and the text, squelching or deferring learners’ 
opportunity to develop and assert their own independent, authoritative readings of 
texts.  
Teachers who are daunted by the vast disciplinary field of Aestheticism should 
remember that they need not be the sole informative source in the classroom. Students 
bring with them knowledge that is often different or even more advanced than that of 
their teachers. When they are trained to read carefully and articulate their points of 
view critically, students can become co-teachers, covering areas that we are less 
familiar with. As teachers, we must quell our craving for mastery. The difficulty of 
this renunciation can be seen in Eastham’s remarks on teaching. Although he desires 
educational situations in which teachers would not need to base their authority to teach 
on a masterful omniscience, the way he describes his ideal educational process works 
against the pedagogical possibilities he works to realize.  
Eastham recounts “being forced to dissimulate a specialty in fin de siècle 
visual culture to a mixed group of Fine Art and Literature students.” He then argues 
that when teachers assume their forged identity “a pact emerges – if the students are 
implicitly aware that we are learning on the job, we hope for their generosity in 
allowing for a shared discovery. This kind of experience is integral to an area where 
we cannot hope to master all contexts, especially since British Aestheticism and 
Decadence incorporates such a vast array of European literary and artistic reference.” 
Eastham’s pact should create the conditions for students to find intimacy with texts. If 
students are no longer obliged to regard teachers as experts or to privilege teachers’ 
critical commentary over their own understanding, they can engage aestheticist texts 
directly, more closely, which is what those texts desire. Yet the promise of Eastham’s 
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pact is not fully realized in his comments on pedagogy. Although he acknowledges 
that aestheticism is a field in which one “cannot hope to master all contexts” he still 
seems to believe that it is necessary to “dissimulate” mastery. Why does he not simply 
divulge to his students that he is not a specialist, in visual culture? In writing his 
account of teaching, why does he not discredit the idea that teachers must project the 
aura of expertise?  After all, he believes that students are capable of a “generosity” 
that allows them to conceive the pedagogical relationship as an intellectual partnership 
between student and teacher, rather than a system in which the teacher instills 
knowledge. Why not call on that generosity as soon as the pedagogical relationship 
begins? Eastham only hopes for the students’ goodwill, never suggesting that it can be 
appealed to directly or that it might be a quality to develop in students. Furthermore, 
he only hopes for this good-naturedness in the event that students are “implicitly 
aware” of his imposture. In his account, the egalitarian educational scenario of teacher 
and student discovering knowledge together emerges only because the teacher 
suspects that he can be exposed as less than omniscient. By contrast the aestheticist 
texts of this study imagine the “shared discovery” of learning as an inherently 
desirable goal. Pater praises the Socrates who professes his ignorance and therefore 
“does not propose to teach anything,” but who is willing “‘along with you’ and if you 
concur ‘to consider to seek out what the thing may be’” (Plato 160). Lee repeatedly 
refuses the title of the all-knowing professor, preferring to imagine herself as a 
schoolboy who has been able to learn some things, but who is eager to confer with 
“his fellow pupils who may have  understood as much of the lessons as himself, but 
have in all probability understood different portions or in different ways” (Belcaro 5). 
As these examples show, the aesthetes’ ideal of intellectual fellowship presumes that 
in the quest for knowledge each fellow has close contact with the objects or texts that 
will reveal knowledge. 
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 As students seek knowledge in our classrooms, they should be guided by the 
following protocol. First, they should consult the texts they study, then their own 
experience and that of their peers, and then they should turn to our expertise. This does 
not mean that teachers should not intervene to correct the errors that students 
necessarily make when they are reading a text, but students must be taught not to rely 
upon the teacher’s guidance to save them from making mistakes. Mistakes are part of 
the risk we take when we expose ourselves directly to the text. To impart this protocol, 
we can develop pedagogical exercises that center around textual engagement and 
which defer the moment when the teacher offers an interpretation. For instance, the 
week before I first lecture on an aestheticist text, I ask my students to select and close-
read a passage from the text. Then, they use their close reading to generate a question 
about the text, posting both the textual analysis and question to an online message 
board. Finally, I ask students to post an online response to at least one of their peers’ 
concerns, basing that response in a close-reading of the text. While I refer to these 
postings in seminars, and use them to steer group discussion, I refrain from responding 
to students on the message board itself. In this way I establish that space as a zone 
where students must engage intimately with the text, using it, not me, to support their 
arguments for their peers.     
 It is all too easy to think of aestheticist texts as inaccessible tomes, texts that 
one can only appreciate by appealing to a wise expert who holds the key to these 
arcane works. But it is clear that this is not the only way these texts present 
themselves.  They wish that readers will pick them up and dare to get close to them. 
They promise us that they will teach us how to understand them. Those of us who 
teach on aestheticism will surely find our jobs easier if we stop presenting ourselves as 
intermediaries or interpreters for aestheticist texts. Instead, we need to figure out how  
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to foster intimacy between aestheticist texts and their readers, intimacy that will 
produce greater understanding, intimacy that will allow these texts to divulge their 
own secrets. 
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